central asia map
Summary

The Eurasian Heartland can expect to immensely benefit from the Russian- and Chinese-led integrational projects being advanced in this region, though any hiccups in the eventual political transitions in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan might open up avenues for Salafist and revisionist threats to return to the surface and destabilize this ultra-crucial crossroads of the continent.

Multipolar Crossroads

Central Asia is located literally in the center of Russia, China, and Iran's multipolar Great Power geostrategic convergence, which amounts to this part of the world being unparalleled in its grand importance. Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran are fully cognizant of this and recognize how disastrous it would be for each of them if Central Asia were to be destabilized by a deadly combination of external and internal factors, which is why they're working so closely together to safeguard it from it all sorts of potential risks. Russia's CSTO provides security guarantees for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, while the Russian- and Chinese-led SCO aims to advance these three countries and Uzbekistan's all-around integration into the multipolar world. Constitutionally neutral Turkmenistan is not a party to either of these agreements, though there's been repeated speculation that it informally cooperates with both on areas of shared interest, such as defending against militant incursions from Afghanistan to helping to geographically facilitate Chinese-Iranian New Silk Road connectivity. As for the latter point, China already has one circuitous railroad connection to Iran and has floated the idea of building a high-speed one directly through the middle of Central Asia in order to connect the two Great Powers by means of the region's main cities and capitals. Understandably, the further along that trilateral Russian-Chinese-Iranian Central Asian connectivity and integrational projects come along, the stronger the emerging Multipolar World Order will become, though contrarily, any unforeseen challenges to these initiatives will reversely create problems for the Eurasian Great Powers.

Political Transitions

The passing of long-serving leaders Niyazov and Karimov in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively set off justified forecasts that each country was on the verge of domestic collapse, but surprisingly their "deep states" (permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies) united in facilitating an orderly and peaceful political transition. This proved that the Turkmen and Uzbek governments were a lot stronger and capable of behind-the-scenes compromise agreements than many observers had thought, which fortuitously enabled their countries and the region as a whole to avoid a potential conflagration. It's hoped that this pattern of peaceful political transitions can be applied in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan when their elderly leaders inevitably pass away, though there's no guarantee that this will be the case. While Kazakhstan is arguably thought of as the most stable of the Central Asian states and seems likely to evade this dark scenario, Tajikistan is the complete opposite and is regularly seen as the weakest country in the region. Additionally, the formerly civil war-torn country is once more threatened by Afghan-originating and -influenced Salafists, so there's a distinct possibility that a similar sort of conflict modelled off of the one in the 1990s might erupt if Dushanbe's elites aren't careful. This could be extremely troublesome for Russia, which might find itself compelled to order the forces from its large military base in the country to help the legal authorities restore order, though judging by the Kyrgyz precedent during their own Hybrid War unrest in 2010, Moscow might play it coy and resist the temptation to intervene and fall for the US' "Reverse Brzezinski" stratagem.

Salafist-Revisionist Trends

The occurrence of political transitions in the Central Asian states might inspire Salafists and territorial revisionists to spring into action. It's already well known that Central Asia is a hotbed for militant extreme Islam, and while the region's leaders have successfully worked to quell this threat over the past two decades, it hasn't ever been completely snuffed out. The ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan and the spread of Daesh to the war-beleaguered country could provide an opportunity for ill-intentioned individuals and groups to acquire valuable in-battle training and other experience conveniently nearby. Should they sense that a political transition in Kazakhstan and/or Tajikistan is fraught with internal elite disagreements and governing paralysis, then they might be inspired to return home and try to exploit the situation to their advantage.

As for the revisionists, the only two real possibilities that exist are for Uzbeks and Tajiks to lay claim to their neighbors' territory, whether de-facto supported by their respective states or done (quasi-)independently through non-state actors. Ethnic Uzbeks densely inhabit many border settlements in Kazakhstan's Southern Kazakhstan region and the Fergana Valley portions of Kyrgyzstan, so if the former is undergoing political uncertainty or the latter falls back into its regular pattern of domestic dysfunction, then they might make a move in advance of their claims. Concerning the Tajiks, they regard the modern-day Uzbek-controlled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara as historic Tajik towns unfairly taken away from them by Stalin, and they or a new nationalist administration might find it advantageous for domestic political reasons to press forward these claims. Also, many Tajiks live in northern Afghanistan, where they and their Northern Alliance have been supported by the US-backed Kabul government for years now, so Washington might have already cultivated some strategic inroads with this militant community which it could exploit if situationally necessary.

The worst-case scenario would be if "Greater Uzbekistan" and "Greater Tajikistan" nationalists simultaneously started pressing their claims and combined their ethnic ideologies with the religious one of aggressive Salafism peddled by Daesh. Seeing as how the two states and people are already heated rivals with one another, the concurrent promotion of their contradictory extreme geopolitical visions could prompt an outbreak of violence in this already-tense region of the world. Conflicts in Central Asia easily have the potential to go cross-border and spiral out of control, which is why all sides regularly do their best to prevent this from happening, but in the case of Uzbek-Tajik clashes (whether of a state or non-state nature, and regardless if it's to advance their "greater" projects or international Salafism), this could also draw in Moscow through its CSTO commitments to Dushanbe.

In the event that Russia calculates that it's better to stay on the sidelines, help to diplomatically negotiate a ceasefire or other related solution, and not directly get involved, then the nationalist American-leaning (as a result of Washington's legacy of support to the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance in Afghanistan) portion of the Tajik people might "pull an Armenia" by threatening to turn to the US instead, which might be more than happy to enter into a tug-of-war for this country's loyalty in order to complicate Russia's regional policies and partially compensate for any strategic losses in Afghanistan. It wouldn't be so much that Tajikistan-inhabiting Tajiks might necessarily choose to go this route, but that their cross-border Afghan-Tajik counterparts might infiltrate/migrate into their eponymous country and try to interfere with the domestic political situation there, similar to how the American-based Armenian diaspora attempts to do so in that namesake country for similar purposes.
south asia map
South Asia

Summary

The joint US-Indian Hybrid War on CPEC will come to define the forthcoming years, but just as equally so might be India's internal problems brought about by its poorly conceived and sloppily implemented "demonetization", which has accelerated calls for a federal devolution of the state and might eventually provoke more intense insurgencies. Also, it can't be forgotten that while all of this is happening, Daesh is silently lying in wait and expanding its covert network of terrorist operatives in neighboring Bangladesh and perhaps even within India itself.

The Hybrid War On CPEC

One of the most under-the-radar developments of 2016 was undoubtedly the commencement of the joint US-Indian Hybrid War on CPEC. The author predicted and monitored the course of these events in the series of articles referenced below, which explain the strategic underpinning behind the project and the multilateral asymmetrical measures designed to subvert it: Complementary with this, the author also wrote about how Russia should most effectively adapt to India's pro-American pivot: The general idea is that China needs CPEC in order to securely chart a direct trade route to the Indian Ocean which avoids the bottlenecked Strait of Malacca chokepoint, but that India is furious that the infrastructural megaproject passes through territory which it maximally claims as its own per the Kashmir dispute (in this case, the Pakistani territory of Gilgit-Baltistan). India and the US strategically converge in the grandest way possible when it comes to countering China, hence why both sides entered into an unprecedented military-strategic partnership over the summer through the signing of LEMOA, which crucially allows either country to use all of the other's military installations on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the US just recently designated India as a "Major Defense Partner", which is essentially a euphemism for being a Major Non-NATO Ally as it allows India the exact same military-technical advantages. Having a shared goal in stopping China and destroying CPEC, the US and India have also teamed up to foment a Baloch insurgency in the southwestern Pakistani province which importantly houses the project's terminal port of Gwadar.

As predicted in South Asian section of the author's "Greater Eurasian Scenario" forecasting series, this is expected to set off a chain reaction of proxy wars between India and Pakistan which could realistically also broaden to involve the US and China, all of which would be duking it out via surrogates across the entirety of South Asia. Whether it's through potential Chinese-Pakistani support for the Sikhs' separatist homeland of "Khalistan" or Northeastern Indian insurgents and the communist Naxalites of the interior, India's American-backed Hybrid War on CPEC proxy campaign is expected to boomerang back and lead to a multitude of unanticipated consequences for New Delhi, the most pressing of which might be the country's eventual devolution.

From "Demonetization" To Devolution

India shocked the world and its own citizenry by suddenly declaring on the day of the American presidential elections (when nobody was paying attention, of course) that it was removing 86% of paper currency from circulation, though this move had a lot more to do with preparing the population for working in foreign "Make In India" industries than fighting "black money", as was explained in the author's Katehon analysis about how "The Cash Crisis Is What 'Make In India' Is Supposed To Look Like". Modi's decision has caused widespread discontent all throughout the country and has already led to disproportionate suffering for the bulk of the impoverished masses. Considering that India is on the brink of starting the "proxy war to end all proxy wars" with Pakistan and China over CPEC (as forecast in the referenced "Greater Eurasian Scenario" article in the prior section), the last thing that it literally needs at this critical moment is an overly agitated citizenry, let alone one which is legitimately upset at the government and not at all under the influence of any foreign actor in this regard.

There's already long been talk from various political movements in the country about advocating for the devolution of the Republic of India into an outright federation, but these demands just acquired extra weight in the aftermath of the ultra-controversial "demonetization". Activists in the strategically positioned state of West Bengal are leading this nationwide movement, and there's a chance that they could gain some practical success in their efforts seeing as how millions of people are upset at the unilateral monetary decisions of the central government. It's still too early to forecast exactly how far this political trend may go, but it's important enough to raise awareness about it because it's indeed emblematic of the direction that some grassroots organizations are moving towards, capitalizing of course on the homegrown anti-government zeitgeist prompted by the disastrous "demonetization". The central authorities in New Delhi are absolutely opposed to federalization since they fear that it would inevitably result in the country's territorial fracturing and the eventual loss of the Northeastern States and perhaps other regions as well (Kashmir, "Khalistan", etc.), so it can be expected that the further that this trend progresses, the more forcefully the government will respond in trying to stop it, which could obviously set into motion a dangerous cycle of civil violence which could inopportunely break out amidst the "proxy war to end all proxy wars'.

Daesh Rising

As India wages its Hybrid War on CPEC and prepares to defend itself from the boomeranged "proxy war to end all proxy war" response from Pakistan and China, it'll also have to confront a greater challenge than the prospective grassroots-demanded devolution of the unitary state into a federation. Unbeknownst to most casual observers, South Asia is turning into the next global hotspot for international Salafist terrorism, as seen both by Al Qaeda's ominous 2014 announcement that it's opening up a regional branch and Daesh's recent advances in Bangladesh. Although Dhaka officially denies that Daesh has found a space to maneuver within the densely populated Muslim-majority state, the author warned back in 2015 that Bangladesh was turning into Bangla-Daesh. This has yet to materialize to the extent that it prompts a larger crisis, but the seeds are surely there for it to become one if all sides aren't too careful. As such, the whole of South Asia needs to be alert for the rise of Daesh all throughout the region, as this terrorist group expertly exploits other preexisting conflicts in order to leverage them to its own Salafist advantage (e.g. 2014 "Syraq").

The consequences of Daesh's migration to South Asia could be catastrophic for India and contribute to further domestic turmoil in the world's second-largest country. It's an interesting set of facts that India has more Muslims than Pakistan and that Bangladesh is the world's most densely populated country, so these two factors alone heighten the impact that a sweeping wave of Salafist terror could have if calculatingly unleashed in the region. Another thing to keep in mind is that Daesh doesn't just specialize in suicide bombings but in urban guerrilla warfare and conventional tactics, signifying that it could present an unparalleled pair of asymmetrical and traditional threats to India. Considering how India is already in the throes of widespread domestic discontent due to the "demonetization", it can ill-afford to deal with these sorts of challenges right now, let alone in the near- to medium-term future if New Delhi irresponsibly unleashes the "proxy war to end all proxy wars" at the US' chaos-driven behest. In a cynical sense, however, the US might actually welcome this eventuality because it could create a perceived "need" for India to request direct US military assistance via the case-by-case LEMOA basing agreement.

Should this come to pass, then India and the US might even use the threat of a widespread Daesh terrorist insurgency as the cover argument for 'justifying' the prolonged deployment of US military assets to the subcontinent, although their real intention would be to "contain" and provoke China.