
© Andreas Lehner | CC BY 2.0
For those who have been following Venezuela closely in recent years there is a distinct sense of déjà vu regarding US foreign policy towards that South American nation. This is because Washington's strategy of regime change in Venezuela is almost identical to the approach it has taken in Latin America on numerous occasions since World War Two. This strategy
involves applying economic sanctions, extensive support for the opposition, and destabilization measures that create a sufficient degree of human suffering and chaos to justify a military coup or direct US military intervention. Because this strategy has worked so well for the United States for more than half a century, our elected leaders see no reason not to use it regarding Venezuela. In other words, from Washington's perspective, its regime change policies towards Venezuela constitute business as usual in Latin America.
Despite US rhetoric, this regime change strategy
does not take into account whether or not a government is democratically elected or the human rights consequences of such interventions. In fact, virtually all of the Latin American governments that the United States has successfully overthrown over the past 65 years were democratically elected. Among the democratically-elected leaders that have been ousted were Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), Salvador Allende in Chile (1973), Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti (2004) and Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009). Washington targeted all these leaders with economic sanctions and destabilization campaigns that created the economic chaos and humanitarian crises required to justify a military solution.
The common denominator in all those cases had
nothing to do with democracy or human rights, it was the fact that those elected
governments had the audacity to challenge US interests in the region. The fact that a Latin American government might prioritize the interests of its own people over US needs is unacceptable in Washington. This attitude was exhibited by CIA director George Tenet during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February 2002 when he arrogantly declared that Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez "probably doesn't have the interests of the United States at heart." Two months later, Washington supported a military coup that attempted to overthrow the Venezuelan leader.
Comment: The example of the multi-layered operational pushback on BDS should be a red alert as to the depth and breadth of intel manipulation and defamation capabilities to threaten, sway, compromise, target, falsely implicate and defame anyone, anywhere, anytime for any reason.