That Sir Robert, the archetypal product of Delamere School for Boys in Nairobi and British rule in Kenya, should express such views would not have been remarkable. However, as Cooper was Tony Blair's top policy adviser at the time, his views were shocking. The egregiousness of the expressed ideas was compounded by Blair's effusive praise of them in the foreword to Cooper's pamphlet.

Cooper's pamphlet proposed such a radical "reordering of the world" that "commentators expressed surprise and alarm at the very public neo-imperial ambitions of Blair's Britain [and] sections of his own party dismissed the prime minister's foreign policy adviser as a maniac."

Therefore, it was unsurprising that within days of 9/11 Blair sent a plan, based on the maniac's ideas, to the Bush administration as an outline for the forthcoming reordering of Afghanistan. Moreover, Sir Robert represented Britain at the crucial Bonn Conference and played a decisive role in engineering the rise of Sir Hamid Karzai, and the Tajik "Northern Alliance," to the stewardship of Afghan affairs.

The U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan and the British-inspired political dispensation were supposed to demonstrate the new paradigm of British brains and American brawn in reordering world affairs. But, the meager military resources available to the London neo-imperialists limited their ability to have a lasting effect on the situation unfolding in Afghanistan, and subsequently in Iraq.

During the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, the British forces were given a minor role in the hunt for foreign and domestic extremists in eastern Afghanistan. As British press reports indicated, this was not appreciated. The U.S. decision to limit ISAF, a British project, to the confines of Kabul also created tensions. Britain would have liked to join forces with the U.S., and so be able to "reorder" the Pashtun heartland in the South, thereby clearing the way for Karzai and his Tajik-dominated regime to extend its power beyond the suburbs of ISAF-controlled Kabul. The British knew that they did not have the necessary resources to do this alone.

As the American objective of destroying the infrastructure of foreign jihadists neared conclusion, Washington agreed to the expansion of ISAF's areas of responsibility to the Afghan provinces, first in the north, then west and south, under the guise of NATO. The final phase was to be handing over the east, where U.S. forces are still battling al-Qaeda and its Afghan component. These "handovers," meant to be part of the U.S. "exit strategy" from Afghanistan after accomplishing its primary objective, was seized on by the British press gleefully as an indicator of the U.S. military's failure, and consequent a cry for help from their stalwart British allies.

The Daily Mirror, a British tabloid newspaper, crowed that Britain intended to deploy a substantial number of troops to Afghanistan. "5,000 BRITISH TROOPS TO BE SENT INTO CHAOS OF AFGHANISTAN ... TO BAIL OUT U.S. IN HUNT FOR BIN LADEN," roared the headline.

This public insult must have angered the American military, particularly as it came after some British officers' widely reported derogatory comments about the U.S. military's fighting prowess, when Britain first joined the hunt for al-Qaeda in the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In any event, British troops saw little or no action at that time, and their casualties consisted of a hundred or so soldiers laid low by a mysterious stomach "bug" contracted in the line of duty, forcing them to do "The Bagram Quickstep."

The Daily Mirror reported that the second deployment was to be different; a senior defense source was quoted as saying: "What is needed is to make the back end of the country secure, the warlords disarmed, and the Taliban destroyed." One could imagine a Colonel Blimp figure smoothing his mustache and clearing his throat before adding that "the feeling is the current setup is not cutting the mustard."

The current setup was U.S. forces battling a spreading Pashtun-led insurgency against Karzai and his regime of venal warlords-cum-war criminals. Consequently, the writ of the impotent, benighted British favorite did not extend beyond the precincts of his palace in Kabul. So the British cavalry was going to ride to the rescue of the alleged "American Project."

John Reid, the British defense secretary, visited Kabul several times to prepare the way for the British deployment. On his last visit prior to leaving his post, he famously said that the British army hoped to leave Afghanistan "without firing a single shot."

However, these conciliatory statements were contradicted by the asides of his officers, who vouchsafed that such remarks were meant to lull the Pashtuns while British forces set up bases and prepared for battle: "A certain amount of deception is essential, don't you know," remarked one valiant officer to reporters in Kabul.

That British intentions were anything other than the settling of old scores with the Pashtuns was belied by the naming of all their military bases after the "heroes" of past British defeats suffered at Pashtun hands. This was reinforced by the widely reported utterances of their top commanding officers in Afghanistan.

Brig. Ed Butler, commander of the British forces in Kandahar, let it be known that he kept the memoirs of Lord Roberts of Kandahar by his bedside. This was the same "vicious runt" whose idea of honorable warfare was to tie captured Afghan nobles to the mouth of cannons and blow them to pieces so their relatives would be unable to find and bury their remains. Gen. Richards, the overall British commander, boasted that he was very happy to be in Kabul, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan: "It's in the blood, you know!"

All this jingoism and British military swagger was predicated on the assumption that NATO forces would be available to achieve British objectives when Richards assumed command of all Western forces in Afghanistan, as ISAF expansion out of Kabul morphed into a NATO presence throughout the country. However, events in Iraq and the "ground realities" in Afghanistan conspired to turn Britain's neo-imperial dreams into a nightmare of military reverses and humiliating retreats, which no amount of obfuscation and spin could hide.

In the prosecution of the Iraqi campaign, the British authorities frequently leaked to the press criticism of American efforts to control the violence in Iraq. It was intimated that the superior British methods of how to tame recalcitrant natives were not inculcated in the American occupying forces. Much was made of the British "soft hat" versus the American "hard hat" approach to peace enforcement. This debate was rudely terminated by the citizens of Basra, who forgot to play their assigned role of obedient natives and began to attack British forces at every opportunity. This was to have consequences for their planned operations in Afghanistan.

The rapid deterioration of the situation in the south of Iraq accentuated the bitter public debate about Britain's deepening involvement in Afghanistan, particularly as their forces were besieged in Basra. The British military responded by pointing out that American behavior had poisoned the atmosphere in Iraq. They said that, unlike in Iraq, in Afghanistan, "[Britain] would be in charge."

The "we would be in charge" hubris infected even the reporters of British broadsheets - there were incessant allusions to the fact that Gen. Richards would be commanding U.S. forces in Afghanistan; this singular event would mark only the second time since World War II that this had happened. What everyone failed to recall was that the American experience of the first occasion was unhappy. Gen. Eisenhower was constantly bombarded with unsolicited criticism and advice by Gen. Montgomery, forcing the mild-mannered and stoical Ike to rebuke the opinionated British general. History repeated itself when Gen. James L. Jones, supreme allied commander and Richards' superior, recently rebuked him and said if Richards had been an American officer he would have been dismissed.

While the British and their Canadian sidekicks were preparing to deploy troops to the Pashtun heartland in southern Afghanistan, it soon became clear that other NATO nations were not as keen to deploy their forces outside Kabul. This reluctance was most marked in Holland, where tremendous pressure was brought to bear on the Dutch to agree to the deployment of their men to the troubled Uruzgun province, despite the Dutch public's opposition to such a move. Germany chose to move their forces to the relative calm of the north, well away from the troublesome Pashtuns.

In the months prior to the deployment of ISAF forces to the south and west, the British took the lead in calling for a change in the rules governing the ISAF mission. Their efforts produced the term "robust peacekeeping"; it was intended to lend legitimacy to British offensive military operations in dealing with their historical enemy, the Pashtuns. The British intention to humble the Pashtuns was further signaled by symbolically placing Camp Bastion, their main base, close to Maiwand in Helmand province, where a major British force was almost annihilated by the Pashtuns in the 19th century.

The British deployment to Helmand was to be spearheaded by the Parachute Regiment. "The Paras," as they are fondly called, form the elite shock troops of the British army. Their fierce reputation is much trumpeted by the British public and media, and is meant to intimidate opponents even before they arrive on the scene. The Pashtun resistance leaders' response was the Afghan equivalent of "Bring 'em on!"

Within days of the British deployment to the south, articles appeared in the British press bemoaning the lack of past American commitment to controlling the spread of resistance in the south of the country in general, and Helmand in particular. It was emphasized that only 300 American troops were stationed in an area the size of half of England. Consequently, Helmand had become the bailiwick of Pashtun resistance in the south, thus making the British task more difficult, but not impossible.

The media enthusiastically reported Gen. Richards' remarks about past British successes in defeating insurgencies during the glory days of their empire. Aspects of the forthcoming campaign to tame the Pashtun hoards were elucidated. The "ink spot" strategy, a term translated from the French term tache d'huile, was explained. The British public, as well as the international audience, was being readied for a bravura performance by British forces. Alas, this did not happen; in fact, quite the opposite occurred.

The name of Sangin will join the battle at Maiwand in British and Afghan military lore. The Guardian in London gave the following account:

"On Wednesday August 30, a couple of Chinook helicopters landed at Camp Bastion, the main British base in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan, and a filthy, exhausted group of armed men walked down the ramp into the dust. The men of A Company of the 3rd battalion, Paratroop Regiment, had just completed their third and last stint in a town whose name has come to stand for the bloodiness of Britain's struggle against the Taliban: Sangin.

"Other British units have fought and suffered losses over the summer in that outwardly unremarkable town of 30,000 people, but none fought longer and took more casualties than A Company and the few dozen non-paras grouped with it. For the best part of two months, they experienced the kind of vicious combat British troops haven't seen since Korea. Roughly every seventh man in the original 65-strong company was killed or wounded. One platoon, the 1st, lost almost a third of its fighting strength: not quite D-Day levels, where airborne units were halved by combat, but getting close."

The Independent gave an equally harrowing account of the battle, but added that one of the Paras said that his bowels opened and he soiled himself when faced with leaving the transport helicopter in the midst of a fierce battle.

The news of other battles (Panjwii one and two, Operation Medusa, etc.), when investigated and reported, was just as shocking to British pride. The tough Paras had been stunned by the Pashtun determination to stand and fight; some of them even voiced their admiration for the skill and bravery of their foe.

As the realization and full import of British reverses sank into the minds of forces on the ground, but apparently not among their political masters in London, accounts of bitter recrimination and blame-apportioning surfaced in the British press.

In unprecedented actions, senior British field commanders began resigning and publicly speaking out against "Blair's War."

"[One] officer decided to leave after Tony Blair told exhausted troops that they were in war-torn [Afghanistan] for 'reconstruction.' The officer said: 'I couldn't believe what I was hearing. It is not a reconstruction exercise in Afghanistan. Every day lives are put at risk on the frontline. Hearing that message was a kick in the guts for me and the rest of the boys. The truth is not being told and there is anger on the frontline....'"

Another officer, "Captain Leo Docherty - aide to Colonel Charlie Knaggs, commander of British operations in Helmand - resigned claiming [British] strategy was 'barking mad.'"

The much-vaunted Royal Air Force's role in Afghanistan did not escape withering criticism: "in leaked e-mails, [Maj. James Loden] condemned the force as 'utterly, utterly useless.'" The RAF began to be called "The Royal Air Farce" by troops on the ground. The Ministry of Defense spokesman, safely in London, said, "We don't believe these views represent a widespread problem on the ground in Afghanistan."

Eventually, the military high command's solution to the grave situation facing British forces in Afghanistan was provided by Sir Richard Dannatt: Get British troops out of Iraq, where they were "part of the problem" and redeploy them in Afghanistan; otherwise, Britain faced defeat in both theaters. This "bombshell" put the beleaguered Blair on the spot - he couldn't act without permission from Washington.

Consequently, an unedifying British media campaign of denigrating the contribution of its European NATO allies was begun. The French and Italians were reported as propping up the bars at Kabul Airport, a drink in one hand and fondling the charms of comely ladies with the other. The German contingent was deemed to be acting as "traffic wardens and social workers" in northern Afghanistan.

By September 2006, the situation of British forces had seriously deteriorated, and it became obvious that NATO allies, apart from Canada and Holland, did not wish to join Britain's campaign against the Pashtuns. Therefore, Gen. Richards, from his bunker in Kabul, ordered ever increasing air strikes - it is estimated that the number of bombing sorties in Afghanistan was 10 times that flown in Iraq during the same period.

The concomitant civilian casualties were horrendous: whole families, and in some cases entire villages, were wiped out. The net result was the swelling of the ranks of the Pashtun resistance and increasing hatred of the Karzai regime and its foreign friends.

In October 2006, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist visited Kabul. On leaving he said that the war against the Taliban guerrillas could never be won militarily because the fighters were "too numerous," and "had too much popular support" to be defeated on the battlefield. "You need to bring them into a more transparent type of government. If that's accomplished, we'll be successful," he added. This was unwelcome news to those who had set out with different aims.

To counter Frist's definition of America's policy objectives in Afghanistan, Blair flew to Helmand in November to rally the demoralized British contingent. Trying to sound Churchillian, he informed the bemused troops, "Here in this extraordinary piece of desert is where the future in the early 21st century of world security is going to be played out." Raising the threat posed to "world security" by the Pashtun refusal to submit to a foreign yoke to the same level as past threats posed by the Wehrmacht or Red Army sounded ridiculous to anyone but the discredited and desperate Blair.

Churchill coined the aphorism that "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." The British media and public have become convinced that Blair has been engaged in this practice all the time, irrespective of a state of war or peace.

Blair's dissembling had little effect on the world stage: on the eve of the NATO summit in Riga, the Belgian defense minister announced that the conflict in Afghanistan could not be resolved militarily, and a political process had to be considered as part of NATO's exit strategy from the Afghan morass. The leaders of France, Germany, and Italy quickly voiced their support for the Belgian position. Seemingly, Britain was alone in wishing to keep slaughtering Pashtuns until they accepted Karzai as their leader and the cutthroats of the Northern Alliance as the new Afghan elite.

The decisions taken at the NATO Riga summit, and the anodyne statements issued at its close, dashed British hopes of using other countries' troops to achieve Britain's objectives. The ensuing British bitterness and anger can be gauged by the recent British claims published in The Independent: "British intelligence and military commanders have accused the U.S. of undermining British policies in Iraq and Afghanistan..."!

The neo-imperialists in London had failed to grasp what was obvious to M.K. Bhadrakumar, a seasoned Indian diplomat who, in numerous published articles, cautioned India against using the tag of "Taliban" to stigmatize the insurgents in Afghanistan. He added that the U.S. does not view the Pashtun "Taliban" through the same prism as India and Britain. Interestingly, the Pashtuns do not view the United States the way they view Britain: an insurgent commander in Kandahar province reportedly said, "We don't hate America - anyone is entitled to one mistake. But we hate the British because this is the fourth time they have invaded our land. We're determined to kill them and send them home in coffins."

Throughout the 10 years of Soviet occupation, and now five years of Western troops' presence on Afghan soil, the Pashtun majority has refused to accept direct or indirect foreign domination of their land. But during both periods, notwithstanding the myths spun about "heroes" such as "The Great Masood," the ethnic minorities, mainly inhabiting the north of the country, have either remained largely quiescent or actively collaborated with all foreign forces. Consequently, it has become an accepted fact in both Washington and Moscow that only the Pashtuns form a bulwark against any foreign power's efforts to drag Afghanistan into its sphere of influence. Therefore, both the United States and Russia have an interest in ending the present marginalization of the Pashtuns and facilitating their reintegration into the Afghan political calculus, thereby ending the present insurgency. Afghanistan's geo-strategic position, as well as its social fabric and cultural identity, dictates its natural destiny to be a neutral buffer between competing geopolitical tectonic plates.

Hence, as the United States nears the achievement of its primary objective of dismantling the international jihadist infrastructure in Afghanistan, it is naturally exploring modalities whereby it can withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. A successful and honorable withdrawal demands the formation of a new government acceptable to the majority of Afghans, as well as a different foreign security architecture for bringing peace to the country, while Afghan forces are being formed and trained.

The idea of a coalition government headed by Hamid Karzai is proposed by his Kabul supporters. However, the leadership of Hamid Karzai is as unacceptable to the insurgent Pashtuns as the leadership of Mullah Omar would be to those presently ensconced in Kabul. The means to resolve this conundrum would be the formation of an apolitical, technocratic transitional government, without the inclusion of either claimant or their circles. The concept of such a regime was mooted by some leading Afghans at the first "jirga" held in Kabul, but it was quickly stifled by the adherents of the Tajik Northern Alliance.

The Pakistani proposal of reconvening meetings of the "six plus two" (the U.S. and Russia plus Afghanistan's six contiguous neighbors), as well as its proposal for holding a joint "jirga" of all Pashtun tribes living on either side of the Durand Line, appear to be aimed at achieving this mode of settlement of the Afghan problem . Unfortunately, it has been vehemently rejected by the British-supported Karzai and those who wish to continue hanging onto power in Kabul, whatever the cost in Afghan lives or foreign blood and treasure.

Sir Robert Cooper's idea of "force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary" remains the British policy in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how long others will be deceived into supporting Britain's position and the hapless Karzai.

Within parties, by contrast, the battle is continuous and often intensely personal. Any party constantly anticipates the next reshuffle when some will be relegated making way for others to be promoted. Most of the time there is also a contest going on for the soul of the party, like that today between modernising and reactionary Tories.

Even though I have understood all that for more than 30 years, I have evidently not lost my capacity to be shocked. Because the viciousness within the Labour party now surpasses anything I had thought possible.

Look at the headlines generated by the cash for peerages affair. For a few days the hue and cry was against Gordon Brown who was accused (by someone) of proposing peerages for two political allies who had given money to Labour. Then it was alleged that Jonathan Powell, the prime minister's chief of staff, would bear the brunt of forthcoming police investigations. Another day we were told that staff at No 10 would be investigated for perverting the course of justice, having destroyed evidence. The newspapers helpfully reminded us that such crimes can be punished by life imprisonment and might be easier to prove than the corrupt award of a peerage.

Such stories do not come from nowhere. My guess is that most stem from either the Brown or Blair camps. Consider the implications. Supporters of the chancellor and the prime minister bandy accusations against their colleagues of potentially criminal behaviour. I cannot think of a precedent.

History provides many examples of political enmity. Enoch Powell, a Tory MP, so detested Edward Heath's policies that he refused to stand in the February 1974 election and urged people to vote Labour, probably sealing the government's defeat. Sir Geoffrey Howe's resignation speech in 1990 precipitated the end of Margaret Thatcher's premiership. After John Major sacked Norman Lamont, his chancellor, the two men did not speak for many years.

However, in none of those cases were the rivals seeking to get each other locked up. Whereas in the present case I am told that a Labour figure took what he hoped was damaging information about this administration to the police. Also, in the past the causes of the enmity were generally political, even if over time they also became highly personal.

Recently I interviewed Tony Benn about the stormy meeting of the parliamentary Labour party that followed the resignation of Aneurin Bevan in 1951 over the chancellor's decision to introduce charges for certain National Health Service supplies. Benn recalls that parliamentarians were offering to take each other outside for a punch- up, and in his diary he mentions Bevan's hatred and paranoia. But even if Hugh Gaitskell at the Treasury and Bevan also hated each other, their dispute was essentially political.

It is a mystery what the fundamental political difference between Brown and Tony Blair is meant to be. The chancellor wishes us to believe that it is not the Iraq war, relations with America or the renewal of our nuclear deterrent. Nor apparently is it the "need" for tough measures to combat domestic terror. Maybe there are differences on foundation schools and trust hospitals, but if so they are so arcane that probably even the warring factions could not explain them.

Perhaps some of Labour's hatred for Blair is because many feel that the party has been kidnapped by an outsider. They see the prime minister as a barely disguised Tory who has trampled on Labour's constitution and traditions. His sins are compounded by Iraq and his worst detractors regard him as a warmonger with blood on his hands. That might explain why they would happily see him end up in jail.

The fact that Blair has won Labour three unprecedented election victories cuts no ice. He has, his enemies say, done nothing to further equality during his time in office and in any case it is a coterie of cronies, not Labour, that has governed Britain for the past decade.

One question arises. Are the people who feed the fratricidal bile to the media really working for Brown or Blair? The short answer is yes. It is true that in the loosely licensed clusters of creeps who do this filthy work some go to excesses that embarrass (if not exactly outrage) their master. But protests of innocence from either Brown or Blair do not wash. These briefings have been going on for more than a decade and the two rivals are therefore by now responsible for everything said, even if the most outlandish accusations were not authorised specifically.

What, you might wonder, is the point of tarring Brown with allegations of corruption? The chancellor is unstoppable. No other candidate for the Labour leadership stands a chance. So the only result from tarnishing his reputation is to push the sleaze slick into Brown's administration and help David Cameron's election chances. To judge by the warmth with which the Tory leader was recently greeted in Brussels by Peter Mandelson, the European commissioner, you have to wonder on whose side Blair's friend will be at the general election. Certainly Mandelson's intelligence about Brown, perhaps along with a few suggestions for dirty tricks, could be helpful to the Tory campaign.

There is always a danger of underestimating Blair's ruthlessness. The charm disorients us still after all these years. But he is, in Chaucer's phrase, the smiler with the knife under the cloak. If Lord Levy needs to be sacrificed in the cash for peerages affair to secure Blair's survival (or freedom), he will be just the latest in a long line of businessmen who flew too close to the sun and were burnt.

The possibility of a politician being imprisoned is not unthinkable these days. I have had to visit two of my former colleagues in jail and their cases emphasise what a potent charge obstruction of justice is. Harold Wilson was never accused of any crime but Joseph Kagan, his raincoat maker, whom Wilson ennobled on his departure from Downing Street, subsequently served time.
It is hardly likely that Blair will be locked away. Even President Nixon avoided clink, although he needed a pardon to ensure it.

Indeed the police investigation may be a distraction in judging the prime minister's conduct. I can foresee him on the day that the investigation ends without charges against him claiming that this proves that he did nothing wrong. It will prove nothing of the sort.

Blair recommended four people for peerages, of whom three were ruled unsuitable by the Lords appointments commission, and that was before it became known that they had lent the Labour party money. At least some of them had been asked to convert their offered donations into loans: that is, to change from something that needed to be declared to something that could remain hidden.

Blair has claimed in recent days that the loans were scarcely odd since the men were being nominated for service to the Labour party. In fact they were proposed for their public service. Even if Levy is made a fall guy, we must recall that he did not put the men up for honours. That power rests with the prime minister alone.

I would be content if Blair were made to account to parliament for his actions. I do not demand that he be locked up and the key thrown away. But why should I? After all, I am not a member of the Labour party.

"Obviously, we'll continue to work with the Iraqi government. The key to success in Iraq is to have a government that's willing to deal with the elements there that are trying to prevent this young democracy from succeeding."

Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stood by Bush as he made his three-minute statement, then turned away, ignoring a reporter's question about the pending execution.

He thanked U.S. troops for their service, yet offered no hint that he was poised to send more of them to war.

"As I think about this plan, I always have our troops in mind," Bush said.

The president is considering the so-called surge option: increasing the number of troops in Iraq and embedding more U.S. advisers in Iraqi units in hopes of quelling violence to provide a window of opportunity for political reconciliation and rebuilding.

"I think the debate is really coming down to: Surge large. Surge small. Surge short. Surge longer," said Tom Donnelly, a defense and security expert at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. "I think the smart money would say that the range of options is fairly narrow and driven by the situation on the ground in Iraq."

Initially, White House advisers said Bush would announce a plan before Christmas. Then, they said it was more likely after the first of the year. His speech now is to occur in the early weeks of January.

James Carafano, senior fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation, said that if Bush is delaying his announcement, it has less to do with events in the United States and more to do with the situation in Iraq.

"If it were just picking a troop number, they'd be done by now," Carafano said. "My guess is that it (Bush's plan) has to synchronize with some kind of Iraqi domestic political situation in Iraq."

Some military experts support a surge in troop levels beyond the 140,000 already on the ground in Iraq. They contend this will provide a window of opportunity for rebuilding and a political reconciliation between the Sunni and Shiite factions.

Democrats and others in the military community say sending more troops only increases the Iraqis' dependence on U.S. forces and allows them to delay making the painful political compromises needed to end the violence. Democrats are calling on Bush to end America's open-ended commitment in Iraq and some want to see Congress put restrictions on funding any large increases in U.S. troops there.

The president's unexpected remarks last week that he backs future expansion of the overall size of the Army and Marine Corps to lessen strain on ground forces was viewed as a possible hint that he plans to send in more troops.

In an action that might also foreshadow an increase in troops, the Pentagon on Wednesday announced that the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., will deploy to Kuwait to serve as the reserve force early next year.

Bush said his New Year's resolution is that U.S. troops will be safe and that the United States, in 2007, helps Iraq move closer to being able to sustain, govern and defend itself.

"My resolution is, is that they'll be safe and that we'll come closer to our objective, that we'll be able to help this young democracy survive and thrive and, therefore, we'll be writing a chapter of peace," Bush said.

As he spoke, the administration was preparing for the execution of Saddam as early as this weekend. That prediction was based on information that U.S. officials in Baghdad were receiving from the Iraqi government, according to a senior administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he didn't want to overshadow the president's remarks.

The official said Bush would likely hold another National Security Council session before announcing his new strategy in Iraq in the first few weeks of January.

At the meeting here Thursday, Gates and Pace, who just returned from Iraq, elaborated on the briefing they gave the president at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland before Christmas. The bulk of the meeting focused on improving security in Iraq, but the president and his advisers also talked about economic and political issues.

Bush plans to return to Washington on Jan. 1. He and first lady Laura Bush will go immediately from Andrews Air Force Base to the Capitol to pay their respects to former President Gerald R. Ford (nyse: F - news - people ), whose casket will be on public display in the Rotunda.

Copyright 2006 Associated Press.

As Parry notes, this declension into madness has moved from very specific targets ("terrorist groups of global reach") to the more generalized and already impossibly vague "global war on terrorism" to the new formulation: a war against "radicals and extremists" - wherever they might be, however you decide, arbitrarily, to define them, and whether or not they engage in violence against the United States.

And make no mistake: the American Establishment as a whole has bought into the "war on terror" package in one form or another, i.e., viewing the murderous actions of a few bands of criminals not as a law enforcement problem to be tackled within the traditional systems of law and representative politics but as some wholly new, ludicrously overblown existential crisis of civilization that can only be "solved" by indiscriminate military force abroad and the gutting of civil liberties at home. In the Establishment, you will find almost no voice of any substance, reach or power that contests the latter view, although a few might quibble on how best to prosecute this endless war. Thus, the benchmarks that Bush is setting today, the way he is defining the "Long War" and establishing the patterns of executive power to deal with it will have a very large and continuing impact even when he is out of office. Why? Because as Parry shows here, Bush's expanding definitions of this endless war are being accepted by the Establishment - even now, when he is at one of the lowest ebbs of popular support that any president has ever faced.

So you should read Parry's whole piece. It's important not only as a description of what is happening today, but also as a guideline for where we will be heading in the future.

Bush's 'Global War on Radicals' (consortiumnews.com)

Excerpts: The United States will never win the "war on terror," in part, because George W. Bush keeps applying elastic definitions to the enemy, most recently expanding the conflict into a war against Muslim "radicals and extremists."

With almost no notice in Official Washington, Bush has inserted this new standard for judging who's an enemy as he lays the groundwork for a wider conflict in the Middle East and a potentially endless world war against many of the planet's one billion adherents to Islam.

Indeed, it could be argued that the "war on terror" has now morphed into the "war on radicals," allowing Bush to add the likes of Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the leaders of Syria and Iran to his lengthening international enemies list...

Now, Bush is broadening the war's parameters yet again, depicting the goal of his Middle East policy as defeating "radicals and extremists," categories that are even more elastic than the word "terrorist."

At a joint news conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Dec. 7, Bush said, "I believe we're in an ideological struggle between forces that are reasonable and want to live in peace, and radicals and extremists." Bush has repeated this formulation in other recent public appearances, including at his news conference of Dec. 20 when he portrayed the fight against "radicals and extremists" as a long-term test of American manhood....

In other words, the war against "terrorist groups of global reach," which became the "global war on terrorism," now has morphed into what might be called the "global war on radicals and extremists," a dramatic escalation of the war's ambitions with nary a comment from the U.S. news media.

So, under Bush's new war framework, the enemy doesn't necessarily have to commit or plot acts of international terrorism or even local acts of terrorism. It only matters that Bush judges the person to be a "radical" or an "extremist." While the word "terrorism" is open to abuse - under the old adage "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" - the definition of "radical" or "extremist" is even looser. It all depends on your point of view.

Sheehan told the Waco Tribune-Herald that she and others were conducting a "peace surge" to address concerns that Bush may increase U.S. troop numbers in Iraq. Protesters said they had expected to be arrested.

Sheehan and the others were arrested on a misdemeanor charge of obstructing a highway passageway, said a bond clerk at the McLennan County Jail in Waco. She said it was unclear if they would be arraigned Thursday evening. If not, she said, they would have to spend the night in jail.

Among those at the ranch were Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The protest briefly delayed state troopers who were to serve in escort motorcades for government officials meeting with Bush, King said.

None of the top advisers at the meeting were held up, Deputy White House press secretary Scott Stanzel said.

Earlier this month in New York, Sheehan was convicted of trespassing for leading a protest across the street from the United Nations.

A judge sentenced her to conditional discharge. Sheehan's attorney, Robert Gottlieb, said Thursday that meant she will not face any punishment as long as they lead a "law-abiding life" for the next year.

"There is nothing to say that what she was arrested for today means that she is not living a law-abiding life," Gottlieb told the AP. "She may in fact be innocent."

He said he didn't think Thursday's arrest would result in any problems in New York.

Sheehan, 49, of Vacaville, Calif., lost her 24-year-old son Casey in Iraq in April 2004. She has since drawn international attention after camping outside Bush's ranch to protest the war.

The trend prompted the Mayor of Philadelphia, John Street, to make a televised address last summer appealing to young people to cease fire. "Lay down your weapons," he pleaded. "Do it now. Choose education over violence." The number of murders in his city will exceed 400 this year for the first time in a decade.

Oakland in California fared worst this year with its homicide rate expected to soar 57 per cent. Less shocking but still worrying upturns in murder numbers are also being reported by cities as diverse as Chicago, Cincinnati, New Haven and Houston. In Houston, officials are pointing to the huge influx of refugees from Hurricane Katrina at the end of 2005.

New York, which has restored its reputation worldwide as a tourist-friendly city partly on the basis of years of falling murder rates, is not immune from the new trend.

As of Christmas Eve, the city had seen 579 murders in its five boroughs, an increase over 2005 of about 10 per cent.

Some neighbourhoods of New York contributed disproportionately to the worsening statistics. Some precincts in Harlem - whichhas undergone significant gentrification after being in the grip of violent crime for years - saw a doubling of murder rates in 2006.

Officials point out, however, that last year's tally of 539 murders in New York was the lowest for 40 years. The increase is partly due also to a reclassification of what counts as murders, by including in the tally a number of people who died from gun and stab wounds suffered in previous years. But even without those, the number would still be up marginally. It is a distressing statistic for Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

His predecessor, Mr Giuliani, has used his record of slashing crime in New York, combined with the plaudits earned for his response to the 9/11 terror attacks, to build a national political platform that may see him seeking the Republican nomination for President. Some believe that the current Mayor could also have presidential ambitions.

Mr Bloomberg has repeatedly complained about a flood of weapons into the city from neighbouring states. Several times this year, the city has sued out-of-state gun shops for selling weapons that are later identified as having been fired in murder cases in New York.

Tackling the mentality of some young people will be difficult. "They're all struggling with this thing about respect and pride," commented Francisco Ortiz, the police chief of New Haven, Connecticut, where murders rose 50 per cent this year. "It's about respect. It's about revenge. It's about having a reputation. It's about turf, and about girls."

On the brighter side, Los Angeles had reported 464 murders by Christmas Eve, a decline over last year of about 3.7 per cent, while in San Francisco the rate is expected to dip by about 15 per cent for the year.

Also seeing a significant improvement is New Orleans, largely due to a two-thirds drop in population in the months after Katrina.