- Signs of the Times for Fri, 05 May 2006 -

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• Pschopathic Legacy
• Israel and America - Partners In Genocide
• Lies Lies Everywhere...
• Israel - Nazi Germany Revisited
• Viral Marketing For Population Reduction
• Homeland Insecurity
• Mother Nature Rebels
• Power To The People
• Around The World
• Oil Oil Everywhere...
• Wobbling World Economy
• Cosmic Weirdness

You have to wonder about a few things in the May 1 sentencing of Sami Al-Arian.

For example, Alberto Gonzalez -- the "torture-is-OK" and "no-law-binds-the-president" U.S. attorney general" -- flew into the Tampa Bay area five days before the courtroom spectacle in which federal District Judge James Moody threw the book at Al-Arian, albeit a tattered tome that bore no resemblance to truth, justice or the U.S. Constitution.

Or, consider that Tampa's U.S. Attorney, Paul Perez, showed up -- for the first time during the Al-Arian case -- at the prosecution table on sentencing day. Courthouse gossips, including some of Perez's own staff, have told me he had wanted to keep a little distance during the trial in case his subalterns faltered. Falter they did. The prosecution team stumbled through awful lawyering and a series of strategic pratfalls. After a decade of investigations, costing U.S. taxpayers as much as $50 million, the feds didn't prove a single crime was committed by Al-Arian and three other Palestinians. Meanwhile, real terrorists with blood on their minds, such as Mohammed Atta, went undetected in Florida.

So, why did Perez show up at the drama's final scene? Why was he so eager to race to a spot in front of the TV cameras and make inflammatory claims about things his minions couldn't prove to a jury?

It's almost as if Perez knew Moody was going to surprise everyone and ignore the negotiated recommendations from both prosecution and defense attorneys that Al-Arian be given the light side of federal sentencing guidelines of 46 to 57 months in jail. With time served, Al-Arian could have anticipated almost immediate release and deportation. Now, with Moody's sentencing, he'll languish through as much as another 18 months in jail.

Those at the sentencing hearing noticed that the prosecutors, when they entered the courtroom, appeared almost jovial. That's suspicious when you remember how badly they were humiliated when a jury in December failed to return a single guilty verdict against Al-Arian and his three co-defendants. (Other counts resulted in mistrials, but in no instance did more than two of the 12 jurors favor conviction on any charge.)

Why were the feds so upbeat? What had gone on when Gonzalez dropped into town? Considering that this administration admits to no legal restraint, and its deceptions and mendacities are a matter of daily public discussion, I believe the fix was made. Careers could be capped or ended by anyone not playing on the team.

Perez already had been passed over for one federal judgeship -- and speculation among his own staff was that it stemmed from his office's clear complicity in attempting to frame an anti-corruption crusading state judge.

So, my bet is that Gonzalez came to town and lowered the hammer. 'Give me blood,' is what I think he told Perez and Moody. Or else.

The only reasonable explanation is that Al-Arian was set up by the "recommendation" from the U.S. Attorney's office for a light sentence. Snookered. The feds never intended for Al-Arian to leave jail anytime soon. Judge Moody did as ordered.

The government's motivation? Revenge. Occam's Razor -- the simplest explanation that fits the facts. The prosecutors have routinely lied and deceived in presenting their case. This final deception was in character. What they couldn't win in a fair trial, they rejoiced at achieving by deceit.

Beyond that, there's little doubt of Moody's deeply ingrained prejudice. The judge would not allow the defense to bring up the slightest mention during the trial of the almost four decades of grinding military occupation of Palestinian lands by the Israelis. Tons of evidence -- highly prejudicial and largely irrelevant to the facts of the case -- was admitted about Israeli deaths. No evidence was allowed about Palestinian deaths. The jury heard about murdered Israeli children, nothing about the far greater number of murdered Arab kids.

Despite that grossly unjust imbalance dictated by Moody, the jurors saw through the propaganda and said, repeatedly, "not guilty."

Al-Arian did eventually plead guilty to one count -- but that was a greatly eviscerated charge. He faced another trial on the remaining counts if he didn't reach an agreement. In an interview last year, he asked me to withhold his assessment of Moody. At that time, he said he feared another trial because he was sure that the overtly biased Moody would not allow a verdict other than guilty.

But a plea of guilty is a plea of guilty. The stateless Palestinian refugee conceded:

• He had helped his brother-in-law, Mazen Al-Najjar, defend himself. Al-Najjar was jailed for almost four years based on "secret evidence." Al-Najjar has never been convicted of anything, although he was charged as a co-defendant. The government, shortly before the indictment, released and deported Al-Najjar, which raises the question about whether the G-men really thought he was a terrorist.
• He provided assistance on immigration matters to Basheer Nafi, another alleged co-conspirator who was never tried and, therefore, has never been convicted of anything. Nafi also was deported by the federal government, on immigration, not terrorism, matters.
• He lied to a St. Petersburg Times reporter, Jim Harper. Al-Arian claimed he had no knowledge of Ramadan Shallah's role in the Islamic Jihad. Shallah left Tampa in early 1995, and there is no record he had any contact with Al-Arian or any of the co-defendants after that. About a half-year later, Shallah resurfaced in Damascus and took over the Islamic Jihad.

What Al-Arian didn't do is to admit to any violence. And, the government stipulated that nothing he admitted to resulted directly or indirectly in violence.

Moreover, what's missing from most of the egregiously misleading reports in The Tampa Tribune, and in the statements by Judge Moody at sentencing, is a time element. The record was very clear that Al-Arian had no active role with the Islamic Jihad after the federal government designated it a terrorist organization in the mid-1990s. Al-Arian's earlier activities -- political activism and fund-raising -- occurred during the time when it was perfectly legal to support the group.

Yet, Judge Moody justified his harsh sentence by claiming Al-Arian had blood on his hands -- an assertion rejected by the jurors. One who spoke to me said the jury "most emphatically" disagreed with the conclusion by Moody.

This was the same judge who had ruled that Al-Arian and associates couldn't mention one word about the military occupation or the plight of the Palestinian people. As I wrote after that ruling, if MLK had been on trial in Judge Moody's courtroom for disturbing the peace, he wouldn't have been allowed to mention Jim Crow or lynchings. This is how ludicrous the judge's rulings were: The prosecution, during closing arguments, noted a document that mentioned U.N. Resolution 242. The defense wanted to explain to the jury what 242 said. The judge wouldn't allow it because it painted a somewhat sympathetic picture of the Palestinians.

The judge also insulted the jurors by parroting a discredited, paid government snitch, Munir Arafat. His testimony was thoroughly demolished during the trial.

Arafat had asserted that Al-Arian sent his children to the best U.S. universities, while promoting the violence that killed children in the Middle East. That hyperbolic claim was rejected by the jury.

Al-Arian is far from a perfect person. Not only did he lie to Harper, but he was deceptive (or as he told me in an interview last year, "incomplete") in statements to me. But he wasn't the only one. The ersatz terrorism expert who started the crusade against Al-Arian, Steve Emerson, also lied. Harper also reported that Emerson had claimed the Tampa Palestinians were involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Emerson claimed he had proof. He did not. Emerson also sued me, and couldn't produce proof of his allegations; I prevailed.

The Tampa Tribune made up stories out of air. Under the tutelage of Emerson, the newspaper tried to pin the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing on Al-Arian. The paper has never retracted or apologized for that mendacity.

According to an article by the highly regarded St. Petersburg Times columnist Susan Taylor Martin, the Israelis weren't much interested in the final chapter of the Al-Arian case. He just wasn't that important.

But for our government, he represented the utter failure of George Bush's "war on terrorism." He had to pay the price.

When was Al-Arian important? More than a decade ago, when Israel's Likudniks in the United States, such as Emerson, were working feverishly to undermine the Oslo peace process. No Arab voice could be tolerated, and Al-Arian (unlike any terrorist I've heard about) was vigorously trying to communicate with our government and its leaders. He was being successful, making speeches to intelligence and military commanders at MacDill AFB's Central Command, inviting the FBI and other officials to attend meetings of his groups. People were beginning to listen and to wonder why only one side of the Middle East debate was heard here.

That was the reason for Al-Arian's political prosecution, a horrendous undermining of our Constitution's guarantees of free speech and fair judicial process.

I disagree with Al-Arian on many things. I believe his people would have won their state had they pursued the tactics of MLK and Gandhi. I believe Israel needs to be assured of security (but not conquest and expansion) and the Palestinians deserve an end to occupation. Al-Arian recognized the inevitability of Israel; he never conceded the Israelis could be partners in peace and prosperity.

Beyond all of that is the fact that any study of Al-Arian reveals a clear trajectory, one that veered away from radicalism and toward a belief in democracy. The government found one very old letter authored by Al-Arian (but never mailed) that condoned a violent attack (against military units, not civilians). What America never had a chance to hear were the many subsequent statements that moved toward moderation.

It's interesting that Judge Moody called the Palestinian academic a "master manipulator." Another man claims that he originated that phrase, as it applied to Al-Arian -- Norman Gross, a radical activist for Israel who lives in St. Petersburg. It's fitting, but sad, that an American judge should adopt the slogan of one side in this case. Justice in Tampa is neither balanced or blind.

Chomsky is adamant and he is right to warn against the idea that foreign policy elites are more fool than knave. "Consider the actual situation, not some dream situation... If we can enter the real world we can begin to talk about it... We have to talk about it in the real world and know what the White House is thinking. They're not willing to live in a dream world."

What, then, is the "actual situation" that led the Bush administration to make the "perfectly sensible" -- if entirely imperialist -- decision to invade Iraq and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein? Here, according to Chomsky, is the real world:

"If [Iraq is] more or less democratic, it'll have a Shiite majority. They will naturally want to improve their linkages with Iran, Shiite Iran. Most of the clerics come from Iran... So you get an Iraqi/Iran loose alliance. Furthermore, right across the border in Saudi Arabia, there's a Shiite population which has been bitterly oppressed by the U.S.-backed fundamentalist tyranny. And any moves toward independence in Iraq are surely going to stimulate them, it's already happening. That happens to be where most of Saudi Arabian oil is. Okay, so you can just imagine the ultimate nightmare in Washington..."

Chomsky isn't making this stuff up. One can get quick confirmation of Chomsky's characterization of this "ultimate nightmare" scenario from the key "realists" of Republican foreign policy establishment -- folks like Bush Sr., former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former Secretary of State James Baker, and Colin Powell. When presented with a Shiite uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991, the "realists" opted to leave Saddam in power, rather than let the nightmare become reality. In a co-authored 1998 memoir, A World Transformed, Bush Sr. and Scowcroft insist that they acted to preserve "the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf" (p.489). In his 1995 memoir The Politics of Diplomacy, James Baker recalls that he didn't want to "play into the hands of the mullahs in Iran, who could export their brand of Islamic fundamentalism with the help of Iraq's Shiites and quickly transform themselves into the dominant regional power" (p.437). Colin Powell, in his 1995 memoir My American Journey, is equally blunt. "Why didn't we finish him off?... In March, the Iraqi Shiites in the south rose up in arms... But our practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an Iran that remained bitterly hostile toward the United States" (pp.512, 516).

The problem is that fear of this "ultimate nightmare" provided the rationale in 1991 for not invading Iraq, or more precisely, not promoting the political ascendance of the Iraqi Shiite majority. Chomksy argues that fear of the nightmare scenario will deter realists from supporting US withdrawal from Iraq. But did the "realists" get us into Iraq? "Realists" may keep us in Iraq, but did the "realists" unleash Iraqi Shiite power by terminating Sunni Baathist political and military rule? "Realists" may, in fact, be sensible -- at least in a self-serving way -- but

Scowcroft, Baker, and Bush Sr. all publicly warned George W. Bush about the risks of unleashing the ultimate nightmare. Kissinger -- who first floated the idea of seizing the Eastern Province from the Saudis in the mid-1970s, prior to the Iranian revolution -- was explicit in a Washington Post Op-Ed. The key to any move to topple Saddam, he insisted, was the contour of "the political outcome," especially insofar as Saudi Arabia would be unlikely to cooperate in the formation of a "Shiite republic" that "would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region." Chomsky is at a loss to explain -- in Realpolitik terms -- the 2003 decision by George W. Bush to invade Iraq and empower the Iraqi Shiite majority.

Gilbert Achcar, like Chomsky, is inclined to stipulate the decisive role of Realpolitik in US foreign policy. Looking at the case of Iraq, however, Achcar makes an exception. "In the case of Iraq, and in this case exclusively," writes Achcar in a 2004 CounterPunch article, "the Bush administration has acted on ideological views so contrary to the 'reality principle' that they could only lead into this major nightmare of U.S. imperial policy... History will probably record this venture as one of the most important blunders ever committed by an administration abroad from the standpoint of U.S. imperial interests."

Chomsky and Achcar both agree that the general aim of the invasion was based on "realism." As Chomsky says, the US would not have invaded Iraq "if its main product was lettuce and pickles... If you have three gray cells functioning, you know... the US invaded Iraq because it has enormous oil resources." Likewise, Achcar is "fully aware of the very oily factors" involved in US military intervention. However, Achcar insists that "many of its concrete decisions" -- chiefly the "clumsiness of de-Baathification... [and the] dissolution of the Iraqi military" -- represented "blunders" and "wild dreams" of "crackpot idealists" who allow "high-flying moral rhetoric" to help guide foreign policy "in a way that stands in blatant contradiction to pragmatic needs."

For Achcar, the crucial decisions were not the ones that simply toppled Saddam Hussein but the ones -- made in May 2003, at the start of the formal US occupation -- to actively undermine authoritarian Sunni minority rule in Iraq. "Whatever the reason," says Achcar, "the fact is that Bush Jr. and his collaborators have acted for a while in conformity with their democratic proclamations." These decisions unleashed a major "nightmare" because they "opened the way for the Iraqi people to seize control of their own destinies... to the benefit of Islamic fundamentalist forces, somewhat on the Iranian pattern." The "clumsiness" is particularly difficult to explain in the terms of Realpolitik since regime change -- without Shiite empowerment -- could have been accomplished "more effectively...had the Bush administration acted from a craftily Machiavellian perspective and managed to get hold of Iraq through an arrangement with the Iraqi army and other apparatuses of the Baathist state."

If there is room for rapprochement between Achcar and Chomsky, it is because Achcar actually agrees that the familiar "realist" crowd never would -- and never did -- jettison craftily Machiavellian perspectives on foreign policy. Achcar insists, however, that on the key questions regarding the political outcome in Iraq -- de-Baathification, military dissolution, and Shiite power -- the "administration was divided." Realists fought against all of these policies for post-invasion Iraq, favoring something more like a US-backed military coup that would result in a political outcome akin to Saddamism-without-Saddam and an "arrangement" with the Baathist state. There was, however, a rival faction within the Bush administration: the so-called neo-conservatives, vaguely defined as those who favored a "crusade for bringing democracy" to Iraq. Neo-conservatives championed comprehensive de-Baathification and dissolution of the Sunni-led military establishment -- even if it meant empowering Iraqi Shiites.

Chomsky, however, seems not to have taken note of neo-conservatives or any factional battles within the Bush administration. In his many interviews on the war in Iraq, he rarely if ever says anything about neo-conservatives (a peculiar asymmetry in light of neo-conservative vilification of Chomsky). His analysis posits not only Realpolitik, but a unified actor. One of the great merits of Achcar's analysis, by contrast, is his attention to the crucial split between neo-conservatives and realists in Washington.

Machiavelli for Zionists

Do neo-conservatives represent the antithesis of Realpolitik? Are neo-conservatives bumbling crackpot idealists who unwittingly opened Pandora's box in Iraq by substituting idealistic dreams of democracy ahead of realist Machiavellian statecraft? Indeed, Achcar suggests that the neo-conservative agenda for Iraq represents "a typical case of self-deception." Perhaps. Financial Times columnist Samuel Brittan, in a typical attack on the neo-conservatives, published an October 2003 Realpolitik manifesto -- This Is Not a Time for Boy Scouts -- in which he condemned neo-conservative zeal as "almost indistinguishable from that of the liberal imperialists" who think foreign policy should be guided by morality. Another defender of Realpolitik, John J. Mearsheimer, dismisses neo-conservative theory as "essentially Wilsonianism with teeth."

Some neo-conservatives welcome that depiction, if not the accompanying criticism. William Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan, two prominent neo-conservatives, insist that their book, The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission, "wears its heart on its sleeve" (p.ix). They present a relentless critique of "a narrow realpolitik that defined America's vital interests in terms of oil wells, strategic chokepoints and regional stability" (p.viii). Even as they celebrate "creating democracy in a land that for decades has known only dictatorship" (p.ix), they make no mention of -- and seem utterly oblivious to -- the prospect of Iraqi democracy emboldening Shiites in Iraq, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.

Kristol and Kaplan may be "Boy Scouts," as suggested by Brittan; or maybe they simply find it convenient to appear good-hearted and bumbling, as Chomsky warned. Either way, not all neo-conservatives wear their merit badges or their heart on their sleeve. The neo-conservative movement is hardly monolithic; there have been many fissures and splits along the way. The crucial point, however, is that some key neo-conservatives are as committed to cold-hearted Machiavellian Realpolitik as any so-called "realist." The battle dividing the Bush administration in Iraq is between two factions of Realpolitik strategists.

Indeed, as Achcar has recently noted, "in some neo-con circles" there is actually support for the same scenario feared most by Chomsky's realists: "some kind of Shia state controlling the bulk of Iraq's oil" that would align itself with Iranian Shiites and "unleash" Shiite power in the whole area, "including the Saudi Kingdom where the main oil producing area is inhabited by a Shia majority." To assume that evidence of neo-conservative support for de-Baathification in Iraq represents a simple blunder by naďve and incompetent Wilsonian idealists is, at best, a misunderstanding -- at worst, a serious underestimation -- of neo-conservative visions for US foreign policy.

Consider, for example, David Wurmser's book, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (hereafter, TA). Wurmser published Tyranny's Ally while serving as a Middle East expert at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think tank long identified with neo-conservative foreign policy analysis. After his time at AEI, Wurmser moved on to service within the Bush administration, most recently serving as Middle East expert in the office of Vice President Richard Cheney. Published in 1999, the book is a Machiavellian tour de force -- and a blueprint for US policy in the Middle East. There are striking parallels between the policies endorsed in Wurmser's book and those enacted by the Bush administration at the start of the US war in Iraq.

Wurmser directly confronts so-called "realist" fears regarding Shiite power in Iraq.

"The ensuing chaos of any policy that generates upheaval in Iraq would offer the oppressed, majority Shi'ites of that country an opportunity to enhance their power and prestige. Fear that this would in turn enable Iran to extend its influence through its coreligionists has led Britain and the United States, along with our Middle Eastern allies, to regard a continued Sunni control of Iraq as the cornerstone for stability in the Levant. Saudi Arabia in particular fears that any Shi'ite autonomy or control in Iraq will undermine its own precarious stability, because an emboldened Shi'ite populace in Iraq could spread its fervor into Saudi Arabia's predominantly Shi'ite northeastern provinces. The Saudi government also fears that this upheaval could spread to predominantly Shi'ite Bahrain, or to other gulf states with large Shi'ite minorities." (TA, p.73)

Wurmser's book is animated by a persistent focus on "balance of power" realist politics. "Iran and Iraq... are serious threats to the United States. How can we vanquish one without helping the other? Similarly, how can we deal either with a radical, secular, pan-Arabic nationalism or with fundamentalist pan-Islamism without allowing one to benefit from the other's defeat? (TA, p.72). For Bush and Scowcroft -- and for the Clinton foreign policy team -- the only plausible response was a balance of power based on the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. Wurmser, however, proposes a Realpolitik basis for moving US policy from dual containment toward a "Dual Rollback of Iran and Iraq" (TA, p.72).

Wurmser offers a direct challenge to the underlying factual premise of balance-of-power policies in the Gulf, even as he embraces the Machiavellian principles of balance-of-power politics. "U.S. policy makers have long presumed that the majority Shi'ite population of Iraq would serve as Iran's fifth column there; but would it?" (TA, p.72). Wurmser thinks not. Instead, he argues that "Iraqi Shi'ites, if liberated from [Saddam's] tyranny, can be expected to present a challenge to Iran's influence and revolution" (TA, p.74). More specifically, Wurmser claims that "Shi'ite Islam is plagued by fissures, none of which has been carefully examined, let alone exploited, by the opponents of Iran's Islamic republic" (TA, p.74, emphasis added). The idea of exploiting fissures is entirely consistent with realist theories of power balancing.

Wurmser argues that at the theological core of the Iranian revolution is "a concept promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini, the wilayat al-faqih -- the rule of the jurisprudent" that served as "the bulldozer with which Khomeini razed the barrier between the clerics and the politicians" (TA, p.74). For Wurmser, the central strategic fissure within Shiite Islam is between those who favor Khomeini's vision and those who reject the rule of the jurisprudent. "The concept of wilayat al-faqih is rejected by most Shi'ite clerics outside Iran (and probably many of those within Iran, too)... The current leading ayatollah of Iraq, Ayatollah Sayyid 'Ali Sistani, has reaffirmed [this rejection], much to the chagrin of the Iranian government" (TA, p.75).

Wurmser suggests that the US could and should exploit this fissure to its own advantage. The "liberation" of the Iraqi Shia can be used to achieve a "Regional Rollback of Shi'ite Fundamentalism."

"[A] shift of the Shi'ite center of gravity toward Iraq has larger, regional implications. Through intermarriage, history, and social relations, the Shi'ites of Lebanon have traditionally maintained close ties with the Shi'ites of Iraq. The Lebanese Shi'ite clerical establishment has customarily been politically quiescent, like the Iraqi Shi'ites. The Lebanese looked to Najaf's clerics for spiritual models [until it was transformed into a regional outpost for Iranian influence]. Prying the Lebanese Shi'ites away from a defunct Iranian revolution and reacquainting them with the Iraqi Shi'ite community could significantly help to shift the region's balance and to whittle away at Syria's power" (TA, p.107, 110).

The core of the Regional Rollback, however, is Iran. For Wurmser, so-called "realists" have always been correct to emphasize the link between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites, but they have misunderstood the potential nature of the link. If realists have traditionally feared Iranian influence in Iraq, Wurmser argues that the more likely scenario is Iraqi influence in Iran. The demise of traditional Sunni rule over the Iraqi Shiites "could potentially trigger a reversal" of fortune for the Iranian regime.

"Liberating the Shi'ite centers in Najaf and Karbala, with their clerics who reject the wilayat al-faqih, could allow Iraqi Shi'ites to challenge and perhaps fatally derail the Iranian revolution. For the first time in half a century, Iraq has the chance to replace Iran as the center of Shi'ite thought, thus resuming its historic place, with its tradition of clerical quiescence and of challenge to Sunni absolutism... A free Iraqi Shi'ite community would be a nightmare for the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran" (TA, p.78-79).

For Wurmser, the liberation of Najaf and Karbala would promote and empower potential US allies in Iraq and Iran. Wurmser's strategy foresees US military intervention against the Sunni minority in Iraq, not primarily as a springboard for further military intervention in Iran, but as the Iraqi detonator for a populist, Shiite-led rebellion against rival clerics in Iran. Neo-conservative support for the political ascendance of Shiite Iraq is not about the principle of democracy. Nor are neo-conservatives blind to the ways in which regime change in Iraq might transform the relationship between Iraq and Iran. Neo-conservatives who favor de-Baathification in Iraq might seem like blundering fools who would unwittingly hand Iraq to Iranian clerics. Wumser's scheme, however, is to hand Iran to Iraqi clerics, especially the followers of Ayatollah Sayyid 'Ali Sistani. For Wurmser, the road to Tehran begins in Najaf.

Wurmser is hardly alone in his strategic vision for the Middle East. His successor at AEI, Reuel Marc Gerecht -- formerly a CIA agent in Iran -- enthusiastically embraces the same vision for dual rollback in Iraq and Iran. In a May 2001 article entitled "Liberate Iraq," Gerecht dismisses "fear of an Iraqi-Iranian Shi'ite collusion upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East. This kind of fraternity between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ites simply does not exist -- except in the minds of Republican 'realists' who tragically used this argument a decade ago." An August 2002 article entitled "Regime Change in Iran?" makes the case for dual rollback and argues that the ascendance of the Iraqi Shia "will be brutal for the mullahs." Similarly, a March 2003 article by Michael Ledeen -- another prominent neo-conservative at AEI -- predicts, "If we understand this war correctly, the Iraqi Shi'ites will fight alongside us against the Iranian terrorists."

That is a very big "if" at the heart of neo-conservative thinking about Iraq and Iran. Richard Perle, doyen of neo-conservatives at AEI, writes in his 2003 book with David Frum, An End to Evil (hereafter, EE), that "President Bush took an enormous risk in Iraq. The risk could well have gone wrong -- and it could still go wrong" (p.36). Similarly, Gerecht warns that "the mullahs" -- once they saw signs of Iraqi Shiite rule in Iraq -- would fight back. Gerecht's August 2002 Weekly Standard article acknowledges that "the Bush administration should prepare itself for Iranian mischief in Iraq's politics."

In advance of the war, however, neo-conservatives found comfort in some "area studies" research -- which they published and promoted -- that found reason to believe Iraqi Shiites might ultimately prevail in any intra-Shiite competition between clerics in Iraq and Iran. In an April 2000 book Who Rules Iran?, published by the Washington Institute, Wilfred Buchta argues that Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, successor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has "a theological Achilles' heel" -- unlike Khomeini before him, and unlike Sistani in Iraq, Khamene'i is not a Grand Ayatollah. In his review of clerical opposition to the Iranian regime, Buchta describes Sistani as "Khamene'i's most serious competitor for the religious leadership of Shi'is throughout the world" (p.89).

Whatever the particular merits or deficiencies of Wurmser's analysis of fissures within Shiite Islam, these do not fully explain the intensity of "realist" opposition to Bush administration policies in Iraq. Neither realists nor neoconservatives shed tears for Saddam Hussein, nor would either grieve the fall of the incumbent Iranian regime. Realists, however, fear that the end of Sunni Arab control in Iraq and the rise of the Shia will tip the balance of power in the Persian Gulf away from a key US ally: the Sunni Arab regime in Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, neo-conservatives agree with realists that the Saudi regime fears Shiite regional power. Echoing the "nightmare" scenario articulated by Chomsky and the "realists," neo-conservatives like Richard Perle agree that the House of Saud has good reason to fear a Shia Gulf.

"[W]hile the royal family, the government, and the moneyed elite all live on the western, Red Sea side of the country, the oil is located on the eastern, Persian Gulf side. And while the people in the west are almost uniformly Sunni, one-third of the people in the Eastern Province... are Shiites.... Independence for the Eastern Province would obviously be a catastrophic outcome for the Saudi state" (EE, p.141).

Sounds just like the realists -- but with a crucial twist. Unlike Chomsky's realists, Perle and Frum think that Shiite control of Arabian Peninsula oil would be catastrophic for the Saudi state, but think it "might be a very good outcome for the United States" (EE, p. 141). This is the great neo-conservative heresy. If realists make little or no distinction between what is good for the Saudis and what is good for the United States, neo-conservatives regard Saudi Arabia as an unreliable, if not downright hostile, regime. Wurmser describes the "Saudi Wahhabi state" as "particularly menacing" (TA, p.68).

Varieties of American Imperialism

Disagreement over the strategic value of the US-Saudi alliance goes to the heart of the venomous battle that has long raged between neo-conservatives and "realists." Indeed, the "Saudi" question is, in many respects, the constitutive difference that cuts through the fog that otherwise surrounds the civil war in Washington over the political outcome of regime change in Iraq.

The earliest evidence of a split between neo-conservatives and "realists" -- the decision by Ronald Reagan to sell Saudi Arabia an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) -- is also the most illuminating for making sense of the division. The most useful expression of neo-conservative hope for Reagan administration foreign policy and of subsequent "anguish" comes from a May 1982 New York Times Magazine essay penned by self-proclaimed neo-conservative, Norman Podhoretz, long-serving editor of Commentary, the official publication of the American Jewish Committee. After the fall of the Shah in Iran, Podhoretz explains, neo-conservatives looked forward with great enthusiasm to Reagan's plan for "shoring up the American position" in the Persian Gulf in order "to secure the oilfields against either a direct or an indirect Soviet move." This would be accomplished by stationing "American ground forces somewhere in the region," perhaps on the Israeli-occupied Sinai peninsula.

Neo-conservative hopes were dashed, however, when "this new idea was dropped" after "Saudis...voiced their opposition." For fear that the oil-rich "Saudis might have done something to damage" the US economy, explains Podhoretz, Reagan fell into the "habit of appeasing Saudi Arabia." Having lost the Shah, the US would now "supply the Saudis with advanced weaponry, including the Awacs planes... depending upon them to police the region" on behalf of the US.

Podhoretz argues that the decision to substitute the fallen Iranian regime with a Saudi surrogate was "bad... on its own terms," that is, for the immediate strategic interests of the United States. If Iran under the Shah proved to be an unreliable "pillar of sand" for the US, "what could we expect of Saudi Arabia?" But the tilt toward Saudi Arabia was "all the more disturbing in its implications for the American connection with Israel" because "the Saudis refused to join" a "de facto alliance" that would "unite the moderate Arab states and Israel."

Podhoretz rejects as false the "general impression" that all neo-conservatives are Jewish, and in no way claims that all supporters of Israel are neo-conservatives. Indeed, the vast majority of Jewish voters and not a few Zionists remain loyal to the Democratic Party. Podhoretz acknowledges, however, "it is certainly true that all neo-conservatives are strong supporters of Israel" who "would all agree that at a minimum the United States has a vital interest in the survival" of Israel as an "outpost" of "the free world." That is, if forced by Arab-Israeli conflict to choose between a strategic alliance with the Saudis and one with the Israelis, neo-conservatives support the latter, rather than the former.

Neo-conservatives lost the battle to prevent the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, but that fight serves as an extremely useful proxy for distinguishing between "neo" conservatives -- who believe that US interests are best served by reliance on Israel, if only that relationship were not regularly jeopardized by the American habit of appeasing the Saudis -- and "realist" conservatives -- who believe that US interests are best served by reliance on Saudi Arabia, if only that were not jeopardized by the American habit of appeasing the Israelis.

The AWACS battle reveals the misleading and potentially self-serving function of labels like "realist" and "neo-conservative," then and now. Whatever the historical salience of the "neo-conservative" label, the term is neither adequate nor helpful in clarifying the defining qualities of the faction. The "neo" in neo-conservatives initially described liberals and anti-Stalinist Leftists who made common cause -- on a number of different political fronts -- with various factions of the traditional Right. Notwithstanding the diversity of neo-conservatives on a host of issues, however, the AWACS issue did a great deal to reveal a crucial division on the Right. As Podhoretz argued, the AWACS affair indicated that -- in matters of foreign policy -- "neo-conservatives" are united in support of Israel. More specifically, neo-conservatives are Right "Zionists" who believe US supremacy in the Persian Gulf is best protected by the US-Israeli alliance. As Podhoretz indicated, not all neo-conservatives are Jewish; so, too, not all are "new" to the Right.

The label "realist" may provide an implicit contrast with allegedly "unrealistic" or "idealistic" neo-conservatives, but it obscures more than it reveals about "realist" commitments in the Middle East. To judge from the Reagan administration AWACS affair, the so-called "realists" are Right "Arabists" who believe that US supremacy in the Persian Gulf is best protected by the US-Saudi alliance. Very few are Arab; some are Jewish.

Each side of this split regularly accuses the other of bad faith -- of trying to serve two flags at once. Right Zionists insist that US recognition of Israel as a strategic asset is compromised by the influence of "big oil" money. Richard Perle and David Frum, for example, insist that the Saudis distort the prevailing US assessment of its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf.

"The reason our policy toward Saudi Arabia has been so abject for so long is not mere error. Our policy has been abject because so many of those who make the policy have been bought and paid for by the Saudis... [T]oo many of our recent ambassadors to Saudi Arabia have served as shills for Saudi Arabia the instant they returned home" (EE, p.141-142).

Similarly, critics of the US-Israeli alliance portray Israel as a strategic burden, rather than an asset. Most recently, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published an article in the London Review of Books entitled, "The Israel Lobby."

"Why has the US been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of [Israel]... One might assume that the bond between the two countries was based on shared strategic interests... [but] the thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the 'Israel Lobby.'"

Each side questions the strategic wisdom of appeasing the other side and searches for extra-strategic explanations for a strategic disagreement. The central strategic question, however, is unavoidable for any empire: which proxy state can most reliably "police" imperial interests?

Right Zionists and Right Arabists tend to agree that recurring battles in the US over policy toward Iraq and Iran are often "proxies" for larger strategic questions about the wisdom of the US alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Right Arabists like Caspar Weinberger, in his 1990 memoir, Fighting for Peace (hereafter, FP) argue that Israel survives, in part, through classic balance-of-power strategies. In explaining the basis for long-standing ties between Israel and the Shah of Iran, for example, Weinberger describes "a natural affinity of all religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East to unite (when at all they unite) against the vast majority -- the Arab population. Hence some Jews, Christians, Turks, and Persians have long linkages... Israel had close ties to Iran under the Shah" (FP, p.365).

Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion allegedly referred to this strategy as the "Doctrine of the Periphery." Gary Sick, a former Carter administration NSC staffer and a critic of Right Zionist activities with the US, describes the "Doctrine" -- which he calls "a touchstone for Israeli foreign policy -- in his 1991 book October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan.

"This doctrine was predicated on the belief that while Israel was destined to be surrounded permanently by a ring of hostile Arab states, just outside this hostile ring there were non-Arab states such as Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran that were themselves frequently at odds with the Arabs and therefore potential allies of Israel. It was a classic case of the old maxim, 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend,' raised to the level of international policy" (p.60).

The Doctrine of the Periphery is simply Realpolitik for Right Zionists. For Israel and Right Zionists, however, the 1979 Iranian Revolution created complex new risks and opportunities for the Doctrine of the Periphery. On the one hand, there was the immediate crisis of anti-Zionist and anti-American zeal within the Revolution. On the other hand, the Shiite Revolution seemed likely to embolden Shia insurgents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates and aggravate hostilities between Arab and Shiite populations. For Right Zionists, the risk of Shiite anti-Zionism was partially offset by the opportunity for a strengthened alliance of the periphery forged on the basis of aggravated rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

For Right Arabists, Iranian hostility toward the US, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia pointed in one direction and one direction only: support for incumbent Arab regimes. At the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the US remained officially neutral. But Caspar Weinberger (Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration) acknowledges that he found it "difficult... to remain neutral... we 'tilted' toward Iraq" (FP, p.358).

This tilt toward Iraq -- in the service of the US-Saudi Alliance -- was a grave concern for Right Zionists. Notwithstanding the anti-Zionist and anti-American fervor of the Iranian regime, Right Zionists like Michael Ledeen -- a key player in the Iran-Contra affair -- viewed the Iran-Iraq war very differently from those like Weinberger who tilted toward Iraq. In his 1988 memoir, Perilous Statecraft: An Insider's Account of the Iran-Contra Affair (herafter, PS), Ledeen explains, "Israel was far more concerned about Iraq than about Iran, since Iraq had participated in the Arab wars against Israel... Iran, at least in the short run, posed no comparable threat to Israel" (PS, p.100). Even as Saudi Arabia -- and Right Zionists like Weinberger -- became pivotal supporters of Iraq in the 1980s Gulf War, Israel -- along with Right Zionists like Ledeen -- championed Iran in its battle against Iraq. As for the Iranians, Ledeen is quick to point out that their "hatred of Judaism did not prevent them from buying weapons from the Jewish state" (PS, p.97).

The AWACS battle lines held in the Iran-Contra affair. Weinberger refers to Iran-Contra as an "Israeli-Iranian plot." For Right Zionists like Wurmser, Weinberger's unofficial tilt toward Saddam Hussein -- akin to a Saudi-Iraqi plot -- helped the US become tyranny's ally. So, too, Weinberger's great fear was that any outreach to Iran "would adversely affect our newly emerging relationship with Iraq" (FP, p.364-366). Right Zionists feared the exact opposite -- that the "newly emerging relationship" between the US and Iraq would adversely affect the US-Israeli alliance.

In many respects, Right Zionist war plans for Iraq represents an audacious attempt to reverse the pro-Saudi tilt in US policy that developed in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and deepened with the movement of US forces onto Saudi soil following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Make no mistake: the US invaded Iraq, but it went to war with the Saudis. The Iraqi political tilt toward Iran is not an accident -- the unintended consequence of bumbling naiveté -- so much as the heart of a future geo-strategic alliance with Iranian Shiites, if not the incumbent clerical regime.

Right Arabists understand the stakes quite well and this -- more than any dovish conversion on the road to Baghdad -- explains the vehemence of their "anti-war" opposition. Although they have attacked the war on a variety of fronts -- for its aggressive unilateralism, its abuse of intelligence, its abuse of prisoners, etc. -- the heart of the critique has always been the political outcome -- symbolized by de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Sunni-led Iraqi Army.

The most famous Right Arabist attack on the Iraq war -- celebrated by much of the Left--remains Richard Clarke's 2004 book, Against All Enemies -- an "insider" account that ostensibly confirmed the senselessness of the US invasion of Iraq and highlighted -- in the person of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (p.30) -- Right Zionist attempts to use 9/11 as a springboard for promoting their agenda for Iraq. "Instead of addressing [the al Qaeda] with all the necessary attention it required, we went off on a tangent, off after Iraq," Clarke complains (p.286-287). The war in Iraq is a "mistaken and costly" attack on "an oil-rich Arab country that posed no threat to us" (p.264-266). Beyond the headline-grabbing charge that the invasion of Iraq was a "tangent" that sidetracked the war on terror, however, Clarke also offers an entirely different -- if less publicized -- "insider" analysis of the Realpolitik rationale for war.

Clarke asserts that al Qaeda inaugurated "a war intended to replace the House of Saud" (p.282). According to Clarke, it was "concern with the long-term stability of the House of Saud" (p.265) in light of the challenge from al Qaeda that led "some in the Bush administration, including Dick Cheney" (p.283) to favor war with Iraq. "With Saddam gone, they believed, the U.S. could reduce its dependence on Saudi Arabia, could pull forces out of the Kingdom, and could open up an alternative source of oil" (p.283). The war on Iraq was, in effect, an indirect attack on the House of Saud.

Clarke is not persuaded. "The risk that the United States runs is of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy" that will undermine the House of Saud "without a plan or any influence about what would happen next... The future and stability of Saudi Arabia is of paramount importance to the United States; our policy cannot just be one of reducing our dependence upon it" (p.283). Just for good measure, Clarke criticizes "firing of the army and de-Baathification" in Iraq (p.272). The Right Arabist critique, in a nutshell.

What's Left?

The vilification of the "neo-conservative" Right Zionists may be well deserved. According to the worst accusations, they are agents of Israel who serve a foreign flag. At best, they represent one imperialist faction within the US foreign policy establishment -- the faction that believes Israel is able to police the Middle East and secure US access to the region's strategic oil resources and the Suez Canal. Anti-imperialists on the Left have good reason to oppose this as an imperialist war and rightly assert that no more US troops should die in order to make the Middle East safe for US empire.

In doing so, however, the Left sometimes runs the risk of becoming unwitting partners in an intra-imperialist battle between Right Zionists and Right Arabists. Right Arabists -- like Brent Scowcroft and General Anthony Zinni--posing as the equivalent of Republican "anti-war activists" do not demand immediate withdrawal of US troops; they attack the "incompetence" of those who have executed this war. Right Arabists are not opposed to the US micro-managing the political outcome in Iraq; they oppose the particular outcome that empowers Iraqi Shiites and Kurds at the expense of Sunni Arab power in Iraq and beyond.

The anti-imperialist Left has no business aligning itself with Right Arabists, and yet the dangerous consequences of this alliance have only grown as Right Arabists have begun to regain control of the US ship of state. Nowhere is the risk for the Left more evident than in the writing of Robert Dreyfuss, a contributing editor at The Nation, a contributing writer at Mother Jones, a senior correspondent for The American Prospect, and author of Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam.

Dreyfuss is a good reporter and, to his credit, he understands the Right Zionist and Right Arabist battle lines within the Bush administration. However, because all of his political firepower is directed at the "neocon-dominated" United States, his critique is completely neutralized in those instances where Right Arabists have managed to regain some influence over Iraq policy. Dreyfuss pins everything on the idea that Right Zionists are dominating US policy. It legitimizes his uncritical embrace of Right Arabist perspectives on Iraq.

In a December 2004 comment, for example, Dreyfuss finds evidence of considerable Right Zionist panic, expressed by "leading neocon strategist" Max Singer, that Right Arabists were winning greater influence over Iraq policy. "What world is Singer living in?" asks Dreyfuss. "The United States is supporting the Sunnis and Baathists? Course not."

More recently, Dreyfuss has acknowledged that the balance in US policy might have shifted back toward the Right Arabists. In an article sub-titled "Bring Back the Baath," Dreyfuss reports on "U.S.-Baath Talks."

"What the United States ought to have done two years ago -- namely, make a deal with the resistance and its core Baathist leadership -- might, after all, be happening. It is unclear how far up the food chain in the Bush administration this effort goes, but it appears that a desperate Ambassador Khalilzad has realized the importance of forging ties to the Baath party... That's all good...."

If Dreyfuss feels awkward about declaring the increasingly Right Arabist inclinations of a Republican administration "all good," he certainly hides it well. Give Dreyfuss the benefit of the doubt and assume that his pro-Baathist perspective is derived not from his love of Sunni Arab authoritarianism but the fact that the "resistance and its core Baathist leadership" offer the best chances for driving the US out of Iraq. That remains to be seen. If the US makes its peace with the Baathists, it is Sistani and the Iraqi Shiites who may ultimately drive the US out of Iraq.

Whatever his intentions, however, Dreyfuss has become a pawn of Right Arabists. Not surprisingly, they have embraced him openly. Charles Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and a prominent Right Arabist, provides a glowing blurb on the back cover of the book. Moreover, key chapters on Right Zionists draw on interviews with Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Atkins, and other prominent Right Arabists whom Dreyfuss quotes approvingly.

The Left would do well to remember that there are at least two imperialist camps in Washington -- one Right Arabist and one Right Zionist. Both are "sensible," within the framework of imperialist statecraft. Neither deserves our embrace. Will Sistani -- like the Shah before him -- collaborate with Israel and police US interests in the Middle East? Or will the Baathists and Saudis patrol the region for the US? These are urgent questions for US imperialism. Not so for the anti-imperialist Left. Our demand is simple: Bring the troops home. Now. 

Jonathan Cutler teaches sociology at Wesleyan University. For more Iraq analysis and commentary, go to his blog,  www.profcutler.com.

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A few weeks ago we got a friendly letter from Tony Swindell, a newspaper editor in Sherman, Texas. "Begin paying attention," Swindell urged, "to stories from Iraq like the very recent one about U.S. Marines killing a group of civilians near Baghdad. This is the next step in the Iraq war as frustration among our soldiers grows -- especially with multiple tours.

"I served with the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, and My Lai was not an isolated incident. We came to be known as the Butcher's Brigade, and we also were the birthplace of the Phoenix Program. The brigade commander and a battalion commander were charged with murdering civilians (shooting them from helicopters, recorded in some of my photos), although both skated. If you recall from his autobiography, Colin Powell served briefly with the 11th in Duc Pho before going to division HQ in Chu Lai.

"The atrocities against Iraqi civilians are slipping under the media radar screen, but they're going to explode in America's face not too long from now and dwarf the Abu Ghraib (sic) incident. That was a fraternity beer bust by comparison. The Ft. Sill episode [described in JoAnn Wypijewski's piece from April, "The Army Slays Its Own."] is another one of the same storm clouds on the horizon. I sincerely fear for our country."

We asked Swindell to expand these thoughts. Here's his powerful response. AC/JSC

On the May 2 edition of the Christian Broadcasting Network's The 700 Club, host Pat Robertson claimed that Iran "now has atomic weapons," even though, the U.S. intelligence community, as well as independent experts, agree that Iran is years away from having the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

After examining the politics of Israel's secular and religious communities, Robertson said he recently "read the 38th chapter of Ezekiel" "to see a war" where "states in that region" join "to move against Israel." Robertson then stated, "It's amazing that Iran has come to the fore as it has with a president who says Israel should be wiped off the map, who ... now has atomic weapons," adding that "[a] year ago, the Lord told me ... that Israel was entering into the most dangerous time in its existence," and "confirmed this again in January."

Media Matters for America has previously rebutted assertions made by other conservative commentators and media outlets that Iran currently possesses nuclear weapons or that it is close to having the capability to manufacture them. Robertson's claim is contradicted by public estimates provided by the U.S. intelligence community and independent experts.

For example, The New York Times reported on March 5 that "American intelligence agencies say it will take 5 to 10 years for Iran to manufacture the fuel for its first atomic bomb." After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced on April 11 that his country had enriched a small quantity of uranium and was researching technology to enhance its enrichment capabilities -- a necessary step to produce the highly enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear weapon -- the Times reported on April 17 that "[i]f Iran moved beyond research and actually began running the machines, it could force American intelligence agencies to revise their estimates of how long it would take for Iran to build an atom bomb -- an event they now put somewhere between 2010 and 2015." According to an April 14 New York Times article, Thomas Fingar, the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, "said the official view of the [U.S.] intelligence agencies remained that Iran was unlikely to have nuclear weapons before 2010 at the earliest." A March 27 issue brief on Iran's nuclear program by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security stated that "Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009." They noted, however, that "[t]his result reflects a worst case assessment, and Iran can be expected to take longer," because "Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties."

Robertson recently mentioned the threat of nuclear attack as justification for calling for the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. As Media Matters noted at the time, Robertson explained that "one day," Chavez will "be aiming nuclear weapons; and what's coming across the Gulf [of Mexico] isn't going to be [Hurricane] Katrina, it's going to be his nukes."

From the May 2 edition of the Christian Broadcasting Network's The 700 Club:

ROBERTSON: It's shocking what's happening. And I got home over the weekend and read the 38th chapter of Ezekiel, once again, to see a war that is forecast where a nation identified as Russia and possibly some of the Caucasian states, maybe Turkey, but some of those states in that region, join with Iran, Libya, and the Sudan to move against Israel. A great horde of people to come against Israel, re-gathered from the nations in the latter days.

It's amazing that Iran has come to the fore as it has with a president who says Israel should be wiped off the map, who -- it now has atomic weapons. And a year ago, the Lord told me, as I was praying, that Israel was entering into the most dangerous time in its existence as a nation. He confirmed this again in January, and lo and behold, the events in the -- in the current affairs just keep tumbling, tumbling, tumbling upon us. And I look in disbelief.

-K.D.

Do you realize that in addition to fluoridating water, why, there are studies underway to fluoridate salt, flour, fruit juices, soup, sugar, milk, ice cream? Ice cream, Mandrake? Children's ice cream!...You know when fluoridation began?...1946. 1946, Mandrake. How does that coincide with your post-war Commie conspiracy, huh? It's incredibly obvious, isn't it? A foreign substance is introduced into our precious bodily fluids without the knowledge of the individual, and certainly without any choice. That's the way your hard-core Commie works.
-- Gen. Jack D. Ripper

On the Sean Hannity radio show Monday, I debated (or rather listened to five minutes of screeching by) a young member of the radical group MeCha. A student at the University of San Francisco, she denied that her group still subscribed to 1960s identity politics, then promptly delivered a full-throated rant about Mexico's right to reclaim American territory: "We believe that we have the right to be in this land...Aztlan is California! Aztlan is this country! This country was ours ... We didn't cross the borders. The borders crossed us ... This country is based on exploitation!"

On NPR's "All Things Considered," Gloria Ramirez Vargas, a politician in Baja, Calif., rallied her constituents with a similar cry: " Many Mexicans are nourishing the ground in the U.S. , but those lands were once ours. Those same lands, which now with intelligence, with love and with a lot of work, we are re-conquering again for our Mexico."

On leading conservative talk show station KFI in Los Angeles, hosts John Kobylt and Ken Chiampou interviewed Tony Valdez, who also invoked "manifest destiny" as a rationale for supporting the sabotage of our immigration laws. He pontificated about 1846, recycled the "We didn't cross the borders" nonsense, inveighed against the war in Iraq, and exclaimed: "You took this country. You killed people in order to take this country for yourselves."

Valdez is a FOX News 11 reporter at KTTV in L.A.

Aztlan is a long-held notion among Mexico's intellectual elite and political class, which asserts that the American southwest rightly belongs to Mexico. Advocates believe the reclamation (or reconquista) of Aztlan will occur through sheer demographic force. If the rallies across the country are any indication, reconquista is already complete.

MeCHA has been an integral part of student life for decades; many, if not most, of my Chicano friends and acquaintances were involved with it; it was then and probably is now an advocacy organization which worked to bring Chicanos (now Latinos) into the educational institutions, to feed and clothe underprivileged children in the community, including those of the migrant farmworkers, was involved with Caesar Chavez in advocating for better working conditions for the migrant workers, and provided tutoring, mentoring, and fellowship for students, as do many other student organizations.

"If the Border Patrol had done its job, using the technology that is available to us, we could stop these people," Spencer said in November, when he was a guest on the Donahue show. "This is an invasion of the United States!"

Spencer sent every member of Congress a copy of his videotape - "Bonds of Our Nation" - that purports to prove the Mexican government and Mexican-Americans are plotting to take over the American Southwest and create the nation of Aztlán. Hand-delivering the videos was Betina McCann, the fiancé of neo-Nazi Steven Barry.

After a neighbor reported hearing two shots fired and a weapon cocked outside her home, local officers drove out and found that bullets had been fired into the woman's garage door. Spencer, claiming that he opened fire after hearing suspicious noises outside, was arrested on three felony counts of disorderly conduct with a weapon, one felony count of endangerment and one count of misdemeanor criminal damage. A few days earlier, following a series of death threats against Spencer, his home headquarters had been burglarized, Spencer claimed.

I first became aware of it, Mandrake, during the physical act of love...Yes, a profound sense of fatigue, a feeling of emptiness followed. Luckily I-I was able to interpret these feelings correctly. Loss of essence. I can assure you it has not recurred, Mandrake. Women, er, women sense my power, and they seek the life essence. I do not avoid women, Mandrake ... but I do deny them my essence.

Bush's vision of a free world actually looks just like the corporate globalization agenda pushed by a succession of American presidents in institutions like the World Trade Organization.

But this administration yearns for freedom too much to leave it up to trade negotiators. Unlike his predecessors, Bush isn't content to use carrots and sticks and a liberal dose of arm twisting to advance that agenda. His administration has made the neoliberal policies euphemistically referred to as "free-trade" a centerpiece of its national security policy.

Bush is willing to use the awesome force of the United States military to guarantee the freedom of the world's largest multinationals.

In her new book, The Bush Agenda, Antonia Juhasz peels the veils away from Bush's agenda -- imperialism, militarism and corporate globalization -- and exposes who drives it: a group of hawkish ideologues with an unprecedented relationship to major defense and energy companies.

Juhasz shows that the invasion of Iraq -- an invasion that was as much economic as military -- was the centerpiece of a larger project: the creation a New American Century in which the end-goal of American foreign policy is to enrich the corporate elites, and dissent at home will not be tolerated. Juhasz is a wonk -- she got her start as a staffer for Rep. John Conyers -- but the book is as readable as it is deeply researched.

I caught up with Juhasz last week at Washington's Union Station, just blocks away from the White House, to chat about The Bush Agenda.

Joshua Holland: [19th century Prussian military philosopher Carl von] Clausewitz said that war is an extension of politics by other means. You suggest that for the Bush administration, war is an extension of corporate globalization by other means. Run down your basic premise.

Antonia Juhasz: The Bush administration has implemented a particularly radical model of corporate globalization by which it has teamed overt military might -- full-scale invasion -- with the advancement of its corporate globalization agenda. And this model is particularly imperial -- that's one of the things that makes it different from, for example, the Reagan or Bush Sr. regimes. As opposed to simply replacing the head of a regime that is no longer serving the interests of the administration, the Bush team has gone further -- using a military invasion to fundamentally transform a country's political and economic structure.

It is also using an occupation to maintain that altered structure, which is the definition of imperialism in my mind: spreading the empire by changing the very laws of foreign nations to service the empire's needs. And, as Bush is repeatedly saying, "Iraq is only the beginning." I detail the rest of the empire's pursuits across the Middle East in the chapter on the U.S.-Middle East Free Trade Area.

The fundamental purpose of the book was to determine how this model came to be, where its advocates hope it will go and who its advocates are so that we can better dismantle it.

JH: But Bush isn't the first to use a full-scale invasion -- unilaterally -- in furtherance of those goals. I think of Reagan's invasion of Grenada to knock off Maurice Bishop, a moderate socialist.

AJ: There was no occupation, and it wasn't done the same way that the Bush administration -- using its own tools, its own people, its own policies -- to explicitly restructure the entire functioning of the country's economy to serve its own ends. Reagan wanted a different leader, a leader that would meet his needs and that was enough. Bush has locked in an entirely new economic and political structure. I'm certainly not justifying the invasion of Grenada, but for me that was quantitatively different.

JH: What is Pax Americana -- the "American Peace" -- and what is it about the original Roman version, Pax Romana, that makes it a poor model to emulate?

AJ: I talk about Pax Americana because that's what members of the administration talk about -- Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Libby, Khalilzad, Perle, Zoellick, Bolton. ... In fact, there are 16 members of the Bush administration that were also participants in the Project for the New American Century, which was very clear that the U.S. not only has a Pax Americana but should seek to maintain it.

This is problematic because it seeks to achieve the Roman model, with an all-powerful emperor who ran his kingdom on 50 percent slave labor, who eliminated all guarantees of civil liberties and eliminated all civic participation, but maintained the fallacy of public institutions and participatory government to keep the elites at bay -- to make elites feel like they had the presence and prestige of serving in government.

So there were senators and there were "representatives of the people," but of course the emperor appointed those he wanted to sit in the senate, and he chose those who would serve his interests. And then he appointed regional overlords to oversee the rest of the empire. In addition, the idea that Rome generated peace -- that it really was in fact a Pax Romana that guaranteed peace for the rest of the world -- is false. To create the empire, there was an enormous amount of war and bloodshed, and also to maintain the empire there was continued fighting as nations and peoples were forced to acquiesce.

However, there was a period of about 200 years where there was relatively less struggle within Rome over who would rule. But one key reason Rome was able to maintain that internal peace was all the money that the empire poured into public services -- building aqueducts, providing services, supporting intellectual thought and -- as I say in the book -- creating the Western Canon.

The Bush administration has chosen all the worst elements of the Roman Empire: the lack of civil liberties and the movement towards a nonrepresentative government run by a dictator. Even the most conservative Republican columnist will admit that Bush has consolidated more and more power in the executive branch than any president in modern history. And he's increased the proportion of people in the United States in the lower income sphere, people who have to work day in and day out in order to meet basic needs like health care, and who often aren't able to meet those needs. I argue that that is a modern form of slavery.

And while the administration is explicitly imperial -- it is trying to annex other nations through its military and its economic policy -- its not putting any of that attention to public education, public resources and public services. So we are getting the worst of the worst. And just as it was a myth that the Pax Romana created world peace, the Pax Americana clearly generates more global insecurity. Acts of deadly terror have increased every year of the Bush administration; they increased more than three-fold between 2003 and 2004.

JH: So he's not just the worst president ever, he's also the worst ...

AJ: ... Yes, he's also the worst emperor ever.

JH: You're blunt about calling Iraq an economic invasion. Most analyses are geopolitical, but you put it together with the long-standing wish list of the corporate globalists. Can you tell me about Bremer's100 rules and what Bearing Point is?

AJ: If you look at the corporations that have profited most from the invasion -- Bechtel, Halliburton, Lockheed Martin and Chevron -- these are all corporations that have decades of operations and activities trying to increase their economic engagement in Iraq -- lobbying the U.S. government to increase their access to Iraq. And they've done so successfully -- first with Saddam Hussein and later with the coalition authorities and now with the new government of Iraq. They have participated with or guided -- you can choose the word you want -- the Bush administration in its invasion. Through their executives, they played key roles in advocating for war. George Shultz is the perfect example and one I focus on in the book.

I emphasize that it's an absolute fallacy that there was no post-war plan. The plan was written two months before the invasion of Iraq by a company, Bearing Point Inc., which is based in Virginia -- it was KPMG Consulting until it changed its name in the wake of the Arthur Anderson-Enron corruption scandals. The company is not well-known. It works behind the scenes for every branch of government, and it provides all kinds of consulting services.

Bearing point received a $250 million contract from USAID to write a remodeled structure for the Iraqi economy. It was to transition Iraq from a state-controlled economy to a market economy, but I argue that the new model was more a state-controlled economy that is controlled on behalf of multinational corporations, and heavily regulated in fact on behalf of multinational corporations. It just no longer serves the public interest.

Bearing point's plan was implemented to a T by L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of Iraq's coalition government. The U.N.'s special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, called him the "Dictator of Iraq," and he was. He ruled Iraq for 14 months, and he implemented Bearing Point's plan; he rewrote Iraq's entire economic and political structure by implementing his 100 orders. The orders had the force of law, and any Iraqi laws that contradicted the orders were overridden.

The 100 orders put into place a standard set of corporate globalization policies. Instead of having to wait for Iraq to become a member of the World Trade Organization, for example, or to fulfill requirements of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, or worrying about whether the policies they most wanted would be accepted, the administration was able to simply invade, occupy and impose those provisions itself. And many of those provisions have been long opposed at institutions like the WTO -- for example the investments provisions -- but they were implemented overnight in Iraq with a stroke of the pen by Paul Bremer.

Probably the most important order in terms of what happened with the occupation was the very first order. Bremer fired 120,000 key bureaucrats in every government ministry in Iraq. That meant that ministries that had been functioning very well for decades lost their bureaucracies almost overnight. The excuse that was given was that they were Ba'ath Party members, but nobody could hold those positions unless they belonged to the Ba'ath Party, so it wasn't an indication that they were a party to Saddam Hussein's crimes. They were fired because they could have stood in the way of the economic transformation.

Then there was the firing of the entire Iraqi military, and I think that problem is well-known. Less well-known is how that played out in relation to the rest of the orders. Order number 39 was the foreign investment order. There were several provisions which I detail in the book, but the most important may be national treatment, which meant that Iraqis could not preference Iraqi companies and Iraqi workers in the reconstruction.

So 150 United States corporations have received $50 billion for work in Iraq, $33 billion of which was exclusively for standard reconstruction -- building bridges, repairing electricity and repairing water. But originally the plan was to use the soldiers -- the Iraqi military -- for the reconstruction. Instead of taking a half a million men and canceling their salaries and sending them home with guns, they were going to go to work and get money, and provide for their families and be part of the reconstruction.

Even worse is that those American companies failed. Miserably. And it's not just because of the insurgency -- the insurgency didn't begin immediately. They failed because they went in to maximize their profit, to build the most expensive state-of-the-art systems they could and to get their feet firmly in Iraq so they would be able to profit long term. But what Iraq needed was just to get the systems up and running. It was summer in the desert.

JH: How long did it take for Iraq to get those systems up after the first invasion?

AJ: Three months. The Iraqi workers and companies rebuilt their systems in three months.

JH: OK, so Bremer imposed these rules under the Coalition Provisional Authority. Explain how rules set up by a provisional government ended up codified in Iraq's new constitution?

AJ: Bremer appointed an interim government for Iraq when the occupation formally ended. The interim government, together with Bremer, threw out the existing Iraqi Constitution. And I think at the time there was this idea that it was a nation being molded out of the dirt -- that it didn't have a government, didn't have a structure -- and here was the United States helping them form a constitutional convention. But they had a government, they had a constitution -- they've had a constitution since 1922. We didn't have to create a constitutional government for them.

The first constitution that was written had all of Bremer's orders, and it could only be changed by a very complicated process -- it essentially locked the orders in. Then the new constitution for Iraq was supposed to be "of the people." It was drafted by the interim government and put to a popular vote. But it was crafted so that it locked into place the occupation, the economic transformation, the constitutionality of the new oil law -- which the United States had drafted -- and all of the Bremer orders.

The only public discussion of the constitution was the few things people were gleaning from the press and what their religious leaders -- who were themselves gleaning it from the press -- told them. Five days before the constitution was to be voted on, the paper copies were released. They made 5 million copies for 15 million voters. And on that same day, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, was meeting with influential Iraqi leaders to rewrite fundamental aspects of that very constitution. There was absolutely no way that the vast majority of the Iraqi people had any idea what was in the constitution. They were voting for hope, and they risked their lives to do so. But there's no way they knew that they were voting to maintain the Bremer orders.

JH: What's the Hague Convention of 1907?

AJ: Under international law an occupying government has one set of responsibilities, and they're very clear. An occupying government must provide security and basic services. An occupying government explicitly cannot fundamentally rewrite the laws of the country they're occupying. The United States did exactly the opposite; we rewrote the laws, and we didn't provide basic services or security for the people.

JH: Did we ratify the Hague Conventions?

AJ: We certainly did.

JH: You focus on four firms that pushed the policy and have profited handsomely from the invasion: Bechtel, Chevron, Lockheed Martin and Halliburton. But there are many other multinational corporations that have both made a killing in Iraq and have close ties to both the administration and to the conservative movement more generally. Why those four and, playing devil's advocate, is there a danger focusing on a small number of firms when the issues are militarism and corporate globalization more broadly?

AJ: These four companies have the longest relationship to Iraq. Through their executives, they lobbied on behalf of an invasion of Iraq, and they have profited more than almost all other companies from that invasion. And they have intimate interlocking relationships with this administration. They demonstrate very clearly how, in the Bush administration, there essentially is no distinction between corporate characters and government characters. They also are companies that because of their corporate behavior around the world have preexisting and longstanding movements -- social movements -- that are organized against their harmful actions, which readers of the book support and become a part of.

JH: That's a great segue. In your final chapter, you discuss ways that people can oppose the Bush agenda, and you suggest that another agenda is possible. I think that's very important because so many books bash Bush and then leave readers feeling dispirited. Name just one thing that needs to be done to reverse this agenda?

AJ: There are so many alternatives, and I give concrete examples of solutions -- for how to end the economic invasion of Iraq. What I hoped to do in the last chapter was to present the movements and many of the ideas generating fundamental change already. I wanted to empower people -- to show that the information in the book can be used as a tool for these movements and a tool for change.

So I give examples of not only different policies, but I also give examples of organizations and communities that have been successfully mobilizing against the full Bush agenda -- that means corporate globalization, war and imperialism. To me that's more important than any one of the alternatives that I present. The whole point of the chapter is that there are, thankfully, millions of alternatives to choose from. And we're already seeing successful transformation -- there are real movements that we can join and in which we can have an impact.