Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko
In Donbass, people are once again speaking of an impending war with Ukraine. Rumors of war spread throughout the people's republics from time to time, usually twice a year, but the current deterioration of the situation on the front bodes something far beyond a "seasonal escalation." If alarmist forecasts are confirmed, then we will see not only more provocations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but full-scale combat operations entailing the prospect of drawing Russian and NATO armed forces into the conflict. In other words, what was successfully avoided in Syria, i.e., a collision between Russian and American troops, could very well happen in Donbass.
The latest spark that could ignite war between the Kiev regime and the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (and possibly both sides' respective allies) is the law on "reintegrating" Donbass adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on January 18th.
This event coincides not only with the delivery of lethal offensive weapons to Ukraine by the United States (at the expense of the American budget) and Canada, but also with the Kiev regime's concentration of all its available coercive resources at the borders of the DPR and LPR.
Thus, the legal, military, strategic, and technological preconditions for a full-scale war are being prepared. All that remains is waiting for the appropriate political conditions, and also suitable weather conditions for Ukrainian troops to go on the offensive.
But let's not get ahead of ourselves. For the sake of avoiding the false alarmism which so often afflicts evaluations and forecasts on Donbass, let us consider in detail the content of the new, controversial and scandalous Ukrainian law, and try to grasp the motives of the Ukrainian side and its Western allies.
The draft law "On Particularities of State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine's State Sovereignty over the Temporarily Occupied Territories in the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions," which has in political and public circles been christened the "reintegration law", was first submitted before the closing of the summer session of the Verkhovna Rada by deputies of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. The document itself was developed deep within the presidential administration.
Following heated discussions in the Rada and clashes outside of the parliament, the bill was sent back for revision, and the vote for the bill on January 16th failed, as Verkhovna Rada deputies did not recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics as "terrorist organizations." The corresponding amendment of the bill on reintegrating Donbass was voted for by only 76 out of 340 parliamentarians.
This preliminary result was welcomed by many in Russia with inflated and, as it has subsequently turned out, unjustifiable optimism. Indeed, on January 18th, during its next vote, the document had all of it's i's dotted, as Verkhovna Rada deputies approved the bill. According to the Ukrainian parliament's speaker, Andrey Parubiy, 280 deputies voted in favor (226 were needed).
The main provisions of the final version of the bill, which overall was subjected to more than 300 amendments and suggestions, have been assessed in the following way by the Ukrainian publication Vesti. Allow us to discuss this editorial's points at length and include our own comments broken down into several key points.
1. The key point of the law is that "Russia is recognized as a state-occupier, and the governments of the 'republics' as occupational administrations." As many might recall, Ukraine originally justified the war in Donbass in ideological terms as a struggle against "terrorists and separatists." But by around summer 2017, this conceptualization of the conflict had dramatically changed. The essence of the new line was that Ukraine is waging war for its territorial integrity not against "terrorists and separatists of Donbass" (i.e., an internal enemy), but against an "aggressor country." Ukraine's main enemy in Donbass has been declared, as expectedly follows, to be Russia, which is accused of temporarily occupying territory in South-Eastern Ukraine.
Therefore, the main emphasis in the document which the Verkhovna Rada examined has changed, and in the very "evolutionary" way which the Ukrainian state opted for following its signing of Minsk 2. Therefore, positive assessments of the outcome of the first vote on the bill appear unnecessary, as they were caused by a lack of understanding concerning the conceptual changes which the new bill entails.
Perhaps no less significant is the second part of the same point's thesis on "occupational administrations." This title means that all residents of the DPR and LPR fall under the scope of the Ukrainian criminal code for having in one way or another "collaborated" with republican authorities, i.e., "occupation administrators."
Hundreds of thousands of people have been involved in the civil and military administration of the Donbass republics in both leading and rank-and-file positions, including 25,000 to 30,000 who have fought in the DPR and LPR militias, served as law enforcement employees, or participated in republican and municipal level organs, etc.
The broad interpretation of this norm will turn practically all citizens of the people's republics into potential defendants. Any documents not recognized by Ukraine - which means all documents issued by the DPR and LPR besides birth certificates - and economic or social appeals to authorities could all be interpreted by Ukraine as legal grounds for prosecuting a Donbass resident.
Finally, collective guilt could also be applied, which would convict the majority of citizens of the DPR and LPR who voted in the independence referenda on May 11, 2014.
2. Moving on, according to Vesti: "The President will obtain expanded powers as commander-in-chief of the army - and none other than the army will now become the leading force." According to some Ukrainian opposition politicians and political analysts, this norm is central: the whole essence of the law is in expanding the authority, including the coercive prerogatives of the president, thus turning him into a figure wielding dictatorial power.
In my opinion, this is a strong exaggeration. However, we cannot but agree that the realization of this postulate could temporarily alleviate domestic political and social conflicts in Ukraine via what would essentially be wartime law, as it could allow for much for the protest movement to be dispersed and even massacred.
I would refrain from exaggerating this aspect of the law, however, given the anarchy of Ukrainian statehood and the complex foreign policy context in which post-Maidan Ukraine is immersed. President Poroshenko is too severely limited by his commitments and obligations to foreign allies and patrons to use any newfound authorities as life-saving tools in his battle against the domestic, now largely pro-American, opposition.
3. Next: "The term 'ATO' (Anti-Terrorist Operation' is being replaced with that of 'measures for ensuring state sovereignty.'" This phrasing is totally consistent with the logic of the document's wording, as it shifts the focus from internal causes (such as the reality that the civil war in Ukraine is a result of a Nazi-oligarch coup) to external explanations.
4. According to one of the deputies who debated amendments to the law, Verkhovna Rada deputy Ivan Vinnik: "The powers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be clearly deregulated - in particular, they will receive the prerogative to use weapons without fear." This distinction pointed out by a Ukrainian MP deserves fundamental clarification: under the new law, the UAF's authorization to use weapons will not be de-regulated, but in fact maximally expanded.
In particular, all restrictions will be lifted on the use of weapons by UAF servicemen and other Ukrainian security forces, as well as paramilitary groups. Extrajudicial killings of those involved in "occupation activities" (P. 1) will allow the number of judicial proceedings to be reduced, thus saving the Ukrainian state time and energy to protect itself against reputation loss and accusations of violating civil rights.
As has been pointed out repeatedly, the law's text lacks any mention of adhering to the Minsk Agreements. In spirit and letter, the "reintegration law" de facto cancels Minsk.
Thus, the conflict in Donbass is reinterpreted in the new law as an act of foreign aggression whose source is officially declared to be the "aggressor" - Russia. Nevertheless, the parliamentary majority in the Verkhovna Rada did not dare to take the law to its logical conclusion, i.e., by severing diplomatic relations with Russia, severing trade and economic ties, and declaring war. But this is precisely what the Nazi street movements, who have staged especially large protests in recent months, have been demanding from Rada deputies. According to some authoritative observers, such as Pogrebinsky, this speaks to the fact that the law is aimed at addressing such domestic issues, such as appeasing the Nazi street movements (so-called "radicals") by publicly insinuating that the conflict is with the "Russian aggressor." Based on this logic, the reintegration law is a palliative simulation of fighting Russia ultimately masking President Poroshenko and the entire Ukrainian ruling elite's reluctance to opt for a real war.
Confirmation or refutation of this point of view can be found in analyzing the current military, political, and foreign policy context of Ukraine's confrontation with Donbass. This will be the subject of the second part of our article.
Part 2
Ukraine's new "reintegration" law has been unambiguously perceived as an act of preparation for war in Donbass not only by Russia, but also some European countries. In a special comment on the matter, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Verkhovna Rada's new bill on "reintegrating" Donbass confirms suspicions that Kiev wants to resolve the "problem" of the territories not under its control by military force. The reintegration law contradicts the Minsk Agreements and gives Ukrainian President Poroshenko "unlimited, close to dictatorial powers to suppress dissent and discontent." The foreign ministry's document additionally stresses that there is no other way to see this law other than as an act of preparation for war. Russia's legislators have offered similar evaluations of the bill.
Kiev's new law has also been met with suspicion in Germany, which is one of the official guarantors of the Minsk Agreements. The German government, represented by its head of information, Steffen Seibert, stated that Berlin intends to "check" the new Donbass reintegration law. According to Seibert, the reason for the need to carefully inspect this law and its implications is that the bill puts the Minsk Agreements on the back burner.
Meanwhile, in Ukrainian expert circles, the view is widespread that the the "reintegration" law is geared towards the domestic political situation as a means of temporarily appeasing the Nazi street movements. This view, however, is discredited by an analysis of the political and military situation in the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone, which can summarize as follows.
Ukraine's military command has concentrated all of its manpower and vehicles along the borders of the Donbass republics. Over the course of all of 2017, Ukrainian, DPR, and LPR information resources periodically published reports on the movement of Ukrainian army units out of Ukraine's interior districts and towards the frontline to the point of even leaving Ukraine's border with the West, i.e., the EU countries of Eastern Europe, practically exposed.
We also know that in 2017, UAF units that had been serving along the border with Russian Crimea were deployed to Donbass. Reports have also suggested the presence in the ATO zone of military vehicles and equipment from the quarantine zone of the Chernobyl disaster. First of all, the use of such equipment threatens the health and lives of Ukrainian soldiers, which is either a sign of desperation or preparation for loss of life - or both. Secondly, the technical condition of such hardware should also be taken into account. The employment of such equipment produced in the 1980's and long outworn its use suggests that Ukraine is mobilizing all available resources for a concentrated assault, a blitzkrieg, against the republics of Donbass. Equipment from the Chernobyl quarantine zone and other unsuitable hardware might be intended as a first wave to break through the DPR and LPR's first line of defense. As far as we can tell, the lion's share of these weapons (and the combat crews operating them) are thus pawns to be destroyed in the first assault wave. From discussions with my friends in Donetsk, I've also heard of the arrival to the demarcation line of Buk anti-aircraft rocket systems.
In addition, in 2017, Ukraine is known to have worked on improving its mobilization plans, such as accelerating the training of junior officers, whose deficit has been keenly felt in the ATO zone. The graduates of the military departments of civilian universities are to receive accelerated four-month programs, upon the completion of which they'll achieve the ranking of junior officers. Thus, the UAF aims to eliminate the shortage of officer corps in Donbass, and the graduates of military departments are to be mobilized in the event of a new conflict.
More resources for mobilization have been found in the face of ATO veterans, who have completed their military service or gone into the reserves. Meanwhile, President Poroshenko has announced that the Ukrainian military budget's expenditures in 2018 will increase by 37%, or to $732 million. This sharp increase in military spending is to come at the expense of cuts to social programs.
Important reports further confirming that Kiev is brewing militaristic plans arrived at the end of 2017 and over literally the past several days. In late 2017, it came to light that the US and Canada have decided to supply Kiev with lethal weapons. In January 2018, first a speech by President Poroshenko and then the words of an employee of the US State Department revealed that the United States intends to afford Ukraine military aid at the expense of the US' own budget. In an interview with the Russian news agency TASS, an American diplomat confirmed that Kiev will be given defensive anti-tank weapons, including Javelin missile systems. These missile systems are called "defensive" only in order to avoid accusations of militarization in the region and suspicions of aggression against Donbass. But this does not change the fact that Javelin systems have been desired in Ukrainian military circles for offensive operations for quite some time. A number of expert publications in Russian media, as well as the Russian foreign ministry, have pointed out the "coincidence" between Kiev's adoption of the "reintegration" law and the news that the US will be supplying offensive weapons.
Another important event took place on January 21st. The 128th Mountain-Infantry Mukachevo brigade left their positions in the ATO and returned - with all their weapons - to their permanent base positions in the Transcarpathian region. It is still unknown whether these Carpathian troops did this on their own initiative, or on ATO orders, but if this was indeed their own "mutiny," then this might serve as indirect proof that the conflict will escalate in the near future - whether in the next 2-3 weeks or months - and that some Ukrainian troops are aware of and want to avoid such a fate.
Now allow me to express my own understanding of the aims of the "reintegration" bill. The Poroshenko Administration which prepared the "reintegration" bill, has with this document in effect established the legal foundations for war with Russia.
Poroshenko himself is not objectively interested in escalating the conflict insofar as he perfectly understands the disparity between Ukrainian and Russian military capacities. Hostilities between the two countries would result in a very rapid defeat of Ukraine and, in the best case scenario, the fleeing of the head of the Ukrainian state. The recent scandal surrounding Poroshenko possessing spare passports confirms that he is prepared to flee Ukrainian territory if or when the time comes.
Nor is Poroshenko interested in Ukraine reasserting control over the territory of the Donbass republics, as in this case, Poroshenko would automatically face the threat of a third, Nazi Maidan. With no "external enemy," Ukrainian Nazi groups would turn their weapons on what they call the "internal enemy" - the Poroshenko regime and the Jewish oligarchs. This scenario is even more dangerous for Poroshenko, since his chances of survival are reduced to a minimum.
Nevertheless, despite all the obvious risks, Poroshenko opted to push this law through even the most grueling parliamentary procedures. Most likely, this was done under strong pressure from the Americans, who are not satisfied with the excessively "peace-weary" Ukrainian president. These aims probably also explain the adventure with the defective Maidan coordinated by Saakashvili, whose aim is not overthrowing, but intimidating the existing government.
Why might the Americans need or want a new war in Donbass, especially with the prospect of it developing into a full-fledged war with Russia? What are Russia's projected retaliations to Ukrainian and American provocations? It is not difficult to see that Russia's being drawn into a conflict in order to prevent genocide in Donbass - about which President Putin warned last October - would, no matter what, be portrayed by the US and European countries as an act of Russian aggression. This, after all, was the case with the operation to save Russian peacekeepers and the population of South Ossetia from Georgian aggression in 2008, which Western media presented as a Russian military invasion of Georgia. In this case, now gradually improving Russian-European relations would be thrown back again far and for long. The US needs and wants this.
Another possible motive could be disrupting and discrediting the Russian presidential elections set for March 18th.
Finally, a full-fledged war between Russia and Ukraine would make any rapprochement between the two countries psychologically impossible at least for the next few decades.
I think that, no matter what, there are only two options: either Russia will refrain from involvement in the conflict in Donbass and allow Ukraine to blitzkrieg the DPR and LPR, or Russia will enter the conflict and defend the population of Donbass. The strategic advantage is on the Americans' side. Russia is in the position of having to react and play according to someone else's rules.
I believe that the second scenario is the only realistic option if Ukraine does unleash full-scale military aggression against Donbass. Any withdrawal from the situation in Donbass would fundamentally contradict Putin's foreign policy and would destroy the political results of the "Crimean consensus" over night. It is difficult to predict what the presidential elections' results would be after such an outcome to the Donbass drama.
It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the Ukrainians (and their American patrons) are not content with regaining Donbass. Having taken Donbass, they will prepare for a rematch in Crimea as well. Therefore, Russian President Vladimir Putin has no other options besides realizing the stand he took in October of last year when he declared that Russia would not allow a massacre in Donbass.
Russia was not afraid of challenging the United States in the latter's stomping ground - the Middle East - where Russia won an important, albeit intermediate victory. Moreover, Russia is not afraid to challenge the American Empire in the region most important for her - Donbass. The economic and other (not military!) disparities between the US and Russia will be balanced by Russians' determination to take extreme measures.
War in Donbass is not a question of "if", but "when."
Eduard Popov is a Rostov State University graduate with a PhD in history and philosophy. In 2008, he founded the Center for Ukrainian Studies of the Southern Federal University of Russia, and from 2009-2013, he was the founding head of the Black Sea-Caspian Center of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, an analytical institute of the Presidential Administration of Russia. In June 2014, Popov headed the establishment of the Representative Office of the Donetsk People's Republic in Rostov-on-Don and actively participated in humanitarian aid efforts in Donbass. In addition to being Fort Russ' guest analyst since June, 2016, Popov is currently the leading research fellow of the Institute of the Russian Abroad and the founding director of the Europe Center for Public and Information Cooperation.
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