When Enough is Enough...
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October 06, 2006 10:40 AM
Lubna Hammad
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Since the early 1990s the Palestinian have been dragged into a slippery slope of "peace" agreements with Israel the result of which has been an increase in Palestinian deaths; injuries; land confiscation; and control over water resources and sources of livelihood. In short, an acceleration in the ethnic cleansing that has started in 1947. Our leadership has been reduced from a liberation movement to a subsidiary of the Israeli occupation. To add insult to injury, this leadership, or more accurately these leaderships are fighting tooth and nail over this subsidiary. As if this is not enough, the "leading parties" crossed the red line and spelled Palestinian blood in their struggle for power over this "Authority."
Putting this in the perspective of the physical weakness of the Palestinians in face of the Israeli killing machine, our lack of a united vision as a natural result of the lack of genuine leadership whose sole goal is liberation and self-determination, the impoverished masses in the occupied territories and the refugee camps, and the frustrated Diaspora, in addition to a complicit international and Arab community, the picture is indeed very bleak, especially if seen within the broader context of ethnic cleansing in the making.
In 2002, Sharon ordered his army to prepare for mass expulsion of the Palestinians similar to that of the 1947-1949, which he hoped can be carried out in the wake of the war on Iraq. This was preceded by public calls by Israeli officials and activists to "transfer" the Palestinians, even those who are now citizens of the Jewish state. Israeli public opinion polls have been showing growing support for this expulsion. All of this has a bad ring to it. It brings to mind the transfer plans of 1937 and 1939, and Plans Gimel and Dalet. Are Operations Defensive Shield and Summer Rains really different from Operations Nachshon, Misparayim or Nikayun in 1948? And how different is Gamla's "Logistics of Transfer" from the work of Yosef Weitz's "Transfer Committees"?
Unlike the first Nakbah, which condensed the Zionist's plot in one historical moment (actually a year), the second Nakbah, which is under way, might not have a peak moment. The Apartheid Wall, military operations, land confiscation, movement restriction, tree uprooting, house demolition, economic blockade and other measures are slowly but surely eroding the basics of livelihood for Palestinians in a process that might take years.
In addition to these external challenges, the Palestinian people is plagued with severe problems of leadership, representation and more importantly national vision. Historically, the PLO has been the official and only representative of the Palestinian people. However, it can hardly claim to be anymore. Palestinians are divided into four groups, each of which must have a voice in any overall sole representative body. These groups are the refugees, Palestinians citizens of Israel, the Diaspora and Palestinians in the 1967-occupied territories. As it stands today, the PLO represents none of these groups. On the other hand, there is the PA, which could be seen as a representative of the Palestinians in the 1967-occupied territories. Ironically, until recently the PA had been in charge of the "peace process" with Israel. This unjustified monopoly was suspended when Hamas ascended to power last January. However, this was done only to ensure Fatah's continued control over any political talks. Fatah, through dominating the PLO, claims the representative status of the Palestinian people. Hamas, on the other hand, claims that it broke Fatah's hegemony over the PLO by gloriously winning the PLC elections. Both factions have an impressive ability to dismiss the fact that the PLO is not representative to begin with, and that what is needed is true reform and comprehensive reconstruction of the house before dividing the cake. Recent developments among the Diaspora (the three conventions in Europe and the upcoming one in North America), as well as the attempts among the refugees to organize seem to be easily dismissed or overlooked in the feverish struggle for power.
As for the lack of a national vision, this is very apparent from the official position of the PLO/PA as represented by President Abbas, which is a two-state solution, with the envisioned Palestinian state over 22% of Palestine. Not only is this opposed by Hamas, who refuses to recognize Israel, but also it is rendered impossible and totally unviable by the ongoing Israeli annexationist and ethnic cleansing policies and measures. Not to mention that this position is not the reflection of an agreed upon national vision for liberation. Rather, it was presented as the program of Abbas during the presidential elections, and the voting by one fourth of the Palestinian people on this program was considered as some form of referendum. In fairness, it must be said that this was the official position of the PLO since Arafat. However, reference is made here to the second presidential elections and Abbas and not Arafat because it was the first time that Palestinians (part of them) had the opportunity to have their say (although partially so, since there were no other options given).
So far, hardly any debate exists among the Palestinians in the four groups regarding the national project. There is no consensus as what key terms like liberation mean. Does it mean an end to the occupation of the territories taken in 1967? Or, is it the emancipation from the Zionist colonial rule? If it is the former, then how would the issues of refugees, Palestinians citizens of Israel, and victims of the ethnic cleansing of 1947-1949 be dealt with? Even if liberation is defined in clear terms, there is no serious discussion of the best means to achieve it. Is it armed resistance as Hamas insists? Is it only through the political process as Abbas advocates? Is it non-violent resistance? Or, is it a combination of all? There are no clear answers coming from the various leaderships simply because there isn't a national dialogue taking place. Each faction is promoting their vision as the only right one, and thus they're all mutually exclusive leaving the people without any vision of strategy at all.
In terms of leadership, on the international level there are two official representative bodies. One is hardly representative at all, and the other represents only those who elected it. Refugees on the other hand do not have an overall leadership. Many of the grassroot leaderships in refugee camps are divided along the traditional factional lines. The Diaspora is even more fragmented. However, in the past years three conventions were held to organize Palestinians of Europe. The Right of Return Congress is taking an active role in this regard. In the US, the Detroit Declaration was issued earlier this year calling for a Pan-US Palestinian convention similar to those that took place in Europe and aiming at organizing the Palestinian Diaspora in the US. However, these efforts still need time to mature and materialize. Palestinian Diaspora in the Arab world or Latin America is hardly on the radar screen.
In the face of all the external and internal challenges, there is a pressing need for a representative leadership and an umbrella body with clear organizational structures and decision-making processes that enable Palestinians from the different backgrounds to participate and work together to formulate a national strategy for liberation. The two main issues that rise here are the reform of the PLO and the status of the PA. Over the last few months there were many calls to dissolve the PA and reform the PLO as an umbrella organization. Proponents of this idea argue rightfully that the PA is in fact facilitating and subsidizing the occupation making it the cheapest ever. It is also undermining the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. The current power struggle between Fatah and Hamas over the PA, and the recent statements by Condolisa Rice regarding the need to strengthen the Presidency (Fatah) while alienating and isolating the Government (Hamas) lend further support to this view.
However, one of the concerns raised regarding this proposition is the lack of guarantees that Israel will assume its responsibilities as an occupying power once the PA is dissolved. Israel already exercises military control over the occupied territories totally disregarding the PA. Under international law, Israel will remain the occupying power even if it declared otherwise, did not assume administrative control over the territories, or unilaterally withdrew from parts of the West Bank. However, the situation becomes complicated if Jordan, for instance, enters the West Bank under the pretext of helping the Palestinians or protecting its own borders.
Whether a third party gets involved, or Israel demarcates the borders unilaterally (and illegally), the Palestinians should be prepared to face the consequences of dissolving the PA. This requires a clear understanding of the possible scenarios and even clearer strategies to respond to any of them.
The other concern regarding disbanding the PA is that this might lead to a civil war. The recent developments in the Palestinian arena show that if anything might cause a civil war it is the very existence of the PA and the power struggle over it. Moreover, despite last week's sad events, the Palestinians have so far acted in a mature manner and avoided slipping into a civil war. Everybody seems to be well aware of the disastrous consequences of such a war. Also, the attack against Gaza this summer showed that when the threat is imminent as in the launch of Operation Summer Rains, Palestinians put aside their internal disagreements and focus their efforts against the aggression. Nonetheless, there will be a state of chaos that will exceed the current one. The total absence of the rule of law and its institutions (as opposed to their partial existence now) will pose a serious threat to the stability of the territories, which should also be taken into consideration.
Another important issue to be taken into consideration when proposing to dissolve the PA is the political and social-developmental achievements of the various actors on the Palestinian scene. Hamas's victory in the elections is the most obvious one. We must find a way in which to reflect this representation in the reformed PLO in proportionate terms. Yet, the real challenge lies in finding mechanisms that allow Palestinians in the territories to elect these representatives regularly. It is not clear how this would be done once the PA is dissolved. Related to this are the modest but important achievements of some national institutions like the PCBS, the Central Committee for Elections, and the Center for Curriculum Development, what would happen to these institutions? Whether and how their functions and achievements could be maintained are questions to be addressed within the debate to dissolve the PA.
Addressing these important issues and others takes time. It also requires a framework within which discussions and measures can take place. Dr. Ali Jirbawi, in an open letter to President Abbas, Prime Minister Haniyeh, and leaders of Hamas and Fatah, presents a seven-point program to get out of the current impasse. Underlying this program is a frustration with the immaturity of our leadership and its inability to lead. It also sends a clear and strong message: enough is enough. It is time that everybody matches rhetoric with actions.
To prove their good intentions, Fatah and Hamas must, according to this plan, form a government of independent figures (yet not technocrats per se) for one year. During this year, Hamas -being the majority in the PLC - should fulfill its promises of reforming the PA. Fatah on the other hand, is expected to perform the duties of an active and constructive opposition and prove that its disagreements with Hamas were over the best ways to serve the national interests as opposed to power-seeking rivalries. Fatah is given yet another test to pass. After stabilizing the situation internally, the former ruling party must, through President Abbas, establish the seriousness (or lack of it) on the other side to reach a peaceful agreement. Abbas has to present the people with tangible results to his approach beyond the usual promises and made-to-breach agreements. Meanwhile, the PLO is to be reformed and reactivated, and armed resistance groups must adhere to a one-year truce (typically unilateral), giving way to grassroots non-violent forms of resistance in order for all parties to be able to work on their specific objectives.
The most interesting point in Jirbawi's plan is the declaration that the proposed government will be the last under the PA. By the end of the one year, either a Palestinian state will be declared or the PA will be dissolved. A fair ultimatum to all those concerned. For Israel and the complicit international community, the message is clear: your grace period is reaching its end. For Fatah and Abbas, this will mark the end of their bet over the current "peace process". Hamas and other Palestinian leaderships should do their homework and formulate their visions for liberation based on the realities at hand. Hezbollah is always there as an example to learn from.
Unlike previous plans and documents, the Jirbawi Plan is very specific in terms of defining the options and the steps. It is very realistic in view of the current situation despite the few challenges arising, which can be overcome with a little bit of serious efforts and good intentions. In short, it is doable and much needed to end this chaos and get us out of the impasse in which we trapped ourselves. It should be supported and adopted. Anyone opposing it must clearly articulate their reasons and offer alternatives in order for their opposition to be constructive. We've had enough of spelling our blood and wasting time. It is time for action, this time á la Palestinienne!
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