© Unknown
Ukrainian officials publicly stated several goals of the operation:
(1) to force Moscow to redeploy troops away from Russian forces' increasingly rapid advance on Pokrovsk and across the Donetsk front;
(2) to seize Russian territory to encourage Moscow to negotiate and to trade for the return of Ukrainian lands in peace talks with Moscow;
(3) to capture Russian prisoners of war to exchange for Ukrainian prisoners;
(4) to create angst in Russia among the elite and population in order to weaken support for the war and/or Putin's hold on power; and
(5) to make Russia feel the pain of death and destruction that Ukraine has been feeling (Zelenskiy alone said this).
None of these goals was achieved.
Regarding the first goal, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander Gen. Oleksandr Syrskii has acknowledged that the Russian forces did not redeploy from Donetsk to Kursk. The strategy was misconceived from the get-go. The Ukrainians tried to get the Russians to make an obvious mistake: divert forces need for their offensives in Donetsk to the Ukrainians' mini-salient in Kursk and thereby weaken their offensive force. Ironically, in order to get the Russians to make the mistake of diverting valuable resources from Donetsk to Kursk the Ukrainians had done the same. This led to an acceleration of the Russian advance towards Pokrovsk - a key hub and perhaps the last best barrier hindering the Russian army's march to the Dnieper.
Regarding the second and third, before the incursion Putin and other Russian officials had repeated their willingness to negotiate, but Kiev refused or ignored each statement. After the incursion, the Russians announced that there will be no talks while Ukrainian forces remain in Kursk and other Russian territories, according to Moscow's definition. Moreover, as one exiled Ukrainian newspaper Ctrana.news, notes, no Russian is going to give back 18 percent of Ukrainian territory held by Russia in return for 5 percent of Kursk region's territory. The same paper notes that even prominent Russian liberals, editor-in-chief of the banned Ekh Moskvy Aleksei Venediktov and Yabloko Party leader Grigorii Yavlinskii (who met with Putin weeks back to discuss peace talks), thought negotiations might have begun by year's end until the Kursk incursion spoiled the mood in the Kremlin. No talks means there will be no trading for land or prisoners, contrary to Kiev's goals.
Regarding the fourth goal, there has been no discernible elite or popular demand for a change in Putin's 'special operation policy' (SMO). To the contrary, prominent hardliners and others intensified their clamor for untying the Russian military's hands and undertaking a full-scale war on Ukraine, and this may explain an escalation in Russian missile attacks. In terms of the population, public opinion surveys demonstrate both continuing popular support for Putin and the mirror opposite effect on its views than that intended by Kiev. Ukrainian forces began their incursion on August 6th, crossing the Ukrainian-Russian border between Sumy, Ukraine and Kursk, Russia. In the Levada Center's polling in July Putin's approval rating was 87 percent. In August it fell a mere 2 points to 85 percent (within the margin of error).
Levada's polling also shows that after a short period of shock regarding the Kursk incursion, Russian public opinion adapted and is taking in stride. It ranks fifth in the populace's mind among the most important events since the SMO's start in February 2022. Concern was largely localized to regions around Kursk, and discontent with performance was directed at the military, border troops, and intelligence services, not the political leadership, no less Putin personally. Levada's monthly polling on the public mood showed a barely significant jump just above the margin of error. Whereas in July negative feeling was registered among 18 percent, in August it rose to 24 percent. However, Levada offered comparative context by noting that this jump pales in significance to the more than doubling (21 to 47 percent) of those admitting to a negative mood in autumn 2022, when the Putin government announced a mobilization of new soldiers for the SMO. Support for the SMO strengthened in the wake of the Kursk invasion as of August. Support for the military's war efforts slightly increased (78 percent), and the percentage of those who supported continuing the war without peace negotiations and of those who supported beginning talks shifted from 58 percent and 34 percent, respectively, to 49 percent and 41 percent, respectively.
The only way the Kursk incursion could spark greater discomfort with the SMO and Putin's course would be if a second mobilization is undertaken in response, since this was the most alarming event for Russians since the SMO began, according to Levada's surveys.
Regarding the Ukrainians' goal of making Russians feel their pain, as noted above the pain has been limited and adjusted to by Russians. Moreover, if there was pain it was in response to Ukrainian brutality broadcast on Russian media and it has led, as noted above, to greater support for continuing the SMO or upgrading it to full-scale war, which so far Putin has resisted. Thus, among those in the already noted Levada opinion survey who expressed concern about Ukraine's Kursk invasion, the second-most frequently expressed concern (25 percent) was outrage over the cruelty of the Ukrainian troops in relation to Russian civilians as conveyed by Russian media. This, as noted in Levada surveys noted above, and the fact of the incursion itself apparently provoked outrage that only increased the desire among Russians to continue the war and decreased the number of those preferring to start peace talks.
In regard to the Kursk gambit's unstated and likely real goal of seizing the Kursk NPP and or nuclear weapons storage site in the hope of holding the local population and the Putin government hostage to a possible terrorist attack and/or trading control of the Kursk object(s) for control over the Zaporozhe NPP, now held by the Russians and badly needed to help Ukraine get throught the upcoming winter, given the diminution of the country's electricity system as a result of Russia's repeated attacks. So just like the attempts to destroy the Crimean Bridge and the drone attacks on Moscow and St. Petersburg, the effect of this newest Kievan-Western move has been the precise opposite of what was supposedly intended. Moscow and all Russia are even more committed to 'Putin's unprovoked war of aggression' and any 'unprovoked responses' the Kremlin may mount. Worst of all for the bright lights who conjured up this operation in Langley or elsewhere, the war is getting closer to 'the last Ukrainian.' The Kursk gambit has led to the destruction of much of Kiev's best fighters and equipment, and it is likely many of those Ukrainian and other troops who made the incursion will be encircled in short time. At the same time, the Kursk gambit made Russian advances greater along much of the front but especially on the Donetsk and southern Donetsk fronts, which will lead to the more rapid fall of Pokrovsk, Vugledar, and the entire Ukrainian defense effort east of the Dnieper River. And do the Second Ruin of Ukraine continues with Western crocodile tears and calls to keep up the fight in defense of NATO expansion for as long as 'it' takes.
The attack on Fort Steadman.
Hood anywhere.