"If Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders, including Jerusalem, acknowledges the right of return, lifts its siege, dismantles the settlements and the wall and releases the prisoners, then it is possible for us as Palestinians and Arabs to make a serious step to match the Zionist step," Meshal said.

"Anything ahead of this is hypothetical; the main Israeli
parties have four objections: they are unanimous in their rejection of the 1967 borders, Jerusalem, the right of return and dismantling the settlements, so there is no chance for a compromise," added Meshal, who has been in exile in Syria for years. [...]

A translation of Afshar's remarks was provided to The Associated Press.

Dehghani was quoted by the Iranian Student News Agency on Tuesday as saying: "We have announced that wherever (in Iran) America does make any mischief, the first place we target will be Israel."

His threat reinforced the Iranian president's call for Israel to be "wiped off the map" and added to international concern over Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Israeli elder statesman Shimon Peres reacted to Dehghani's warning with a call to Iran to scrap its nuclear program and a warning of his own: "Remember that Israel is exceptionally strong and knows how to defend itself."

The Entekhab News Agency said Afshar was asked about Dehghani's comments at a book exhibition in Tehran.

"Mr. Dehghani was the spokesman of a military maneuver which ended on April 8 (he has no official positions now) and his statement is his personal view and has no validity as far as the Iranian military officials are concerned," Afshar was quoted as saying.

Dehghani, who served as a spokesman during a large-scale war game by the elite Revolutionary Guards last month, was described in the Iranian Student News Agency report as a general and by Entekhab as a rear admiral.

He told the Student News Agency that the military exercises were held ahead of schedule to send a message to the U.S. and its allies against any plans for a military strike.

U.S. President George W. Bush has said a military option remains on the table if Iran doesn't agree to international demands to stop enriching uranium and open its nuclear program to intrusive inspections. But Bush has stressed that Washington wanted to solve the dispute through diplomacy.

The U.S., Britain and France are expected to circulate a Security Council resolution shortly, making mandatory the council's earlier demand that Iran halt uranium enrichment. They want the resolution adopted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which can be enforced by sanctions - or if necessary - military action.

But Russia and China, while concerned about Iran's nuclear program, say there is no evidence yet that they are pursuing nuclear weapons and oppose putting the resolution under Chapter 7.

Valid and binding contracts to build nuclear power plants were unilaterally abrogated;

Nuclear material rightfully purchased and owned by Iran was illegally withheld;

Exercise of Iran's right as a shareholder in several national and multinational nuclear power corporations was obstructed;

Unjustified and coercive interventions were routinely made in order to undermine, impede and delay the implementation of Iran's nuclear agreements with third parties; and

Unfounded accusations against Iran's exclusively peaceful nuclear program were systematically publicized.

As a result, and merely in order to prevent further illegal and illegitimate restrictions on its ability to procure its needed materials and equipments, Iran had been left with no option but to be discrete in its perfectly legal and exclusively peaceful activities. In doing so, Iran broke no laws nor diverted its peaceful program to military activities. It only refrained from disclosing the details of its programs. In nearly all cases, it was not even obliged to disclose these programs under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Therefore, while Iran's rights under the NPT continued to be grossly and systematically violated, and while major state parties to the Treaty persisted in their non-compliance with many of their obligations under Articles I, IV and VI of the Treaty in general, and under paragraph 2 of Article IV vis-à-vis Iran in particular, Iran nevertheless continued to diligently comply with all its obligations under the Treaty.

2. Nuclear Technology OR Nuclear Weapons?

A vicious cycle of restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and attempts by Iran to circumvent them through concealment and black market acquisitions have fueled mutual suspicions. In this self-perpetuating atmosphere, the conclusion is already drawn that Iran's declared peaceful nuclear program is just a cover for developing atomic weapons. But this conclusion is based on two erroneous assumptions, which have been repeated often enough to become conventional wisdom.

2.1- Iran Needs Nuclear Energy

2.1.1. Nuclear Energy for an Oil-Rich Country

The first is that Iran has vast oil and gas resources and therefore does not need nuclear energy. Although it is true that Iran is rich in oil and gas, these resources are finite and, given the pace of Iran's economic development, they will be depleted within two to five decades. With a territory of 1,648,000 km2 and a population of about 70 million, projected to be more than 105 million in 2050, Iran has no choice but to seek access to more diversified and secure sources of energy. Availability of electricity to 46,000 villages now, compared to 4400 twenty five years ago, just as an example, demonstrates the fast growing demand for more energy. And the youthfulness of the Iranian population, with around 70% under 30, doesn't allow complacency when it comes to energy policy. To satisfy such growing demands, Iran can't rely exclusively on fossil energy. Since Iranian national economy is still dependant on oil revenue, it can't allow the ever increasing domestic demand affect the oil revenues from the oil export.

2.1.2. US Support for Iranian Nuclear Program

Iran's quest for nuclear energy picked momentum following a study in 1974 carried out by the prestigious US-based Stanford Research Institute, which predicted Iran's need for nuclear energy and recommended the building of nuclear plants capable of generating 20,000 megawatts of electricity before 1994. Now, 30 years later, Iran aims at reaching that level by 2020, which may save Iran 190 million barrels of crude oil or $10 billion per year in today's prices.

Therefore, Iran's nuclear program is neither ambitious nor economically unjustifiable. Diversification - including the development of nuclear energy - is the only sound and responsible energy strategy for Iran.

Even the US State Department was convinced of this in 1978 when it stated in a memo that the U.S. was encouraged by Iran's efforts to expand its non-oil energy base and was hopeful that the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement would be concluded soon and that U.S. companies would be able to play a role in Iran's nuclear energy projects.

2.1.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Producing fuel for its nuclear power plants is an integral part of Iran's nuclear energy policy. While domestic production of fuel for this number of nuclear power plants makes perfect economic sense, Iran's decision should not be judged solely on economic grounds. Having been a victim of a pattern of deprivation from peaceful nuclear material and technology, Iran cannot solely rely on procurement of fuel from outside sources. Such dependence would in effect hold Iran's multi-billion dollar investment in power plants hostage to the political whims of suppliers in a tightly controlled market. Furthermore, it is self evident that the time-consuming efforts to gain the necessary technology and develop the capability for fuel production must proceed simultaneously with the acquisition and construction of nuclear power plants. Otherwise constructed plans may become obsolete in case of denial of fuel without a contingency capacity to produce it domestically.

2.2. Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons for Its Security

The second false assumption is that because Iran is surrounded by nuclear weapons in all directions - the U.S., Russia, Pakistan and Israel - any sound Iranian strategists must be seeking to develop a nuclear deterrent capability for Iran as well.

It is true that Iran has neighbors with abundant nuclear weapons, but this does not mean that Iran must follow suit. In fact, the predominant view among Iranian decision-makers is that development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons would only undermine Iranian security. Viable security for Iran can be attained only through inclusion and regional and global engagement. Iran's history is the perfect illustration of its geo-strategic outlook. Over the past 250 years, Iran has not waged a single war of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it initiated any hostilities.

Iran today is the strongest country in its immediate neighborhood. It does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors, who have historically been concerned with size and power disparities.

On the other hand, Iran, with its current state of technological development and military capability, cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region of the Middle East. Moreover, such an unrealistic option would be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic resources of the country. In sum, a costly nuclear-weapon option would reduce Iran's regional influence and increase its global vulnerabilities without providing any credible deterrence.

There is also a fundamental ideological objection to weapons of mass destruction, including a religious decree issued by the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibiting the development, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons.

3. Negotiations with UK, France and Germany (EU3)

3.1. Iran's Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

In October 2003, Iran entered into an understanding with France, Germany and the United Kingdom with the explicit expectation to open a new chapter of full transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear and other advanced technologies. Iran agreed to a number of important transparency and voluntary confidence building measures and immediately and fully implemented them.

It signed and immediately began full implementation of the Additional Protocol;

It opened its doors to one of the most expansive and intrusive IAEA inspections;

It provided a detailed account of its peaceful nuclear activities, all of which had been carried out in full conformity with its rights and obligations under the NPT;

It began and has continuously maintained for the past 2 years a voluntarily suspension of its rightful enrichment of Uranium as a confidence building measure;

It further expanded its voluntary suspension in February and November 2004, following agreements with EU3 in Brussels and Paris respectively, to incorporate activities which go well beyond the original IAEA's definition of "enrichment" and even "enrichment-related" activities.

3.1.1. Resolution of Outstanding Issues

Iran has worked closely with the IAEA, during the course of the last two years, to deal with the issues and questions raised about its peaceful nuclear program. All significant issues, particularly those related to the sources of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) have now been resolved. Indeed, except for few mostly speculative questions, nothing more remains to close this Chapter

3.1.2. No Indication of Non-Peaceful Activity

The Agency's thorough inspections of Iran have repeatedly confirmed Iran's assertion that no amount of inspection and scrutiny will ever show the slightest diversion into military activity. The Director-General confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme." After one more year and over a thousand person-days of the most rigorous inspections, the Director-General again confirmed in Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities." This conclusion has been repeatedly reaffirmed in every statement by responsible authorities of the IAEA.

3.2. Broken Promises and Expanded Demands by the EU3

Regrettably, Iran received very little, if anything, in return for its transparency, cooperation and voluntary suspension of the exercise of its legitimate and inalienable right. The European negotiating partners, pressured by the US, instead of carrying out their promises of cooperation and open access, have repeatedly called for expansion of Iran's voluntary confidence building measures only to be reciprocated by more broken promises and expanded requests:

The October 2003 promises of the EU3 on nuclear cooperation and regional security and non-proliferation was never even addressed.

The February 2004 written and signed commitment by the EU3 to "work actively to gain recognition at the June 2004 Board of the efforts made by Iran, so that the Board works thereafter on the basis of Director-General reporting if and when he deems it necessary, in accordance with the normal practice pertaining to the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol" was violated, even though Iran had in fact carried out its part of the deal by expanding its suspension to include assembly and component manufacturing. Instead, the EU3 proposed a harsh resolution with further unjustifiable demands in June 2004;

The EU3 never honored its recognition, in the Paris Agreement of November 2004, of "Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination."

In spite of its repeated and publicized claims, the EU3 never offered, throughout the negotiations process, any meaningful incentives to Iran, other than empty and demeaning "promises" of "consideration" of "possible future cooperation".

4. The Paris Agreement

In November 2004, following extensive negotiations, Iran and EU3 agreed on a package that has become known as the Paris Agreement. The objective of the Paris Agreement was to "to move forward" in "negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues."

The Paris Agreement envisaged that "while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements," and "to build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities."

At the same time, the EU3 recognized "that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation" as well as "Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination."

The Paris Agreement rested on the premise that the purpose of the Agreement was reaching mutually acceptable long term arrangements and that suspension was a temporary measure for as long as negotiations were making progress. The Agreement further envisaged specific mechanisms to monitor and assess progress.

4.1. March Report: Lack of Progress

In March 2005, in accordance with the Paris Agreement, senior officials from Iran and the three European countries were mandated to make an assessment of the progress that had been achieved. The reports of over three months of negotiations by the working groups, created by the Paris Agreement, made it evident that while there was every prospect for reaching a negotiated solution based on the Paris Agreement, and while Iran had made many significant and far-reaching proposals benefiting both sides, the EU3, faced with extraneous pressure, were simply trying to prolong fruitless negotiations. This policy, in addition to its devastating impact on mutual trust, was detrimental to Iran's interests and rights as it attempted to superficially prolong Iran's voluntary suspension by dragging the negotiations.

It also became evident that despite repeated requests by Iran from EU3 representatives to present their proposals and ideas on the implementation of various provisions of the Paris Agreement to the working groups, the European three did not have the intention or the ability to present its proposals on "objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes [and] equally ... firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues" as called for in that Agreement.

In short, it became evident that after massive pressure from the United States in the winter of 2005, the EU3 had conceded to unilaterally altering the Paris Agreement into solely an instrument of de-facto cessation of Iranian peaceful enrichment program, in violation of the letter and spirit of that Agreement.

4.2. Iran's Proposals

In February 2005, Iran suggested to the EU3 to ask the IAEA to develop technical, legal and monitoring modalities for Iran's enrichment program as objective guarantees to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would remain exclusively for peaceful purposes. While one member of EU3 accepted the suggestion, unfortunately the lack of consensus among the EU3 prevented resort to the IAEA as an authoritative and impartial framework for solving the impasse.

On March 23, 2005, in a clearly stated desire to salvage the Paris Agreement, Iran offered a collection of solutions for objective guarantees suggested by various independent scientist and observers from the United States and Europe. The package included:

1.

Strong and mutually beneficial relations between Iran and the EU/EU3, which would provide the best guarantee for respect for the concerns of each side;

2.

Confinement of Iran's enrichment program, in order to preclude through objective technical guarantees any proliferation concern:

1.


Open fuel cycle, to remove any concern about reprocessing and production of plutonium;

2.

Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level;

3.

Limitation of the extent of the enrichment program to solely meet the contingency fuel requirements of Iran's power reactors;

4.

Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to fuel rods to preclude even the technical possibility of further enrichment;

5.

Incremental and phased approach to implementation in order to begin with the least sensitive aspects of the enrichment program and to gradually move to enrichment as confidence in the program would be enhanced;

Legislative and regulatory measures

1.

Additional Protocol;

2.

Permanent ban on the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons through binding national legislation;

3.

Enhancement of Iran's export control regulations;

4.

Enhanced monitoring

1.

Continued implementation of the Additional Protocol; and

2.

Continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.

4.2.1. EU3 Inability to React

Extraneous pressure had resulted in the absence of any desire or ability by EU3 to even consider any "objective guarantee" as called for in the Paris Agreement and instead to maneuver to achieve a de-facto cessation of Iran's lawful activities. This extraneous political element precluded even a serious review by EU3 of these independently worked out proposals, which continue to have the most credible potential of providing a basis for allaying all reasonable concerns.

Even Iran's further good-faith effort on April 29, 2005 to salvage the process by suggesting the negotiated resumption of the work of the UCF- which had never had any past alleged failures, and is virtually proliferation free - at low capacity and with additional confidence building and surveillance and monitoring measures was rejected outright by EU3 officials without even consideration at political level.

4.2.2. Prelude to Breakdown in Nuclear Talks

Iran replied to such intransigence with self-restraint to ensure that no opportunity was spared for an agreed settlement. In a ministerial meeting in Geneva in May 2005, Iran agreed to extend the period of full suspension for another two months, in response to a commitment made by the EU3 ministers to finally present their comprehensive package for the implementation of the Paris Agreement by the end of July or early August 2005, that is nearly nine months after the Agreement.

Iran made it clear in Geneva that any proposal by the EU3 must incorporate EU3's perception of objective guarantees for the gradual resumption of the Iranian enrichment program, and that any attempt to turn objective guarantees into cessation or long-term suspension were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and therefore unacceptable to Iran.

4.2.3. A Further Compromise Suggested by Iran

Eager to salvage the negotiations, in a further message to the Ministers, Iran offered the most flexible solution to the EU3 as they were finalizing their package:

Commencement of the work of Esfahan plant (UCF)

At low capacity, Under full scope monitoring,

Agreed arrangements for import of the feed material and export of the product;

Initial limited operation at Natanz following

Further negotiations on a mutually acceptable arrangement,

or

Allowing the IAEA to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers, monitoring mechanism and other specifics;

Full scale operation of Natanz:

Based on a negotiated agreement;

Synchronized with the fuel requirements of future light water reactors.

4.3. EU's Package: Too Many Demands, No Incentives

Against all its sincere efforts and maximum flexibility, on 5 August 2005 Iran received a disappointing proposal. It not only failed to address Iran's rights for peaceful development of nuclear technology, but did not offer anything to Iran in return. It even fell far short of correcting the illegal and unjustified restrictions placed on Iran's economic and technological development, let alone providing firm guarantees for economic, technological and nuclear cooperation and firm commitments on security issues. While Iran had made it crystal clear that no incentive would be sufficient to compromise Iran's inalienable right to all aspects of peaceful nuclear technology, the offers of incentives incorporated in the proposal were in and of themselves demeaning and totally incommensurate with Iran and its vast capabilities, potentials and requirements.

4.3.1. Extra-Legal Demands of Binding Commitments from Iran

The proposal self-righteously assumed rights and licenses for the EU3 which clearly went beyond or even contravened international law and assumed obligations for Iran which have no place in law or practice. It incorporated a series of one-sided and self serving extra-legal demands from Iran, ranging from accepting infringements on its sovereignty to relinquishing its inalienable rights.

It sought to intimidate Iran to accept intrusive and illegal inspections well beyond the Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol. It asked Iran to abandon most of its peaceful nuclear program. It further sought to establish a subjective, discriminatory and arbitrary set of criteria for the Iranian nuclear program, which would have effectively dismantled most of Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure, criteria that if applied globally would only monopolize the nuclear industry for the Nuclear-Weapon States.

4.3.2. Vague, Conditional and Demeaning Offers to Iran

The proposal had absolutely no firm guarantees or commitments and did not even incorporate meaningful or serious offers of cooperation to Iran. It amounted to an elongated but substantively shortened and self-servingly revised version of an offer that had been proposed by EU3 and rejected by Iran in October 2004 even prior to the Paris Agreement. This indicated that there was no attempt on the part of EU3 to even take into consideration the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement in their proposal.

This point is further illustrated by the fact that the proposal never even mentioned the terms "objective guarantees", "firm guarantees" or "firm commitments", which were the foundations of the Paris Agreement. Instead it tried to replace "objective guarantees" with termination of Iran's hard gained peaceful nuclear program, and replace "firm guarantees and firm commitments" with vague, conditional and partial restatements of existing obligations.

In the area of security, the proposal did not go beyond repeating UN Charter principles or previously-made general commitments. Worse yet, the proposal even attempted to make EU3's commitment to these general principles of international law optional, partial, and conditional by prefacing the segment with the following statement: "The EU3 propose that, within the context of an overall agreement, this section could include, inter alia, the following mutual commitments in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations."

Another example is the negative security assurances provided in the proposal by the nuclear-weapons states of the EU3. The proposal offered the mere repetition - only by UK and France -- of a universal commitment already made by all nuclear weapon states in 1995 to all NPT members. It even made the application of that commitment to Iran contingent on an overall agreement by stating "Within the context of an overall agreement and Iran's fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom and France would be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995)."

In the area of technology cooperation, it failed to include even an indication - let alone guarantees -- of the EU3 readiness to abandon or ease its violations of international law and the NPT with regard to Iran's access to technology. For instance, while under the NPT, the EU3 is obliged to facilitate Iran's access to nuclear technology, the proposal makes a conditional and ambiguous offer "not to impede participation in open competitive tendering." And far from the generally advertised offer of EU cooperation with Iran in construction of new nuclear power plants, the proposal generously offered to "fully support long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field between Iran and Russia."

In the area of economic cooperation, the proposal only included a conditional recital of already existing commitments and arrangements. While most of the document amounted to general promises of future considerations, even specific offers went no further than conditional expressions of "readiness to discuss." Two examples may be sufficient in this regard: "The EU3 would continue to promote the sale of aircraft parts to Iran and be willing to enter into discussion about open procurement of the sale of civil passenger aircraft to Iran." Or, "the EU3 and Iran, as well as the Commission, would discuss possible future oil and gas pipeline projects."

This proposal made it self-evident that negotiations were not "proceeding" as called for in the Paris Agreement, due to EU3 policy of disregarding the requirements of that Agreement, reverting to their pre-Agreement positions, and prolonging a semblance of negotiations without the slightest attempt to move forward in fulfilling their commitments under the Tehran or Paris Agreements. This protracted continuation was solely designed to keep the suspension in place for as long as it takes to make "cessation" a fait accompli. This was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and was not in line with principles of good faith negotiations.

In short, the proposal, read objectively in the context of the negotiating history of the Paris Agreement as well as its letter and spirit, clearly illustrates the total abandonment of that Agreement by the EU3, who have conveniently accused Iran of the same.

4.3.3. Minimal Reaction from Iran

After such a long period of negotiations and all that Iran had done and continues to do in order to restore confidence as well as the flexibility that Iran has shown, there was no pretext for any further delay in the implementation of the first phase of Iran's proposal, by limited resumption of UCF at Esfahan, which has been free from any past alleged failures, and is virtually proliferation free. In this context, Iran informed the Agency of its decision to resume the uranium conversion activities at the UCF in Esfahan and asked the Agency to be prepared for the implementation of the Safeguards related activities in a timely manner prior to the resumption of the UCF activities.

4.4. Who Violated the Paris Agreement?

According to the Paris Agreement, "the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements." It also envisaged a mechanism for assessment of progress within three months. In the meeting of 23 March 2005, it was clear that there had been no progress over the preceding three months. As a clearly-stated attempt to salvage the agreement, Iran made its March 23rd proposal in terms of a package of objective guarantees.

The refusal of the EU3 to even consider that package coupled with their behavior in the course of the negotiations, their August 2005 proposal and their repeated statements during the time of the presentation of that proposal and since then made in abundantly clear that under pressure from the US following the Paris Agreement, the EU3 had decided to unilaterally change the nature of the Paris Agreement. This amounted to a breach of the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement as well as the principle of good-faith negotiations.

The EU3 negotiating posture and the empirical evidence of lack of progress had in fact removed any onus from Iran to continue the suspension. However, Iran decided to maintain the suspension of all enrichment related activities and resume only the UCF process, which is by definition a pre-enrichment process. Therefore, the assertion that Iran broke the Paris Agreement is a self-serving and factually false proposition. In fact, the reverse is the case.

5. Iran Goes the Extra Mile for a Negotiated Solution

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always wanted to ensure that no effort is spared in order to reach a negotiated resumption of its enrichment activities. It, therefore, engaged in good faith and intensive negotiations with the EU3 and other interested delegations during the Summit of the United Nations in September 2005 in order to remove obstacles to the resumption of good-faith and result-oriented negotiations in accordance with established rights and obligations under the NPT. In this context, Iran responded positively to a proposal which would have removed any concern about the continued operation of the UCF in Esfahan at lower capacity for a specific period to allow negotiations to reach results. Iran also agreed to resume negotiations with the EU3 and to consider all proposals that had been presented.

Furthermore, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his address to the General Assembly on September 17, 2005, made yet another far reaching offer of added guarantee by inviting international partnership in Iran's enrichment activities.

While the President reiterated that Iran's right to have fuel cycle technology was not negotiable, he presented the following confidence-building positions and proposals in his statement:

Readiness for constructive interaction and a just dialogue in good faith;

Prohibition of pursuit of nuclear weapons in accordance with religious principles;

Necessity to revitalize the NPT;

Cooperation with the IAEA as the centerpiece of Iran's nuclear policy;

Readiness to continue negotiations with the EU3;

Readiness to consider various proposals that have been presented;

Welcome the proposal of South Africa to move the process forward;

Acceptance of partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran which engages other countries directly and removes any concerns.

6. Abuse of IAEA Machinery

Regrettably, the EU3, pressed by the United States, adopted a path of confrontation in the September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. In clear violation of their October 2003 and November 2004 commitments, the EU3moved a politically motivated and factually and legally flawed resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors, and together with the United States and using all their combined diplomatic and economic leverages imposed it on the Board through an unprecedented resort to voting rather than the previously unbroken practice of consensus.

6.1. No Legal or Factual Grounds for IAEA "Findings"

The imposed resolution makes a mockery of the proceedings of the Board of Governors by rehashing alleged failures that had already been dealt with in the November 2003 Board. At that time, despite the existence of ambiguities and serious questions on important issues such as the source of HEU contamination, "findings" of "non-compliance" or "absence of confidence" in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program were impossible.

The Board refrained from making such findings in 2003 not because of a now-claimed "voluntary restraint" by EU3, but because such were factually and legally impossible due to the nature of failures - which were solely of technical reporting character -- and also because of the fact that the Director-General had specifically stated in his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme."

It is ironic that after two years of cooperation, over 1200 person/days of intrusive inspections, resolution of nearly all outstanding issues particularly the foreign source of contamination, and after repeated reiteration of the finding of non-diversion including the conclusion in the IAEA November 2004 report that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities," the imposed resolution discovered ex post facto that the failures "detailed in Gov/2003/75 [the aforementioned report of November 2003] constitutes non-compliance."

6.2. The Real Story: Pressure to Deny Iran's Inalienable Rights

While the resolution attempted to create a convenient - albeit false - pretext of these alleged and old reporting failures for its so-called "findings", it is abundantly clear that the reason for production of this resolution was by no means those alleged failures, but instead the resumption of Iran's perfectly legal and safeguarded activities in Esfahan.

In this context, it must be underlined that all States party to the NPT, without discrimination, have an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As this right is "inalienable", it cannot be undermined or curtailed under any pretext. Any attempt to do so, would be an attempt to undermine a pillar of the Treaty and indeed the Treaty itself.

Iran, like any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, had no obligation to negotiate and seek agreement for the exercise of its "inalienable" right, nor could it be obligated to suspend it. Suspension of Uranium enrichment, or any derivative of such suspension, is a voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure, effectuated by Iran in order to enhance cooperation and close the chapter of denials of access to technology imposed by the west on Iran. It is not an end in itself, nor can it be construed or turned into a permanent abandonment of a perfectly lawful activity, thereby perpetuating, rather than easing, the pattern of denial of access to technology.

The suspension of Uranium enrichment has been in place for nearly two years, with all its economic and social ramifications affecting thousands of families. The EU3 failed to remove any of the multifaceted restrictions on Iran's access to advanced and nuclear technology. In a twist of logic, it even attempted to prolong the suspension, thereby trying to effectively widen its restrictions instead of fulfilling its commitments of October 2003 and November 2004 to remove them.

As the IAEA Board of Governors had underlined in its past and current resolution, suspension "is a voluntary, non-legal binding confidence building measure". When the Board itself explicitly recognizes that suspension is "not a legally-binding obligation", no wording by the Board can turn this voluntary measure into an essential element for anything. In fact the Board of Governors has no factual or legal ground, nor any statutory power, to make or enforce such a demand, or impose ramifications as a consequence of it.

7. The Way Forward: No Coercion, Good-Faith Negotiations

The recently imposed resolution on the IAEA Board of Governors is devoid of any legal authority, and any attempt to implement it will be counter-productive and will leave Iran with no option but to suspend its voluntary confidence building measures. The threat of referral to the Security Council will only further complicate the issue and will not alter Iran's resolve to exercise its legitimate and inalienable rights under the NPT.

At the same time, Iran is determined to pursue good-faith interaction and negotiations, based on equal footing, as the centerpiece of its approach to the nuclear issue. A diplomatic and negotiated framework is the desired approach for a successful outcome and Iran is ready to consider all constructive and effective proposals.

Iran welcomes consultations and negotiations with other countries in order to facilitate the work of the Agency and calls on the EU3 to replace the course of confrontation with interaction and negotiation to reach understanding and agreement.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and considers nuclear weapons and capability to produce or acquire them as detrimental to its security. Iran will continue to abide by its obligations under the NPT and will continue to work actively for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Dehghani was quoted by the Iranian Student News Agency on Tuesday as saying: " We have announced that wherever (in Iran) America does make any mischief, the first place we target will be Israel."

His threat reinforced the Iranian president's call for Israel to be "wiped off the map" and added to international concern over Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Israeli elder statesman Shimon Peres reacted to Dehghani's warning with a call to Iran to scrap its nuclear program and a warning of his own: "Remember that Israel is exceptionally strong and knows how to defend itself."

The Entekhab News Agency said Afshar was asked about Dehghani's comments at a book exhibition in Tehran.

"Mr. Dehghani was the spokesman of a military maneuver which ended on April 8 (he has no official positions now) and his statement is his personal view and has no validity as far as the Iranian military officials are concerned," Afshar was quoted as saying.

Dehghani, who served as a spokesman during a large-scale war game by the elite Revolutionary Guards last month, was described in the Iranian Student News Agency report as a general and by Entekhab as a rear admiral.

He told the Student News Agency that the military exercises were held ahead of schedule to send a message to the U.S. and its allies against any plans for a military strike.

U.S. President George W. Bush has said a military option remains on the table if Iran doesn't agree to international demands to stop enriching uranium and open its nuclear program to intrusive inspections. But Bush has stressed that Washington wanted to solve the dispute through diplomacy.

The U.S., Britain and France are expected to circulate a Security Council resolution shortly, making mandatory the council's earlier demand that Iran halt uranium enrichment. They want the resolution adopted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which can be enforced by sanctions - or if necessary - military action.

But Russia and China, while concerned about Iran's nuclear program, say there is no evidence yet that they are pursuing nuclear weapons and oppose putting the resolution under Chapter 7.

The latest US National Security Strategy document, published this year, labeled Iran as the most serious challenge to the United States posed by any country. This should be an indication of just how safe the US is in the post-Cold War world, where the "most serious challenge" is no longer a rival superpower with thousands of nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems capable of destroying the country, but a Third World nation on the far side of the planet that, according to the latest National Intelligence Estimate out of Washington, is at least 10 years away from actually producing a usable nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, Iran has no capacity to develop any delivery system in the foreseeable future capable of landing a weapon within 16,000 kilometers of US shores.

However, despite the fact that there is no evidence that Iran is even developing nuclear weapons in the first place, the Bush administration and congressional leaders of both main US parties argue that simply having the technology that would make it theoretically possible for Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon at some point in the future is sufficient casus belli.

As part of his desperate search for enemies, President George W Bush claimed in January that a nuclear-armed Iran would be "a grave threat to the security of the world", words that echoed language he used in reference to Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion of that oil-rich country.

Meanwhile, Vice President Dick Cheney vowed "meaningful consequences" if Iran did not give up its nuclear program, and US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton claimed there would be "tangible and painful consequences" if Iran did not cooperate.

The Washington Post quoted White House sources as reporting that "Bush views Tehran as a serious menace that must be dealt with before his presidency ends", apparently out of concern that neither a Democratic nor Republican successor might be as willing to consider a military option.

Not that he needs to worry about that. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, widely seen as the front-runner for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, accused the Bush administration in January of not taking the threat of a nuclear Iran seriously enough, criticized the administration for allowing European nations to take the lead in pursuing a diplomatic solution, and insisted that the administration should make it clear that military options were being actively considered.

Similarly, Democratic Senator Evan Bayh, another likely contender for the Democratic presidential nomination, accused the Bush administration of "ignoring and then largely deferring management of this crisis to the Europeans". Taking the diplomatic route, according to Bayh, "has certainly been damaging to our national security".

Despite the hostility of these two Democratic senators toward diplomatic means of resolving the crisis and the similarity of their rhetoric to the false claims they made prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein's government was a threat to global security and that diplomatic solutions were impossible, both Clinton and Bayh are widely respected by their fellow Democrats as leaders on security policy.

Indeed, in May 2004, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution, with only three dissenting votes, calling on the Bush administration to "use all appropriate means" - presumably including military force - to "prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons".

As with the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, Republican and Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill have tended to call witnesses before the relevant committees who would present the most alarmist perceptions as fact. Last month, for example, Patrick Clawson of the right-wing Washington Institute for Near East Policy testified before the Senate International Relations Committee: "So long as Iran has an Islamic Republic, it will have a nuclear-weapons program, at least clandestinely."

None of the senators present, however, bothered to mention the inconvenient fact that under the secular regime of the shah that preceded the Islamic Republic, Iran also had a nuclear program (which was actively supported and encouraged by the United States). However, Clawson said that since a nuclear program was inevitable under the Islamic Republic, only by overthrowing the government - not through a negotiated settlement - would the US be safe from the nuclear threat. He insisted, therefore, that "the key issue" was not whether an arms-control agreement could be enforced, but "how long will the present Iranian regime last?"

The risks from a US attack on Iran
With the ongoing debacle in Iraq, any kind of ground invasion of Iran by US forces is out of the question. Iran is three times as big as Iraq, in terms of both population and geography. It is a far more mountainous country that would increase the ability of the resistance to engage in guerrilla warfare, and the intensity of the nationalist backlash against such a foreign invasion would likely be even stronger.

An attack by air- and sea-launched missiles and bombing raids by fighter jets would be a more realistic scenario. However, even such a limited military operation would create serious problems for the US.

The Washington Post, in a recent article about a possible US strike against Iran, quoted Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Central Intelligence Agency Middle East specialist, as noting that "the Pentagon is arguing forcefully against it because it is so constrained" by ongoing operations in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan.

Similarly, the Post quoted a former Pentagon official in contact with his former colleagues as observing, "I don't think anybody's prepared to use the military option at this point." Given the growing opposition to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 's handling of the war in Iraq within the leadership of the armed services, as expressed by a number of prominent recently retired generals, a major military operation without strong support from America's military leadership would be particularly problematic.

Fears expressed by some opponents of possible US military action against Iran that the Iranians would retaliate through terrorist attacks against US interests are probably not realistic. Indeed, Iran's control over foreign terrorist groups and its role in terrorist operations have frequently been exaggerated by US analysts.

However, there are a number of areas in which the United States would be particularly vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. One would be in the Persian Gulf, where US Navy ships could become easy targets for Iranian missiles and torpedoes.

Perhaps more serious problems would be in Iraq, where US troops are operating against the Sunni-led insurgency alongside Iranian-backed pro-government militias. If these Iranian-backed militias also decided to turn their guns on American forces, the US would be caught in a vise between both sides in the country's simmering civil war with few places to hide.

It would be difficult for the US to label militias affiliated with the ruling parties of a democratically elected government fighting foreign occupation forces in their own country as "terrorists" or to use such attacks as an excuse to launch further military operations against Iran. (Given that the Iraqi government is ruled by two pro-Iranian parties, recent charges by the Bush administration that Iran is aiding the anti-government Sunni insurgency are utterly ludicrous and have been rejected by Baghdad.)

A US air strike would be a clear violation of the UN Charter and would be met by widespread condemnation in the international community. It would further isolate the US as a rogue superpower at a time in which it needs to repair its damaged relations with its European and Middle Eastern allies.

Even Britain has expressed its opposition to military action. Pro-Western Arab states, despite their unease at Iran's nuclear program, would react quite negatively to a US strike, particularly since it would likely strengthen anti-American extremists by allowing them to take advantage of popular opposition to the US utilizing force against a Muslim nation in order to defend the US-Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region.

As a result, the negative consequences of a US attack may be strong enough to persuade even the Bush administration not to proceed with the military option.

Israel as a proxy
Though direct US military action against Iran is still very possible, it is more likely that the United States will encourage Israel to take military action instead. In such a scenario, US officials believe that the United States would gain the perceived benefits of a military strike against Iran while limiting the damage to the US by focusing the world's wrath on Israel.

Fox News has reported that Bush administration officials in effect told the Israelis that "we are doing the heavy lifting in Iraq and Afghanistan ... and that Israel needs to handle this themselves".

Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to violate international legal norms and - with US veto power blocking the Security Council from imposing sanctions on Israel, and the United States providing vast sums of unconditional military and economic assistance to the Israeli government - its ability to get away with doing so.

The Israeli government is convinced that the US occupation of Iraq has radicalized the Iranian clerical leadership and that Iran, unlike Iraq in the final years of Saddam Hussein, poses a risk to Israel's national-security interests. However, for reasons mentioned above, Israeli leaders have been reported to believe that the US will not move militarily against Iran and that they will end up using their own forces instead.

An Israeli strike is not inevitable, however. Public opinion polls show that a majority of Israelis oppose the idea. Policy analyst Steve Clemons was quoted in the Washington Monthly as saying, "I have witnessed far more worries about Iranian President [Mahmud] Ahmadinejad's anti-Holocaust and anti-Israel rhetoric in the US than I did in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem ... Nearly everyone I spoke to in Israel, who ranged in political sympathies from the Likud right to ... left, thought that ... Israel thought it wrong-headed and too impulsive to be engaged in saber-rattling with Iran at this stage."

He added, "Israeli national-security bureaucrats - diplomats and generals - have far greater confidence that there are numerous potential solutions to the growing Iran crisis short of bombing them in an invasive, hot attack."

There is no indication that Iran would ever contemplate a first strike against Israel or any other country. Tehran, like other Islamic governments in the region, has used Israel's repression of the Palestinians for propaganda purposes, but has rarely done anything actually to help the Palestinians. It is inconceivable that the Iranians would ever consider launching a nuclear attack on Israel - which possesses at least 300 nuclear weapons and sophisticated missiles and other delivery systems that could destroy Iran - for the sake of the Palestinians, many thousands of whom would die as well. However, an Israeli attack could give Iran grounds for retaliation.

Despite these dangers, Israel - with US encouragement - has long considered the possibility of an attack against Iran.

In the mid-1990s, prior to the election of the US-backed Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu to office, the peace process with the Palestinians was progressing steadily, a peace treaty had been signed with Jordan, and diplomatic and commercial ties with other Arab states was growing.

With the prospects of a permanent Israeli-Arab peace, US arms exporters and their allies in Congress and the administration of president Bill Clinton, along with their hawkish counterparts in Israel, began emphasizing the alleged threat to Israel from Iran as justification for the more than $2 billion worth of annual US taxpayer subsidies for US arms exporters for them to send weapons to Israel.

Among these was an agreement to provide Israel with sophisticated F-15 fighter-bombers. As the peace process faltered because of increased repression and colonization by Israel and increased terrorism from radical Palestinian groups and as reformists appeared to be gaining momentum in Iran, Israel began focusing on more immediate threats closer to home, though deliveries of the F-15s continued through 2001.

Last year, however, the US unexpectedly provided Israel with an additional 30 long-range F-15s at a cost of $48 million each. The US has also recently provided Israel with 5,000 GBU-27 and GBU-28 weapons, better known as "bunker-busters", warheads guided by lasers or satellites that can penetrate up to 10 meters of earth and concrete to destroy suspected underground facilities.

Reuters reported a senior Israeli security source as noting, "This is not the sort of ordnance needed for the Palestinian front. Bunker-busters could serve Israel against Iran ..." Israel also has at least five submarines armed with sea-launched missiles that could easily get within range of Iranian targets.

One scenario reportedly has Israel sending three squadrons of F15s to fly over Jordanian and Iraqi airspace, currently controlled by the US Air Force, to strike at major Iranian facilities. The US would provide satellite information for the attack as well as refueling for the Israeli jets as they leave Iranian air space for their return to Israel.

The London Sunday Times has reported that the Israelis have been "coordinating with American forces" for such a scenario. That same article described Israeli commando training operations at a full-sized mockup of Iran's Natanz nuclear facility at a military facility in Israel's Negev Desert and the dispatch of clandestine Israeli Special Forces units into Iran. Meanwhile, the Israeli Ofek-6 spy satellite is now reported to have been moved to an orbit over Iranian facilities.

As far back as April 2004, Bush exchanged letters with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in which he stated, in reference to Iran, that "Israel has the right to defend itself with its own forces".

Despite the widely held tail-wagging-the-dog assumptions, history has shown that the US has frequently used Israel to advance its strategic interests in the region and beyond, such as aiding pro-Western governments and pro-Western insurgencies, keeping radical nationalist governments such as Syria in check, and engaging in covert interventions in Jordan, Lebanon, and now Kurdistan.

During the 1980s, Israel was used to funnel arms to third parties the US could not arm directly, such as the apartheid regime South Africa, the Guatemalan junta, the Nicaraguan Contras and, ironically, the Iranian mullahs. Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 - despite formal criticism - was enthusiastically supported by the administration of US president Ronald Reagan.

One Israeli analyst was quoted as saying in the Washington Post during the Iran-Contra scandal, "It's like Israel has become just another federal agency, one that's convenient to use when you want something done quietly." Nathan Shahan wrote in Yediot Ahronot that his country serves as the "Godfather's messenger", since Israel "undertakes the dirty work of the Godfather, who always tries to appear to be the owner of some large, respectable business".

Israeli satirist B Michael describes US aid to Israel as a situation where "my master gives me food to eat and I bite those whom he tells me to bite. It's called strategic cooperation."

Just as the ruling elites of medieval Europe used the Jews as money-lenders and tax collectors to avoid the wrath of an exploited population, the elites of the world's one remaining superpower would similarly be quite willing to use Israel to do their dirty work against Iran. That way Israel, not the US, will get the blame. (In fact, there are those who blame Israel even when the United States takes military action itself, such as the various conspiracy theories now circulating that the US invasion of Iraq was done on behalf of Israel.)

It won't work
A military strike against Iran, either directly by the US or through Israel, will not likely succeed in curbing Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, it will likely motivate the Iranian government, with enhanced popular support in reaction to foreign aggression against their country, to redouble its efforts.

Iran has deliberately spread its nuclear facilities over a wide geographical range, in at least nine major locations. Even the bunker-buster bombs may not fully penetrate a number of these facilities, assuming all the secret sites could be located.

The US-backed Israeli raid of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, according to virtually all accounts by Iraqi nuclear scientists, was at most a temporary setback for Saddam Hussein's nuclear program and ultimately led to the regime accelerating its timetable for the development of nuclear weapons until it was dismantled under the watch of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency in the early 1990s. Despite this, the US Congress passed a resolution in 1991 defending Israel's action and criticizing the UN for its opposition to Israel's illegal military attack.

The only real solution to the standoff over Iran's nuclear program is a diplomatic one. For example, Iran has called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone for the entire Middle East in which all nations in the region would be required to give up their nuclear weapons and open up their programs to strict international inspections. Iran has been joined in its proposal by Syria, by US allies Jordan and Egypt, and by other Middle Eastern states. Such nuclear-weapons-free zones have already been successfully established for Latin America, the South Pacific, Antarctica, Africa and Southeast Asia.

The Bush administration and congressional leaders of both US parties have rejected such a proposal, however, insisting that the United States has the right to decide unilaterally which countries get to have nuclear weapons and which ones do not, in effect imposing a kind of nuclear apartheid.

In 1958, the US was the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East region, bringing tactical nuclear bombs on its ships and planes. Israel became a nuclear-weapons state by the early 1970s with the quiet support of the US government. To Iran's east, Pakistan and India have developed nuclear weapons as well, and the Bush administration recently signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India and has provided both countries with nuclear-capable jet fighter-bombers.

Located in such a dangerous region, then, it is not surprising that Iran might be seeking a nuclear deterrent. The US and Israel do not want Iran to have such a deterrent, however, since it would challenge the US-Israeli nuclear monopoly in that oil-rich region. In other words, what those in the Bush administration, the Israeli government and the bipartisan leadership in Congress are concerned about is protecting the hegemonic interests of the US and its junior partner Israel, not stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Such a policy does not protect the interests of the American or Israeli people, nor does it help the people of Iran and the Middle East as a whole. It remains to be seen, however, whether the American public will once again allow the Bush administration and the leadership of both parties in Congress successfully to employ exaggerated stories of potential "weapons of mass destruction" controlled by an oil-rich country on the far side of the world to justify a disastrous war.

Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy In Focus Project. He serves as a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco and is the author of Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).

The lifts in the New York Hilton played CNN on a small screen you could not avoid watching. Iraq was top of the news; pronouncements about a "civil war" and "sectarian violence" were repeated incessantly. It was as if the US invasion had never happened and the killing of tens of thousands of civilians by the Americans was a surreal fiction. The Iraqis were mindless Arabs, haunted by religion, ethnic strife and the need to blow themselves up. Unctuous puppet politicians were paraded with no hint that their exercise yard was inside an American fortress.

And when you left the lift, this followed you to your room, to the hotel gym, the airport, the next airport and the next country. Such is the power of America's corporate propaganda, which, as Edward Said pointed out in Culture and Imperialism , "penetrates electronically" with its equivalent of a party line.

The party line changed the other day. For almost three years it was that al-Qaeda was the driving force behind the "insurgency", led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a bloodthirsty Jordanian who was clearly being groomed for the kind of infamy Saddam Hussein enjoys. It mattered not that al-Zarqawi had never been seen alive and that only a fraction of the "insurgents" followed al-Qaeda. For the Americans, Zarqawi's role was to distract attention from the thing that almost all Iraqis oppose: the brutal Anglo-American occupation of their country.

Now that al-Zarqawi has been replaced by "sectarian violence" and "civil war", the big news is the attacks by Sunnis on Shia mosques and bazaars. The real news, which is not reported in the CNN "mainstream", is that the Salvador Option has been invoked in Iraq. This is the campaign of terror by death squads armed and trained by the US, which attack Sunnis and Shias alike. The goal is the incitement of a real civil war and the break-up of Iraq, the original war aim of Bush's administration. The ministry of the interior in Baghdad, which is run by the CIA, directs the principal death squads. Their members are not exclusively Shia, as the myth goes. The most brutal are the Sunni-led Special Police Commandos, headed by former senior officers in Saddam's Ba'ath Party. This unit was formed and trained by CIA "counter-insurgency" experts, including veterans of the CIA's terror operations in central America in the 1980s, notably El Salvador. In his new book, Empire's Workshop (Metropolitan Books), the American historian Greg Grandin describes the Salvador Option thus: "Once in office, [President] Reagan came down hard on central America, in effect letting his administration's most committed militarists set and execute policy. In El Salvador, they provided more than a million dollars a day to fund a lethal counter-insurgency campaign . . . All told, US allies in central America during Reagan's two terms killed over 300,000 people, tortured hundreds of thousands and drove millions into exile."

Although the Reagan administration spawned the current Bushites, or "neo-cons", the pattern was set earlier. In Vietnam, death squads trained, armed and directed by the CIA murdered up to 50,000 people in Operation Phoenix. In the mid-1960s in Indonesia CIA officers compiled "death lists" for General Suharto's killing spree during his seizure of power. After the 2003 invasion, it was only a matter of time before this venerable "policy" was applied in Iraq.

According to the investigative writer Max Fuller (National Review Online), the key CIA manager of the interior ministry death squads "cut his teeth in Vietnam before moving on to direct the US military mission in El Salvador". Professor Grandin names another central America veteran whose job now is to "train a ruthless counter-insurgent force made up of ex-Ba'athist thugs". Another, says Fuller, is well-known for his "production of death lists". A secret militia run by the Americans is the Facilities Protection Service, which has been responsible for bombings. "The British and US Special Forces," concludes Fuller, "in conjunction with the [US-created] intelligence services at the Iraqi defence ministry, are fabricating insurgent bombings of Shias."

On 16 March, Reuters reported the arrest of an American "security contractor" who was found with weapons and explosives in his car. Last year, two Britons disguised as Arabs were caught with a car full of weapons and explosives; British forces bulldozed the Basra prison to rescue them. The Boston Globe recently reported: "The FBI's counter-terrorism unit has launched a broad investigation of US-based theft rings after discovering that some of the vehicles used in deadly car bombings in Iraq, including attacks that killed US troops and Iraqi civilians, were probably stolen in the United States, according to senior government officials."

As I say, all this has been tried before - just as the preparation of the American public for an atrocious attack on Iran is similar to the WMD fabrications in Iraq. If that attack comes, there will be no warning, no declaration of war, no truth. Imprisoned in the Hilton lift, staring at CNN, my fellow passengers could be excused for not making sense of the Middle East, or Latin America, or anywhere. They are isolated. Nothing is explained. Congress is silent. The Democrats are moribund. And the freest media on earth insult the public every day. As Voltaire put it: "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities."

This article first appeared in the New Statesman. For the latest in current and cultural affairs subscribe to the New Statesman print edition.

© New Statesman 1913 - 2006

In Iraq, our descent into hell, our "Apocalypse Now" moment, has begun. First there was Gitmo, then the global rendition program, then Abu Ghraib, then the pulverizing of Fallujah, and now trigger-happy raids that are filling multitudes of sandy graves with men, women and children. Has "Kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" become the mission in Babylon? Can't anyone remember Vietnam, where we left behind more than a million dead civilians? In Iraq, we've way past the half-million mark, probably the million mark, if you count the 1990s sanctions. Are the American people as blind and deaf as they seem? Don't we see ourselves walking through the gates of hell and can't we hear the doors clanging shut on our country?

Who am I to say all this, you might ask. Fair enough, I reply. So let me tell you a story about monstrous crimes and tragedies from my generation about to be repeated in Iraq in front of the whole world. First, understand that a single soldier can't be expected to grasp the total criminality of war because his whole universe is a tiny place right in front of his nose. So he can stay alive. If he knew everything that was going on, he would be heartbroken, and if he also knew why, he would go insane.

The narrowness of his vision is exactly how even the best and most humane soldier unwillingly becomes a monster, and the people who create war know this. Out of grief and rage, with the stench of his buddy's shredded flesh in his nostrils, the soldier stops asking questions and then begins making up his own rules with a rifle. He has touched the heart of darkness and there's no going back ever. Embracing the whore called war destroys morality, and doing all this in a dishonorable cause compounds the damage.

That's why we who have been there must speak out forcefully. If it requires a stiff punch in the mouth to jump-start some addled neocon brains, so be it. And for anyone who gets their political truth from self-inflating whoopee cushions like Rush Limbaugh and Bill O'Reilly, it will come none too soon. To remain silent this time risks the loss of everything that our country stands for.

The story I want to tell you begins on a miserably hot day in February, 1969, as I watched U.S. Army Col. John W. Donaldson put a cup of rice wine mixed with blood to his lips and drink deeply. No matter that the concoction was alive with heartworms, Donaldson never flinched. At the time, I was serving as an army combat correspondent attached to the 11th Light Infantry Brigade and my job that day was to follow Donaldson around, snapping picture after picture of the macabre festivities unfolding in front of my eyes. He was the brigade commander at a bloody punching bag called LZ Bronco next to the village of Duc Pho. The brigade base camp was part of the Americal Division, headquartered to the north in Chu Lai.

The colonel and a large contingent of other brigade and division officers were guests of honor at a Tet festival in the Montagnard village of Ba To in the central highlands southwest of Chu Lai. Nearby was a Special Forces A Team camp, an ominous triangular fortress bristling with 105 mm cannon at each corner firing flechette rounds. A snake couldn't have crawled through the maze of sharp barbed and razor tape wire surrounding the compound, and dozens of claymore mines were set in the walls. A claymore at close range will instantly render you into your constituent molecules.

The Montagnard village and A Team camp had been hit hard by concentrated North Vietnamese forces earlier in the week, and Donaldson's presence was in part a thumb in the eye to enemy commanders licking their wounds in nearby triple canopy jungle. The landscape gave me chills, because the beautiful, green-dappled hills all around the village were pockmarked with hundreds of fresh artillery and bomb craters exposing the bright red soil. I couldn't get the image of the Jolly Green Giant with a bad case of acne out of my mind. While topless Montagnard women spruced up the area with totems and bright banners to cover attack damage, a sacrificial water buffalo calf was slowly being prodded to death with a spear by the local village chief. It took about half an hour before the calf sagged to its knees in exhaustion, at that point too weak to even cry out. The chief then cut the calf's throat above a large earthen jug to catch the pulsing blood while another villager poured rice wine and stirred.

Unknown to the visitors, the Montagnards had earlier tortured to death three North Vietnamese captives and partook of their blood in the company of Special Forces A Team troopers. These unfortunate had been impaled through their anuses with bamboo poles and given the same spear prodding. Later, their bodies were staked out along enemy infiltration trails as a mortal warning to the enemy.

This day became my own personal "Apocalypse Now" moment, a full decade before the Francis Ford Coppola's movie was released. Not long before, we became personally aware that soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, had rampaged in My Lai when military police ransacked our hooch looking for evidence and then hauled Rusty Calley off in handcuffs. Meanwhile, Tiger Teams were creating ruthless, bloody havoc across the Batangan Peninsula against suspected enemy cadre. Brutality against civilians was standard operating procedure. Because of the Pacification Program mass relocations, entire swathes of the countryside began to resemble the Missouri Burnt District during the Civil War.

The Phoenix Program was in full swing, and it was the horror to end all horrors. I had earlier tagged along on a Phoenix mission directed by the ARVN National Police, and will spare you the details. Trust me, you do not want to know what was being done. Standing there and watching Donaldson drink from the cup, the profound symbolism of all that was wrong in this place hit me like a blow in the face. Ironically, an anti-war rag called the Overseas Weekly or Overseas latched onto one of my pictures and captioned it, "Army Brass Drinks Blood In Pagan Ceremonies".

By February 1969, morale in the brigade had hit rock bottom because of horrific casualties caused primarily from booby traps, and an entire battalion had been stood down as non-functional. The North Vietnamese were endlessly blasting our firebases with 122 mm rocket artillery, and LZ Bronco was soon to be hit more than 200 times during a famous assault that came to be called "Duc Pho Burning". Mutinies, insubordination and fragging of officers became commonplace. Soldiers cracked and a few committed suicide. One grunt over the edge opened fire into the POW compound, killing a number of captured enemy. Col. Donaldson and a battalion commander, two of the highest-ranking officers in the brigade, were charged with murdering civilians from helicopters while the My Lai investigation was still underway. A young Major Colin Powell assigned to the 11th Brigade ­ who was well acquainted with Donaldson ­ wrote in his autobiography about being stunned by what he saw going on in the 11th. Perhaps, he had experienced his own "Apocalypse Now" moment.

There's a numbness in my guts as I see the same nightmares becoming reality again in Iraq, and I wonder what's happened to America's soul. Is this what we want, another generation suckled on the poison of another renegade leadership? Gooks have become ragheads, every adult male is an insurgent eligible for torture, and every Iraqi home filled with men, women and children is a free-fire zone. Even places of worship get flattened. Once again, we've been marched into another lunatic asylum in the Twilight Zone.

How did it happen? Why did we sit on our hands and let our leaders initiate an unprovoked proxy war? A mushroom cloud over Cleveland delivered by a pipsqueak Iraq that couldn't even get an airplane in the air or a dilapidated tank outside its own borders without throwing a track? Gimme a break. How could the average John Doe let himself be deceived into believing that Saddam Hussein was really a threat?

With Iran now in the crosshairs, I pray that our national amnesia is wearing off. I know that from coast to coast a growing number of people ­ especially many combat veterans like myself ­ feel helpless, confused, frightened, and completely out of the loop. Three years into Iraq, why do we still keep hearing the same refrain, pre-emptive war into the next generation? On and on and on it goes, but unfortunately our emperors in Washington treat middle Americans asking hard questions like bill collectors at a funeral or, publicly skewer them as extremists and traitors. And don't even think about asking about Israeli involvement in the disaster that Dubya calls a Middle Eastern policy.

I listen in vain to hear the voices of young Americans who will be directly and immediately affected. Current events in the Middle East should be a paramount issue, but, inexplicably, the kids are completely nonchalant. Raised on the Internet and X-Boxes, maybe Iraq is just another Hollywood-style media production to them. But, I'm going to make a prediction. Our salvation will come when Selective Service notices begin arriving in mailboxes, and make no mistake, they are coming. I predict that young voices will soon become the loudest against empire as the hip-hoppers, the teeny boppers and the slackers rudely discover that involuntary combat means no video games or boom boxes, no marathon beer busts, and certainly no teenaged girls in thong bikinis.

We in the older generation can help things along. First, turn off the televisions and study a little American history, like the parts repeatedly warning us about foreign entanglements and passionate attachments. Really think about what kind of America we're handing to our children. Organize geezer squads to buttonhole politicians, and enlist a slacker cavalry to rain e-mail on every bureaucrat in sight. Let them all know we don't care about the new world order and its Manifest Corporate Destiny. Tell Washington that unprovoked, pre-emptive wars go against the grain of everything that's American, and we're no longer going to give it the Good Homicidal Seal of Approval.

While we're at it, let's make a sincere effort to tell elected representatives, loud and clear at every opportunity, that we want our government back from the political and corporate lobbies. Give the entire bureaucratic structure the message that we want the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth on anything that affects our lives fast, before another bullet is fired or bomb dropped in anger. The U.S. State Department especially needs this message drummed into their heads until they all have tinnitus.

Don't leave out the Billy Grahams, Jerry Falwells, and Pat Robertsons, (comma) and their legions of religious robots. Ask these Bible thumpers a simple question: brother, who would GEE-zus bomb, torture, rape and murder? While they choke on their own hypocrisy, direct them to the Book of John in the New Testament for a theology refresher. Christ wasn't called the Prince of Peace for nothing.

Constantly remind anyone who'll listen to you that the American Revolution blossomed with a ferocious commitment to keep a new continent free from two thousand years of empires, monarchies, feudal dictatorships, and armed religious institutions held in power by brute force and the doctrine of might makes right. People like Washington, Jefferson and Franklin instead shouted no, RIGHT makes might. That timeless concept was an invincible weapon against King George's Redcoats and it is just as powerful against nuclear weapons and carrier battle groups.

Yes, it will take guts, but what's our alternative? Either we start living up to our own ideals or the world will very soon compel us to do it. If, that is, they even think we're worth saving.

FYI, my unit was given an entire chapter in the Time Life Vietnam War collection about combat photos and correspondents. In a nutshell, we went everywhere ­ with grunts, recon, Special Forces, combat engineers, artillery, wherever combat was anticipated. We pretty much served as the army's eyes, kept track of action and casualty info and passed it along, etc. As a result, we had a good handle on things. Our unit was almost totally made up of experienced combat soldiers who joined the unit after service in the bush. It takes a little sand to be able to concentrate on your camera while people are shooting at you with automatic weapons or high explosive rounds. I got shot down once on a combat assault against the North Vietnamese in the 1st Huey into a landing zone so I could take pictures of the grunts coming in. In all, I participated in more than 30 full-scale combat missions, and several more aboard Medevac flights. My buddies in the unit had equally harrowing experiences, with one taking an AK round through the lens of his camera. I think all of us each earned four battle stars in 11 months, which gave a 4-week early release from Vietnam. We all had nicknames, and mine was Torch.

So I rushed to sign up for the Army Reserves, in part because it was the only place I knew of that promised I wouldn't be judged or limited by my race or gender. We women, people of color, and immigrants are especially attracted by the idea that we could live our lives on equal footing with other Americans. But the military isn't the egalitarian nirvana that its multi-billion dollar advertising blitz -- with a budget of almost $4 billion in 2003 -- claims.

Like most female soldiers, I learned the hard way that men dominate military culture. We are stuck in a system that makes it difficult to report abuse because of fear of reprisal. Even the military itself admitted in a June 2005 report by the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies, "harassment is the more prevalent and corrosive problem, creating an environment in which sexual assault is more likely to occur."

Just ask any woman in uniform -- sexual harassment is a common experience on base. I remember on the day of boot camp graduation, the same drill sergeant who had threatened to "rip off my head and shit in my neck" for a minor infraction during training grabbed my arm in the on-base store and pressured me for a date. This was a man that had exercised incredible power over me and my unit for twelve weeks, and through my fear I mumbled, "Drill sergeant, no" three times before he let me go. I didn't know at the time that about 60 percent of women who have served in the National Guard and reserves said they were sexually harassed or assaulted, but less than one-quarter reported it. Many who did complain were encouraged to drop their complaints.

When I first joined the military at age seventeen, a military doctor administered a demeaning and uncomfortable pelvic exam during my induction physical. He didn't wear gloves. It turns out that my experience wasn't unusual.

At last year's National Summit of Women Veterans Issues in Washington, D.C., former Air Force officer Dorothy Mackey told of several instances of abuse during OB-GYN exams. "He sodomized me," she said. "I started looking into what happens in a normal OB-GYN examination, and that is definitely not supposed to be part of it."

Nine out of ten women under fifty who had served in the U.S. military and had responded to a survey reported being sexually harassed while in the service. In an episode of "60 Minutes," New Jersey National Guard Lieutenant Jennifer Dyer revealed that she was treated like a criminal after accusing a fellow officer of rape in early 2004. She reported the rape immediately to the military criminal investigation division (CID), who took her to a civilian hospital for a rape kit -- then held her in seclusion for the next three days with no counseling and no medical treatment. The CID agent advised her of her Miranda rights and threatened to prosecute her for filing a false report. Her command announced her rape and accusation to the entire unit. By the time she returned to her unit after a two-week leave, she was "fearful for [her] health, safety, and sanity." Her assailant was roaming free on base and was later acquitted of any crime.

All the bad press about rape in the military has led to congressional demands for reform. For the eighteenth time in sixteen years, the Pentagon has studied the problem and proposed changes, including designated victim advocates in every command and a promise of confidentiality, according to "60 Minutes."

It's too bad that fully funding this need isn't a high priority. A Department of Veterans Affairs report released in September 2005 found that the annual cost for health care, including mental health for National Guard members like Lieutenant Jennifer Dyer who experience sexual trauma, is about $20 million. Only $13 million is budgeted for the 2006 fiscal year.

Reports of sexual assaults have skyrocketed recently, especially in hostile environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. The Washington Post reported, "In many U.S. military camps in Iraq, for example, signs are posted in female showers and other locations requiring U.S. servicewomen to be in the company of a 'battle buddy,' especially at night, for their safety."

The military has rules and structures to direct every aspect of a person's conduct. Why does abuse still occur? One answer is that a male commander most often decides when to prosecute for abuse or misconduct. In 2002, the number of female active Army officers was about 20 percent. This means that the vast majority of officers in the military are men.

In addition, military training itself is responsible for further desensitizing men to sexual violence. In January 2003, the Village Voice reported that military training has included efforts to get young soldiers used to the sounds of women being raped so that, if captured, hearing fellow soldiers assaulted would not cause them to crack.

These revelations are not surprising to former Marine Corps Lance Corporal Stephen Funk. During his training in 2002, Stephen told me that his drill instructor gave a rousing speech at the end of Marine combat training: "This is the reality of war. We Marines like war. We like killing. We like raping females. This is what we do." If there was a touch of irony in his voice, it sure wasn't clear to the young, impressionable group eager to prove they were men, Stephen said.

Basic training also reinforces racism. Boot camp systematically breaks a recruit down physically and emotionally. Military discipline depends on eliminating individuality. Anything that makes you different from the "standard" (read: straight white male) makes you a target for abuse. But submissiveness and conformity are not the only goals of training. Soldiers are taught to follow orders in war without question. When the training taps into a person's own racist views, it's easier to convince them to kill people who are different.

Iraq war veteran Aidan Delgado, who served as a mechanic in the 320th Military Police Company in Abu Ghraib, described how his training led to racism against Muslims and Arabs.

"'Hajji' is the new slur, the new ethnic slur for Arabs and Muslims. It is used extensively in the military," he told a reporter. "The Arabic word refers to one who has gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca. But it is used in the military with the same kind of connotation as 'gook,' 'Charlie,' or the n-word."

Stephen, the former Marine corporal, said that his training on operating machine guns included a tip to avoid overheating the machinery: Squeeze the trigger for as long as it takes to chant, "Die, fucking raghead, die." When riling up the troops to take part in a nighttime simulation, the squad leader would yell, Stephen recalled, "Let's go burn some turbans!"

But racism in the military doesn't stop at Arabs. Basic training -- a nightmare for most -- is even more difficult if you happen to be a person of color or gay. If you are in these groups, I don't have to tell you that many times it's seemingly small insults that create a feeling of oppression.

When I was at Army boot camp at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, standing in line for chow, I overheard the white drill sergeant tell a dark-skinned recruit with a smile, "You look like Kunta Kinte [a slave from the TV miniseries Roots]."

"Doesn't she? Doesn't she?" he asked everyone within earshot. She moved on silently in the wake of laughter.

It was common for my drill sergeant to ask, "Where are my Chinese at?" when assigning laundry duty. "For some reason, they do it the best," he'd say with a smirk.

I went to training with many new immigrants, since recruiters often falsely promised them citizenship. One Sudanese immigrant was the butt of many of the drill sergeant's jokes. The sergeant would hand him a dark-colored rifle and then loudly comment that they couldn't tell where the rifle ended and the hands began.

In preparation for a night-ops simulation, the drill sergeant announced that recruits were to blow a whistle if they got lost. "Except you," he said, pointing at the Sudanese recruit. "You just smile and we'll see you in the dark."

Then the drill instructor made him stand up in front of the others.

"Give me a pimp walk," the instructor ordered. English wasn't his native language and he hadn't been in the United States long, so he didn't understand what the sergeant meant. Then the sergeant pulled up another black recruit and said, "Give me a pimp walk." The man answered that he didn't know how because he wasn't a pimp. Finally, a white recruit volunteered to show the group. Pretty soon, many others were doing the "black" pimp walk as well.

In the early morning hours during the second week of boot camp, I was forced to leave my barracks with an unfamiliar drill sergeant who decided to punish me for turning my head while standing at attention. I was afraid to go with a strange man to another part of the base, but was just as scared to refuse. He made me stand at attention and gathered his unit around to watch the show. He called me stupid, ugly, dumb.

"Where are you from, private?" he screamed. "You look like a gang member. Are you a gang member?"

I started crying -- he looked at my dark skin and didn't know or care that I was an excellent student on my way to the university.

"Get down into front position!" he yelled at me in front of his own unit of women. "Get up. Get down. Get up."

The thirty minutes of humiliation seemed to last an eternity.

Although the military doesn't officially condone racism and sexism, it explicitly discriminates against gays who are open about their identity, both in legal practice and in day-to-day life. The Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, an advocacy group for gay and lesbian soldiers, claims that more than 65,000 lesbian and gay Americans are on active duty and serving in the National Guard and reserves.

Thanks to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, put in place under the Clinton administration in 1993, as long as gay people stay deep in the closet, the military won't kick them out. In other words, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" actually authorizes the federal government to fire someone for being gay. According to the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, soldiers may be investigated and administratively discharged if they:

* make a statement that they are lesbian, gay, or bisexual;
* engage in physical contact with someone of the same sex for the purposes of sexual gratification; or
* marry, or attempt to marry, someone of the same sex.

Several soldiers have been discharged for posting online profiles that indicated they were gay or looking to date someone of the same gender.

The other part of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy attempts to limit harassment and the scope of investigations into a soldier's sexual orientation. Yet, as Stephen Funk's experience shows, the services continue to violate these basic rules. Stephen, a gay man, told me what it's like to live with a constant barrage of antigay slurs. No one dares speak up against it because they fear facing suspicion and investigation for being gay. Stephen's sergeant secretly investigated his homosexuality for more than a month by pulling other members of his unit into his office and grilling them about his suspicions. A soldier in his squad finally told Stephen about the interview: the sergeant had asked him, "Did you notice anything 'funny'? Did he touch you or use 'gay' words? Do you agree that his feminine gestures and soft voice make him seem like a 'fag'?"

After learning about the investigation, Stephen was forever shaken and self-conscious about his interactions with other soldiers.

The military may try to sell itself as a level playing field, but as long as abuse is tolerated and discrimination helps recruits pull the trigger, they will always be part of the soldiers' experience.

© 2006 by The New Press. This article originally appears in the forthcoming book 10 Excellent Reasons Not to Join the Military to be published on May 18, 2006 by The New Press.