I recently saw this "commentary" published in a newspaper called the Globe and Mail. I tried to pitch them on a column-length response, as well as on a much shorter letter. Alas, the Globe and Mail has thus far shown no interest in publishing my response. It is for them only to know why that is the case. Nonetheless, the internet and the generous editors at The Post Millennial have helped ensure that good debate can still occur.
On one level, it was gratifying to see the author of the original piece try to wade into a discussion of "virtue". Virtue is an under-discussed and important concept, and further engagement with it is a good way to increase the moral coherence of our public debates. However, by conflating criticisms of "virtue-signalling" with hypothetical criticisms of virtue, Ostroff's piece is ultimately not particularly illuminating. I hope this response can clarify the appropriate distinctions.
Unlike Ostroff's piece, mine will begin with the brief definition of relevant terms.
Virtue can generally be defined as a "character competence". Just as precision and sensitivity are important qualities for a good physician, courage and compassion are important qualities for any good person. These latter two are examples of virtues - qualities of character or character competences that help someone to live a good life.
Virtue-signalling, on the other hand, is faking it at virtue - trying to send signals to suggest the presence of a character competence that is not actually present. Those who criticize virtue-signalling are not criticizing virtue - rather quite the opposite. Certainly the term "virtue-signalling" can be misused, and is sometimes thrown around casually as just another school yard insult, but that does not change the fact that the term does have a real meaning.
Ostroff's article suggests that the use of the term virtue-signalling is some kind of attempted moral inversion by those on the right, who want to make good things seem bad and bad things seem good. He cites some past examples of this, such as a character in a Hollywood movie. But if you want to understand what and how conservatives think, you probably should not use a Hollywood villain as your first example of conservative thought.
It's not just conservatives who criticize virtue-signalling by the way - a Liberal Parliamentary Secretary recently directed the term at me in the House of Commons. (As I said, sometimes the term can be used incorrectly).
Still, it is probably the case that conservatives use the term more often and justifiably so. The current Liberal government is often promoting simplified and ineffective solutions to large and complex problems, and seeking to wrap themselves in glory in the process.
The most obvious example of this is on gender equality. The government has created a gender equality week, rebranded many existing international assistance programs as a "feminist foreign policy", added a lot of gender talk to the budget (selectively applying gender analysis in some areas and not others), and appointed an almost equal number of women and men to the cabinet.
These steps are clearly part of a coordinated branding or "signalling" exercise, but none of the rebranding actually impacts the lives of women on the ground. A gender balanced cabinet is supposed to ensure that women's voices are heard, and yet we have a former status of women minister running defence when the Prime Minister is accused of misconduct. In this situation, there is clearly a strong case for the "virtue-signalling" charge.
Many on the left falsely suppose that a criticism of virtue signalling is actually a criticism of the virtues in question. This exposes a deeper reality in the thinking of those who make this conflation. For them, the appearance is the reality. The signalling is the virtue.
I have spoken at some length in the House of Commons on a few occasions about virtue. Inevitably, those interventions are greeted by great confusion and misunderstanding from the Liberal side. The actual historically and philosophically grounded virtue discourse is unfamiliar to most modern liberals - who see questions around the formation of character as archaic and moralistic. Their failure to understand the charge of virtue-signalling is rooted more deeply in a general disinterest in the "virtue ethics" intellectual tradition.
When I last spoke about virtue in the House of Commons, Liberal Adam Vaughan pontificated that my way of thinking was rooted in "the member's parents read[ing] too much Ayn Rand to him as a child at bedtime". His response betrays a fairly fundamental philosophical illiteracy and a total ignorance of either virtue ethics or Rand (perhaps both). But, his response is also important and revealing. Liberals want to believe that conservatives get their philosophy from the likes of Rand, as opposed to from people like Aristotle and Aquinas. (Or even Mill, who writes in Utilitarianism about how achieving greater happiness requires "nobleness of character".)
The same mistake is made in Ostroff's article, when he uses conservatives' alleged love of greed in the 1980s as another example of alleged moral inversion. But 1980s conservatives were not followers of Gordon Gekko; it was the conservatism of John Paul II and not the individualism of Ayn Rand that won the Cold War. Conservatives are committed to the deeper substance of developing character, through freedom, personal responsibility, strong families, and strong social institutions. We stand for virtue, and for the rejection of both its opposite and its pretence.
I welcome Ostroff's and the Globe's interest in exploring these subjects, but Ostroff should undertake a deeper study of those he wishes to criticize. As I told Adam Vaughan after his comments on this in the House, the book After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre would be a good place to start. Next I would recommend Centesimus annus by John Paul II.
Great article:
What is Virtue Signaling? (substack.com)