China will have to confront the Three T's of Trump, trade, and Taiwan, as well as the progressively unfolding and American-provoked New Cold War that it's involved in with India, but Beijing could make positive geopolitical progress so long as its New Silk Road plans in Pakistan and ASEAN aren't derailed by Hybrid War.
The Three T's
Right off the bat, China will be forced to confront the incoming Trump Administration's hard-bargaining approach towards trade and Taiwan, with both variables being intertwined with one another in order to give the Manhattan dealmaker maximum leverage for his all-encompassing negotiations with Beijing. China is accustomed to the implicit 'gentlemen's agreement' that has been in play ever since the end of the Cold War, whereby the US and China occasionally criticize the trading ties between their two countries but generally refrain from taking any dramatically substantial steps to decouple their economies. Trump wants to change that, however, and it fills China with dread since it might result in an unexpected shock to its economic system. What is meant by this is that Chinese production is still heavily influenced by American investments and capital, and that if Trump creates enticing incentives for American companies to return back to their country and close up shop in China (or perhaps relocate elsewhere such to as ASEAN or India), then it might cumulatively contribute to socio-political issues inside of the People's Republic if this is done on a large enough scale and within a short period of time.
China's chief challenge is to sustain its macroeconomic growth and trickle down tangible benefits to its people, though this could be partially offset to an uncertain degree if unemployment spikes as a result of the US moving out capital-intensive industries and laying off untold numbers of workers. In such a scenario, Beijing would then become even more strategically dependent on the One Belt One Road vision than ever before, as it would have to redirect the restless unemployed masses into overseas construction projects, many of which are threatened by Hybrid War and entail monumental future risks (whether of a physical, financial, and/or strategic nature). No matter, China would still prefer not to have Trump "rock the boat", which is what he's threatening to do so long as he carries through on his campaign promises (which he's expected to do). In order to strike a "better deal" with China, Trump wants to compel Beijing to adjust its monetary policies in order to make them "fairer" in relation to the US. This is a highly sensitive subject for China and Trump's transitional team of advisors are well aware of that, which explains why they've upped the stakes by unexpectedly introducing Taiwan and the long-standing One China policy into the equation.
In all actuality, Trump probably isn't interested in revising the US' stance towards Taiwan, but he understands how pivotal of an issue this is for China and therefore sought to make it a component of the grand deal which he hopes to seal with Beijing. It's uncertain at this point how long the prospective negotiations could take between the US and China, or if they'd even succeed and not be ruined by either side pulling out of the talks (whether public or secret) for whatever their reason might be, so it's extremely difficult to forecast the specifics of what will be in store for American-Chinese relations. However, it's a safe bet to assume that neither side has an interest in fundamentally upsetting the grand strategic balance between them due to the complex economic interdependence that their predecessor administrations have weaved with one another, as the consequences of an acrimonious split could be mutually disastrous in the short and possibly even medium terms. That being said, the upcoming stage of bilateral relations is completely unprecedented and could result in an unforeseeable outcome despite both sides' well-intentioned efforts to reach a "better deal", which is why China has legitimate reasons to fret the Three T's all across the next four to eight years.
The Chinese-Indian New Cold War
This trend was touched upon when speaking about the most likely scenarios for South Asia, but at this moment it's worthwhile to elaborate on it just a little bit more. The author first came to the conclusion that this outgrowth of the global New Cold War was occurring in November 2015 when analyzing the regime change crisis that was afflicting the Maldives at that time. Although ultimately resolved in favor of the government, it followed in the footsteps of Chinese-Indian proxy tensions over Nepal, and prior to that, over Sri Lanka, both of which were explained a bit more in the previously cited Oriental Review hyperlink. Furthermore, when analyzing South Asian affairs in 2015, one couldn't exclude Myanmar and Pakistan, with the former being between both Asian giants while the latter is solidly on the side of the Chinese. This regional proxy rivalry for influence and strategic positioning was unprecedentedly intensified in 2016 after India made the historic decision to enter into a military-strategic partnership with the US via LEMOA and the "Major Defense Partner" designation (itself a euphemism for "Major Non-NATO Ally).
Right around the time that the first agreement was signed, India Prime Minister and Hindutva nationalist-supremacist Modi began sabre-rattling over Pakistani Balochistan and then exploited a convenient militant attack in Uri less than one month later in order to provoke tensions with Pakistan to the point of war. Ever since then, India has been confidently moving in the direction of becoming a pro-American unipolar lackey, while China and Pakistan have stayed true to the opposite course of multipolarity. The interesting part of this proxy competition, however, is that China and India are very close trading partners with one another, similar in principle (but by no means extent) to China and the US, which puts both in an uncomfortable position during times of strategic trouble. Whereas China and the US might never go to war with one another, the situation with China and its South Asian neighbor is qualitatively different because of the existence of unresolved territorial disputes stemming from their brief 1962 border war with one another. Moreover, India has been taking aggressive moves over the past year to revive 24-39 World War II-era airfields in the disputed Himalayan territory of what it calls "Arunachal Pradesh" but China says is South Tibet, thus raising the stakes tremendously and setting into motion a destabilizing security dilemma.
China will thus have to balance India's bellicosity with its promising economic potential as the world's second-most-populated nation, keeping in mind that New Delhi is nominally a BRICS "partner" and at least on paper committed to bettering relations with the multipolar world. This may not be reflected in practice when it comes to India's military moves and rhetoric over the past year, but it doesn't mean that the South Asian giant is forever doomed to remain the unipolar-aligned state that it's shaping out to be. After all, there is a lot more that unites China and India than separates the two and puts them at odds with one another, but what's needed is pragmatic and rational leadership in India which ignores the US' temptations and puts aside its own emotional knee-jerk reactions in hashing out a comprehensive and mutually beneficial partnership with China. In essence, what's needed in Chinese-Indian relations is the type of "deal-making" which is expected to characterize Chinese-American relations under Trump, though it's unknown how long Beijing will have to wait for a more level-headed leader to come to power in New Delhi, as the present incumbent seems hell-bent on taking relations to their worst-ever stage in order to please his new Washington master.
The Southern Silk Roads
The final tendency which China is forecasted to exhibit is its iron-clad resolve to move forward with its three Southern Silk Road projects. The China-Pakistani Economic Corridor (CPEC) was already discussed as part of the South Asia section of this analysis, while the other two in ASEAN were mentioned in regards to that part of the world. Still, it's necessary to speak more on these three projects in order to convey their ultra-strategic significance and explain why China is so adamant to see them succeed. CPEC is already partially operational, while the ASEAN Silk Road through Laos-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore is only in its first initial stages in the first-mentioned country, while the Myanmar Silk Road has yet to begin any sort of construction or prerequisite serious planning. Each of these projects complement one another in that they're supposed to be Beijing's alternative mainland routes to the Indian Ocean, from where the People's Republic can trade more directly with the Mideast, East Africa, and even the EU (via the Suez Canal) without having to worry about the geopolitical blackmail that the US could exert upon it through the bottlenecked Strait of Malacca chokepoint and South China Sea proxy tensions.
It's of the utmost strategic importance to China that the ASEAN Silk Road and its Myanmar counterpart can enter into operation sometime in the 2020s, as the successful implementation of these two projects alongside CPEC would give Beijing multiple unrestricted and heavily reliable routes to the Indian Ocean. On the reverse side, however, this means that China's strategic future is inordinately dependent on the US' ability to wage Hybrid War on one, some, or all of these three New Silk Roads, the scenarios of which were briefly described in previous sections. In spite of the risks involved, China essentially has no choice but to go forward with each of these projects in the hopes that at least one of them will eventually pan out and provide the necessary outlet to India's namesake body of water. Right now CPEC is impressively succeeding, but it must still deal with joint US-Indian intrigue in Pakistani Balochistan as well as Afghan-originating terrorism, among other threats. Concerning the ASEAN Silk Road, landlocked Laos is the weak link in the mainland chain of transit states, though Thailand has many more Hybrid War scenarios that could perhaps be more easily exploited to much more 'effective' ends. Finally, the yet-to-be-formalized Myanmar Silk Road holds enormous promise for China, but could preemptively disrupted through a renewed round of civil war in the fragile "federalizing" country.
Summary
Russia will continue to "clean house" in removing or functionally neutralizing unipolar-linked elements in the country whether through public or discrete actions, and this will empower the country to more assuredly practice its multi-vectored diplomacy of geopolitical balancing and thus strengthen its position as the core of the emerging Multipolar World Order.
House Cleaning
2016 was a wonderful year for Russian patriots, as President Putin got them excited by going after corrupt Economic Development Minister Ulyukaev and arresting him in mid-November for accepting bribes. Ulyukaev is a hated figure among patriotic Russians who see him as a neoliberal sellout to the unipolar world order, so his removal from the political scene was met with joy by many people. The Russian government insists that this was just a simple anti-corruption operation and that there wasn't anything deeper to it, but popular military analyst and blogger The Saker predicted earlier in the year that Putin would undertake such a move against what he calls "Medvedev's allies", or in other words, the "Atlantic Integrationists" who behave as a sixth column on behalf of the US. The Saker updated his analysis following Ulyukaev's arrest to declare that Putin had finally taken steps to fulfill the forecast and that related moves could be expected at an uncertain time in the future. This was echoed by prominent geopolitical analyst F. William Engdahl who suggested that Anatoly Chubais might be the "next neoliberal head to roll".
What's relevant to pay attention to is the intersection between Russia's anti-corruption crusade and international geopolitics, as there's a chance that the former could be commenced or guided according to the latter's imperatives. For example, Brazil has been in the throes of an extended political crisis for the past couple of years due to the NSA-assisted "Operation Car Wash" 'anti-corruption' investigation, which in reality was conditioned in order to purge the multipolar-friendly elements of the government and also overthrow President Rousseff. While the intentions behind the Brazilian example are nefarious and aligned with unipolar strategic precepts, the reverse could theoretically take place in Russia whereby anti-corruption operations result in the legal 'cleansing'/purging of unipolar elements in advance of multipolar strategic objectives. In both cases - whether it's Brazil's Rousseff or Russia's Ulyukaev - the targeted politician's overthrow was technically legal, though with the South American one being done on extremely dubious grounds of gray legality while the Russian example was flawlessly conducted without a hint of ulterior motives.
Going forward, should the military-security "deep state" elements aligned with President Putin decide to 'cleanse'/'purge' some more of their unipolar fifth/sixth column rivals, then they'll most likely do so following this established pattern of executing anti-corruption operations.
On the other hand, there might be certain individuals who are legitimately "clean" in the sense that they haven't ever partaken in any provably corrupt activities and are thus exempt from ever being 'cleansed'/'purged' through the modus operandi of an anti-corruption crusade. Therefore, in such a situation, they could instead be functionally neutralized/sidelined in the sense that they'd still likely retain their nominal position of power and/or influence, but they'd be powerless and uninfluential in their post. This often happens in any sort of job when an employee encounters a manager or other higher-up who dislikes them for whatever reason yet are unable to fire them due to legal reasons, so the decision is made to essentially make the said individual functionless and unable to effect any real change within the establishment. In parallel, a similar template could be applied in mitigating the damage that Atlantic Integrationists could have in undermining the multipolar gains of the Russian state, though of course these people would first have to be identified and then have their intentions investigated by the interested "deep state" parties. It's not at all to imply that this would take place in an irresponsible manner against all sorts of random people, but just that it could selectively be practiced on a case-by-case basis to strategically neutralize the most pressing threats in the media, government, and "deep state" spheres.
Balancing Acts All Across The Board
The earlier-cited article about how "Russia's Diplomatic Balancing Act In Asia Is To The Benefit Of Its Chinese Ally" provides the most accurate template for understanding Moscow's global foreign strategy. In sum, Russia seeks to position itself as the indispensable balancing partner all across Eurasia, expertly maintaining the peace between a host of rival states and thus making itself the ultimate kingmaker over supercontinental affairs. For instance, Russia's policy of "military diplomacy" which the author wrote about for an earlier Sputnik piece back in September wisely provides weapons systems and other assets to rivalling states Armenia and Azerbaijan, India and China, and China and Vietnam, with the potential to expand this paradigm even further to Pakistan and India, and Iran and Saudi Arabia in the future. The article should be reviewed for more specific details about this policy, but the main idea is that this approach has hitherto kept the balance between each pair of countries and uniquely elevated Russia to the point of pivotally maintaining the peaceful status quo. While there are certainly criticisms that could be levelled against this strategy, it's for the most part been very successful, and this is largely due to the fact that Russia seeks to preserve the balance of forces between its rivaling partners, unlike the US which persistently tries to tip this towards its own allies' favor in order to provoke a military conflict.
Extrapolating the lessons that can be learned from Russia's diplomatic balancing act in Asia and its application of military diplomacy, Moscow can also be said to be applying the root strategy of these policies towards other parts of Eurasia as well.
One of the most monumental examples of this is through the groundbreaking Tripartite arrangement that's incipiently taking place in the Mideast between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The only reason that such a geostrategic-diplomatic construction is even possible is entirely because of Moscow's role in balancing between Tehran and Ankara. Similarly, something along the lines of this established model has the chance of taking shape in Northeast Asia through the formation of a Regional Quartet between Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea, though it's not exactly the most likely development that could take place. Relatedly, Russia would like to engage in the same sort of geopolitical balancing with Vietnam, China, and the Philippines, which could then give it the enviable role of partially mediating over the South China Sea. No other country has the potential to embrace all three of the most direct South China Sea claimants like Russia does, with Moscow's moves towards Manila being only a recent development brought about by multipolar-enthused President Duterte and his positive statements towards Russia.
Finally, if Russia had the ability, then it would also of course like to emulate this pattern when it comes to the EU, particularly towards the Eurocautionary governments (with the exception of Poland) which were described in the first section's analysis about Europe. If Russia can enter into pragmatic arrangements with a loose coalition of them, then it could not only enhance relations on a bilateral level with each constituent partner, but the mutually beneficial results of this new series of partnerships could lead to the EU also modifying its bloc-wide approach towards Moscow, though provided of course that Russia and China's Balkan megaprojects can succeed to the point of progressively liberating the continent from the US' overbearing unipolar influence. This is of course a forward-looking goal and not one which will likely see any fruits in the coming couple of years of course, but if Russia can press ahead with this strategy and leverage any positive relations that it manages to cultivate with the pragmatic Eurocautionary states of the EU, then there's a chance that this could lead to significantly positive changes for the multilateral Russia-EU relationship so long as Brussels can garner and sustain the political will to do so (which would by far be assisted by a Eurocautionary victory in France next year).
The Core Of The 21st Century
Russia's primary geostrategic objective is to become the pivotal core for the 21st century's global transition into the emerging Multipolar World Order. This is admittedly a very ambitious task and not one which can easily be accomplished, but it carries with it unparalleled importance in fundamentally changing the course of world history and setting Russia out to be the ultimate driver for global affairs in the future. The concept behind Russia becoming the 21st century core is that it's located at the juncture of Eastern, Central, and Western Eurasia, thereby endowing it with the natural opportunity to link these corners of the supercontinent together by means of its advantageous geography. As China pushes forth with its One Belt One Road global vision, Beijing and Moscow are beginning to understanding just how important their strategic convergences are and the irreplaceable role that Russia is expected to play in the coming century. China's New Silk Road paradigm preaches that the geographic distances between the extremities of Eurasia can be lessened through mainland transport networks which cut down on the time of trade between Europe and East Asia by means high-speed rail and other such technologies. Of crucial significance, however, is that these envisioned routes wouldn't be subjected to the influence of the all-powerful US Navy, a force which has hitherto threatened to cut off China's Sea Lines Of Communication with the rest of the world in the event of a serious crisis.
Being the long-term planners that they stereotypically are, the Chinese know better than to allow themselves to remain geostrategically blackmailed by the US' military forces, which is why its leadership decided to pioneer a revival of the ancient Silk Road across Eurasia in order to neutralize this persistent threat.
While it can be argued that CPEC might one day extend through Iran and Turkey to eventually reach the Balkans and thenceforth the gates to Europe, there's considerably less Hybrid War risk if China just streamlined a direct access route to the EU by means of its close Russian partner. Due to this immovable constant, Russia will thus forever occupy the utmost pivotal geostrategic position in the 21st century and beyond, which explains why it's destined to function as the core of the worldwide movement to multipolarity. There's no intention to lessen the huge role played by China in this regard, as Russia's role would never have become what it is today had it not been for Chinese strategic planning and capital investments, but the author simply wants to draw attention to how Russia's geography has gifted it the very real potential to unite all corners of Eurasia by means of its territory. It can therefore be argued that Russia and China's fates are forever inseparable as neither can exist in the multipolar world without the other - Russia needs China's market size and stability in order to attract trans-Eurasian European trade across its territory through modern transport routes which will be partially paid for by Chinese capital investment, and likewise, China needs Russia's geography in order to securely facilitate this away from any of the US' Hybrid War interferences or conventional military obstacles.
As a final point, it's worthwhile to include the map which the author commissioned for his forecast about Russia's Greater Eurasian Scenarios. The graphic there illustrates the myriad Silk Road connectivity possibilities which Russia has in the emerging Multipolar World Order, showcasing its strategic significance to the future and underpinning just how irreplaceable it is for Eurasian connectivity.
Thanks for posting this article.
Interesting, like the other three, and worth reading.
Read it and weep, uncle sam.