"Legitimacy and influence reside in sound logic, quest for justice and compassion and empathy for all humanity."

"The global position of the United States is in all probability weakened because the administration has continued to resort to force, to conceal the truth and to mislead the American people about its policies and practices."

The Iran leader urged the Bush administration to withdraw its troop from Iraq, saying "Now that Iraq has a constitution and an independent assembly and government, would it not be more beneficial to bring the U.S. officers and soldiers home and to spend the astronomical U.S. military expenditures in Iraq for the welfare and prosperity of the American people?"

"Undoubtedly the American people are not satisfied with this behavior and they showed their discontent in the recent elections," Ahmadinejad noted. "I hope that in the wake of the mid-term elections, the administration of President Bush will have heard and will heed the message of the American people.

In mid-term election on Nov. 7, Bush's Republican Party lost control of both the Senate and the House of the Representatives.

In his unprecedented letter to the American people, Ahmadinejad also tried to seek for direct dialogue between Iran and the United States.

"Noble Americans, our nation has always extended its hand of friendship to all other nations of the world."

"Hundreds of thousands of my Iranian compatriots are living amongst you in friendship and peace, and are contributing positively to your society," he said, noting "Our people have been in contact with you over the past many years and have maintained these contacts despite the unnecessary restriction of the US authorities."

Prior to his latest letter, Ahmadinejad wrote an 18-page letter to U.S. President George W. Bush in May, which Washington criticized for not addressing Iran's nuclear program - where the U.S. is leading the drive to impose UN sanctions on Tehran for its refusal to stop enriching uranium.

Iran and the United States have had no diplomatic relations since 1979 when Iranian protesters seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and kept 52 people hostage for 444 days.

"We need a conference, probably, one under the UN. It should bea big forum to discuss the problems of Iraq," he was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying.

"The international community should work out proposals on economic, political and, above all, security issues," Safonov specified.

UN's top human rights official Louise Arbour said on Wednesday that violence in Iraq is now worse than ever, urging the country's leaders and U.S.-led coalition forces to reassert the government's authority and ensure respect for the rule of law.

Violence rages in Iraq as sectarian killings, car bombings, and roadside bombs cause dozens of Iraqi casualties per day.

She said ever growing unemployment, poverty, discrimination and diminishing access to basic services were severely affecting the economic and social rights of the Iraqi people.

"The inability of law enforcement agencies and the justice system to protect the Iraqi population has further reduced confidence that perpetrators will be held accountable," Arbour told the 47-nation UN rights watchdog.

She also urged Iraqi leaders from all sides, multi-national forces in Iraq and the international community as a whole to increase efforts to reassert the authority of the Iraqi government and ensure respect for the rule of law.

"This afternoon, we reached a consensus," Hamilton said at a forum on national security at the Center for American Progress.

He refused to disclose details of the group's recommendations, to be included in a report the commission would issue on Dec. 6.

President George W. Bush and lawmakers were likely to be briefed on recommendations before the public release of the report.

The group, which was headed by Hamilton and former secretary of state James A. Baker III, a Republican, favored a regional diplomatic initiative that includes direct talks with Iran and Syria.

Media reports have said the panel, created in March, was divided on whether to include a declaration that within a specified period of time a significant number of American troops should be withdrawn from Iraq, and might link American withdrawal to the performance of the Iraqi military.

The group was expected to recommend regional talks involving Syria and Iran, despite the Bush administration's reluctance to engage those two countries, but it was not clear what recommendations it would make regarding U.S. troops levels in Iraq.

Earlier this month, the commission met with Bush and members of his foreign policy team, and interviewed British Prime Minister Tony Blair by videoconference, as part of its final round of interviews.

The White House, which has faced enormous pressure for a major change in its Iraq policy following the midterm elections on Nov. 7 in which Democrats retook control of both houses of Congress, also launched an internal review of its Iraq policy this month, to assess the situation in Iraq, review the options and recommend the best way forward.

GORANI: Well, within the context of the leaders conference in Dubai and also within the context of this debate, this semantics debate, over whether to call what is going on on in Iraq a civil war, the former Secretary of State Colin Powell says he thinks we can call it a civil war and added if he were still heading the State Department, he probably would recommend to the Bush administration that those terms should be used in order to come to terms with the reality on the ground.

I'm paraphrasing what he told me. This was closed to cameras and this was something he said within the context of this academic debate with 2 or 3,000 people watching on in the region.

All eyes are on Amman as President Bush meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki looking for solutions to the political and military morass in Iraq.

Prospects for the already-delayed meeting were put into further doubt when al-Maliki canceled a presummit dinner with Bush. But White House Spokesperson Dan Bartlett denied there was a snub, saying it was nothing more then a schedule change.

Even before the meetings began, ABC News had learned the Pentagon was considering essentially writing off Iraq's deadliest province for American forces, pulling U.S. troops out of Anbar, and moving them to fight what may be an even more difficult battle: the fight for Baghdad.


Professor Noah Feldman from New York University helped write the Iraqi constitution.

He said, "As Baghdad goes, so goes the nation."


But the fact that the Pentagon is considering abandoning Anbar shows the "ineffectiveness of the strategy and troop commitment to this point," Feldman said. "We have spent so much blood there."


Feldman said, "In a perfect world, I would not walk away from Anbar. But Iraq is far from a perfect world."


From the beginning of the war, Anbar province has been the heart of the Sunni insurgency, and more recently al Qaeda's main base of operations in Iraq.

But it is a place of increasing frustration to the 30,000 U.S. troops there, most of them Marines.


A recent assessment by the top Marine intelligence officer in Anbar concluded that without a massive increase in U.S. forces, the insurgency in Anbar could not be defeated militarily, a bleak assessment shared by top military commanders.


Under the plan now being considered by Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace, U.S. forces would turn Anbar province over to Iraqi forces.


A senior military official told ABC News, "If we are are not going to do a better job doing what we are doing out there, what's the point of having them out there?"


The U.S. general in charge of the region, John Abizaid, told Congress: "Al-Anbar province is critical, but, more critical than al-Anbar province is Baghdad. Baghdad's the main military effort."


Senior Pentagon officials say they are moving three battalions (about 2,000 troops) into Baghdad from other more peaceful areas in the country.

These troops will come from the north, in the Kirkuk area.

The movement of forces will happen "soon," and in fact may have already started.

This is the first in what may be several steps to reposition forces to concentrate on the battle to secure Baghdad, and is in addition to whatever plans the Pentagon has for Anbar.


The major fear in having U.S. forces leave Anbar is that insurgents could use the area to organize and stage attacks, creating a quasi-state, much like they did in the region prior to the American siege of Fallujah in 2004.

But the Pentagon might be willing to risk a political and military vacuum there in an effort to stabilize Baghdad.


Meanwhile, the Iraqi prime minister is facing political pressure from home.

The party led by the anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr says it is temporarily suspending participation in the cabinet and the Iraqi National Assembly.


It is seen as a temporary protest against the Maliki/Bush summit.

But a spokesman for al Sadr told the Reuters News Service that the bloc also had made the move to oppose the extension of the U.N. mandate allowing U.S.-led forces to stay in Iraq to the end of 2007.

The U.N. Security Council approved the extension on Tuesday at the request of the Iraqi government.


"This was done without the Iraqi parliament's approval," said Al Sadr's spokesman Faleh Shanshal said, adding that Maliki had promised a debate in parliament on the extension.


"We will not return to parliament and the government unless the government responds to our request. ... Although we are suspending our membership, we will go to parliament to raise this issue [the U.N. mandate]. It is a violation of the law."


But Feldman sees the al Sadr statement as a message: "The root to a solution in Iraq must go through Sadr."

Al Sadr is telling Maliki that "without him, he doesn't have a government."


Bush is facing political pressures of his own: a rebuke by the voters and even sniping from his own party over whether the country is now in a civil war.

"I would call it a civil war," former Secretary of State Colin Powell told a business forum in the United Arab Emirates. "I have been using it [civil war] because I like to face the reality,"

The stakes could not be higher for Bush and Maliki.

Many in Washington have held out hope that the group's report would provide a way for the United States to extricate itself from an increasingly deadly and unpopular war or, at least, a set of recommendations on how to move forward that could attract support from both Democrats and Republicans.

Their conclusions are likely to carry significant political weight even if President Bush chooses to ignore them, especially after his fellow Republicans lost control of the U.S. Congress in November 7 elections largely because of deep public discontent with the Iraq war.

The New York Times earlier reported that there was no hard timetable for the proposed U.S. pullback, but the source said: "There is a kind of indication in the report as to when that ought to be completed ... sometime within the next year."

The newspaper said the pullback of the 15 U.S. combat brigades in Iraq could still leave more than 70,000 American trainers, logistics experts and members of a rapid reaction force in the country.

The source declined to say whether the report recommended the withdrawal of specific numbers of U.S. troops.

REGIONAL CONFERENCE

He said the group's recommendations would include a call for a regional conference that could lead to direct U.S. talks with Iran and Syria, both accused by the United States of fomenting violence in Iraq.

The 10-member panel is led by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, a Republican and close Bush family friend, and by former Rep. Lee Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat.

Bush, who has ordered up his own parallel reviews by the Pentagon and the White House National Security Council, has said he is willing to make adjustments and listen to the suggestions of others, including the Iraq Study Group.

But he has shown little appetite for a major change in strategy such as pulling out U.S. forces.

Some Democrats have urged a phased withdrawal beginning in four to six months. There are now roughly 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and more than 2,800 have been killed since the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.

"We'll continue to be flexible, and we'll make the changes necessary to succeed," Bush said in Latvia on Tuesday. "But there's one thing I'm not going to do: I'm not going to pull our troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete."

Bush and White House aides also have so far spurned the idea of Washington negotiating directly with Syria and Iran to stabilize Iraq. Their message has been that such talks should be left to the sovereign government of Iraq and that the United States, as an outsider, should not interfere.

As expectations for the Iraq Study Group soared and bloodshed in Iraq reached new heights in November, analysts and experts said there was no magic bullet to resolve the crisis and that the panel was facing a virtually impossible task.

"I think the odds that it will get much worse, that we can't contain it, are considerably better than even," Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told reporters on Wednesday.

He also offered a deeply pessimistic assessment of Iraqi forces' ability to provide security in the short term, saying: "The reality is that out of the supposed Iraqi battalions, which are formed, and in the lead, only a small fraction actually exist and have combat capability."

The Iraq War dominated the electoral landscape during the recent mid-term elections. Voters swept in candidates across the nation who vowed for change in Iraq. But making good on his pledge that "I will not withdraw even if Laura and Barney [his dog] are the only ones supporting me," President George W. Bush is readying the largest request for funds so far to continue the war. Even worse, he's on the cusp of actually increasing troops.

Both in polls before the elections and in exit polling, voters were clear that they wanted a change in Iraq. Polls report that 56 percent support withdrawing some or all U.S. troops. But a series of high-level reviews and reports requested by Mr. Bush and Republicans in Congress in order to look like they are "doing something," are likely to take a different direction than voters want.

The Iraq Study Group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton commission because it's headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Indiana Representative Lee Hamilton) will likely push greater international involvement in the conflict, urging the United States to conduct talks with Iraq's closest neighbors, Iran and Syria. Though incredibly tight-lipped about the group's forthcoming recommendations, in interviews Baker has ruled out a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq over the next year.

Worried that the independent Iraq Study Group wouldn't produce a policy in line with the administration's, Bush requested a review by the Pentagon. Its review is considering an increase of at least 20,000 American troops and the addition of several thousand more trainers to work with Iraqi forces.

The Pentagon's proposed increases would be on top of the additional 12,000 U.S. troops Mr. Bush sent to Iraq and the 100,000 newly trained Iraqis in 2006. With these increases, the number of coalition and Iraqi security forces Iraq top 500,000. Yet, violence has reached new heights. In November, well over 1,300 Iraqis died, representing the highest monthly total since the initial invasion. And the U.S. death toll will top 800 for the year -- the most deaths in a single year since the war began.

Also reaching epic proportions is the war's cost. President Bush will be asking Congress in January for $124 billion for the war. Add in the $70 billion Congress has already approved for the year and the tab nearly reaches $200 billion for the fiscal year -- a 60 percent increase from the previous year. Put in perspective, spending on the Iraq War in 2007 will equal that for the U.S. departments of health, education, international affairs, and veteran's affairs combined.

The long-term financial picture is grim. Because the funds have been borrowed and we have a moral and medical obligation to care for the 20,000 wounded veterans over their lifetimes, taxpayers can expect to shell out between $1 trillion and $2 trillion over the next decade.

Given the strategic failures, great expense, and mid-term voters backing withdrawal, it is incomprehensible why Mr. Bush would opt to increase U.S. troops in Iraq. Reminiscent of Vietnam, troop increases in Iraq have not created better conditions for Iraqis. Adding more troops and trainers will not produce a different result on the ground, but it will add to the terrible stress our troops are under and raise the human and economic costs even higher.

The trap that Mr. Bush and the various commissions have fallen into is the belief that "doing something" is better than withdrawing. While the commissions are right in stating that there are no good options, the least bad option is phased withdrawal. It is simply wishful thinking that the United States can tweak the formula of troops, training, and international support to produce a "victory."

Despite digging in, sending more troops, training more Iraqis, and spending more money, 2006 has been the worst year of the Iraq War by far. The late Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll noted, "There is an old military doctrine called the 'First Rule of Holes': if you find yourself stuck in one, stop digging." The official commissions making recommendations on Iraq are side-by-side with Bush's dog Barney digging deeper. It's time to stop.

Erik Leaver is policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.

"Prime Minister Maliki also has been very aggressive in recent weeks in taking on some of the key challenges,'' Snow said. "He has been taking a good hard look at police forces in trying to comb out those taking part in acts of violence... He understands that ultimately it is going to be the Iraqi people who have to government, sustain and defend themselves.''

Yet the published report of National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley's five-page memo, written Nov. 8 following a visit to Baghdad, increases the tension surrounding President Bush's planned meetings with al-Maliki in Amman, Jordan, tonight and Thursday. The two leaders plan a meeting and then dinner at the palace with their Jordanian host, King Abdullah II, this evening and then further meetings on Thursday.

Senior administration officials acknowledged today that Bush and al-Maliki will face some "candid'' discussions, following the publication of the memo on the New York Times Web site:

"The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action,'' Hadley reportedly wrote in his memo classified as secret, noting that U.S. military commanders in Iraq had voiced concerns about al-Maliki.

"Despite Maliki's reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki's government,'' wrote Hadley, citing a failure to deliver services to Sunni areas, lack of intervention by the prime minister's office in the prevention of military action against Shia targets while acting "to encourage them against Sunni ones'' and the removal of Iraq's "most effective commanders'' on a sectarian basis as part of efforts "to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries.''

"While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant,'' Hadley reported in his five-page memo. "The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change.''

Senior administration officials say al-Maliki already has taken some of the steps that Hadley recommended in the memo, such as cracking down on violent police forces within the Interior Ministry. Yet the Hadley memo notes: "It is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon.''

The judgments contained in Hadley memo contrast sharply with his own public words in recent days as well the administration's public pronouncements about the al-Maliki-led government in Iraq

"When you're in war-time, you're going to ask tough questions,'' a senior administration official said today in Riga, insisting on anonymity when discussing a classified document and insisting the administration has not "cast judgment'' on al-Maliki's government. "The bulk of the memo demonstrates that it's a capability issue,'' this official said. "Because you raise the range of possibilities, doesn't mean you're casting judgment... It's not to say that it's a slap in the face, but how do we raise his capability?

"Obvious points of assessment are being made,'' this official said. "But the raw conclusion, as identified in that memo, is capability...We have acknowledged that one of the central tents of this meeting is how to turn (al-Maliki's) good intentions into concrete action.... He believes he needs greater autonomy and control.''

The two leaders expect to discuss the transfer of responsibility for security in Iraq from U.S.-led forces to Iraqi forces, which Bush has maintained is essential before the U.S. discusses any troop withdrawal.

"If you take a look at key parts of the memo, you have a constant reiteration about strengthening the Maliki government,'' another senior administration official said. "This, in fact, has become the focal point of U.S.-Iraqi cooperation...The approach of this government is how we can help.

"There is not a summary judgment of Prime Minister Maliki,'' this official said. "Instead, there is enormous respect for the challenges that he faces.''

While the Bush administration has accused Iran and Syria of abetting terrorists inside Iraq - yet has remained reluctant to speak directly with either Iran or Syria - Hadley's memo suggests that his predecessor as national security adviser, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hold an "Iraq-plus neighbors meeting in the region in early December.'' Asked if this might include Iran and Syria, officials declined to comment today.

Hadley also has recommended "getting Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role,'' including "cutting off any public or private funds to insurgents or death squads'' and acting aggressively "to lean on Syria.'' Vice President Dick Cheney traveled to Saudi Arabia over the weekend for a meeting with King Abdullah, which the Bush administration has refused to publicly comment on - with Hadley calling it a "confidential conversation.''

Hadley's memo outlined "steps'' that al-Maliki should take to improve the situation: Compelling his ministers to provide health services and open bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods "to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities: Confronting the Shiite cleric leader Moktada al-Sadar and "bring to justice'' any "actors'' who do not eschew violence; Shaking up his Cabinet by appointing "non-sectarian, capable technocrats;'' Overhauling his own staff to "reflect the face of Iraq;'' demanding that all government workers publicly renounce violence as condition for keeping their jobs; supporting the renewal of a United Nations mandate for multinational forces; negotiating a "status of forces agreement'' with the United States over the next year; expanding the Iraqi army and immediately suspending "suspect Iraqi police units.''

Yesterday -- upon arrival in Riga, and as Bush prepares for meetings with al-Maliki in Jordan tonight and Thursday - Hadley had offered a more optimistic assessment of Maliki's government: "We think that this unity government is doing pretty well in a very difficult situation,'' Hadley had said here in Riga. "What I'm saying to you is Maliki has been impatient, and has said that his government has not produced the results that they seek, and he's got some ideas about how to enhance their capabilities to do so.

"This is a pretty tall order for a government, and, at the same time, you're building your government institutions and your security institutions from the ground up,'' Hadley said Tuesday. "This is a big challenge. This is a big challenge for a very sophisticated and well-established democracy, much less a country -- a big challenge for a country with the political institutions he's got.

"So I don't think one should be surprised that it is not moving at the speed that he wants it to move,'' Hadley had added. "This is a huge challenge, and this government needs our support. All I'm saying is, they are not making the progress we would like, they are not making the progress they would like, and there's some reasons for that, because they face a very challenging situation.'' But the president's national security adviser had returned from Iraq on Oct. 30 with a far more candid and sobering assessment, detailed in a Nov. 8 memo which has been classified as secret and was read to and reported by the Times, which published a text of the memo on its Web-site today. Senior Bush administration officials commented in detail on the leaked memo today, insisting upon anonymity when commenting on a classified document. This is the published text:

"We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq. Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so.

" Maliki pointed to incidents, such as the use of Iraqi forces in Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.

"Despite Maliki's reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki's government. Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister's office to stop military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq's most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries -- when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi's (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings -- all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.

"While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.

"Steps Maliki Could Take

"There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

"Compel his ministers to take small steps -- such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods -- to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities.

"Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence.

"Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries.

"Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that "it reflects the face of Iraq.

"Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions.

"Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year.

"Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or "Council of Representatives" of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach.

"Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and

Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.

"What We Can Do to Help Maliki

"If Maliki is willing to move decisively on the actions above, we can help him in a variety of ways. We should be willing to:

"Continue to target al-Qaeda and insurgent strongholds in Baghdad to demonstrate the Shia do not need the JAM to protect their families -- and that we are a reliable partner;

"Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority -- and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader -- by taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the Coalition.);

"Continue our diplomatic efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political process by pushing for the negotiation of a national compact and by talking up provincial council elections next spring/summer as a mechanism for Sunni empowerment;

"Support his announcement to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI more aggressively;

"Seek ways to strengthen Maliki immediately by giving him additional control over Iraqi forces, although we must recognize that in the immediate time frame, we would likely be able to give him more authority over existing forces, not more forces;

"Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December; and

"Step up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent leaders.

Augmenting Maliki's Political and Security Capabilities

"The above approach may prove difficult to execute even if Maliki has the right intentions. He may simply not have the political or security capabilities to take such steps, which risk alienating his narrow Sadrist political base and require a greater number of more reliable forces. Pushing Maliki to take these steps without augmenting his capabilities could force him to failure -- if the Parliament removes him from office with a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture and leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq. We must also be mindful of Maliki's personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party -- an underground conspiratorial movement -- during Saddam's rule. Maliki and those around him are naturally inclined to distrust new actors, and it may take strong assurances from the United States ultimately to convince him to expand his circle of advisers or take action against the interests of his own Shia coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as a whole.

"If it is Maliki's assessment that he does not have the capability -- politically or militarily -- to take the steps outlined above, we will need to work with him to augment his capabilities. We could do so in two ways. First, we could help him form a new political base among moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other communities. Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc that would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors. (This bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve a realignment of political actors within the Parliament). In its creation, Maliki would need to be willing to risk alienating some of his Shia political base and may need to get the approval of Ayatollah Sistani for actions that could split the Shia politically. Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.

"This approach would require that we take steps beyond those laid out above, to include:

"Actively support Maliki in helping him develop an alternative political base. We would likely need to use our own political capital to press moderates to align themselves with Maliki's new political bloc;

"Consider monetary support to moderate groups that have been seeking to break with larger, more sectarian parties, as well as to support Maliki himself as he declares himself the leader of his bloc and risks his position within Dawa and the Sadrists; and

"Provide Maliki with more resources to help build a nonsectarian national movement.

"- If we expect him to adopt a nonsectarian security agenda, we must ensure he has reasonably nonsectarian security institutions to execute it -- such as through a more robust embedding program.

"- We might also need to fill the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad with coalition forces if reliable Iraqi forces are not identified.

"Moving Ahead

"We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki's intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities. We might take the following steps immediately:

"Convince Maliki to deliver on key actions that might reassure Sunnis (open banks and direct electricity rebuilding in Sunni areas, depoliticize hospitals);

"Tell Maliki that we understand that he is working his own strategy for dealing with the Sadrists and that:

"- You have asked General Casey to support Maliki in this effort

" - It is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon;

"Send your personal representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy with Maliki and to press other leaders to work with him, especially if he determines that he must build an alternative political base;

"Ask Casey to develop a plan to empower Maliki, including:

"- Formation of National Strike Forces

"- Dramatic increase in National Police embedding

"-- More forces under Maliki command and control

"Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are need in Baghdad;

"Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to devise a more robust embedding plan and a plan to resource it;

"Direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action;

"If Maliki seeks to build an alternative political base:

"- Press Sunni and other Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to support Maliki

"- Engage Sistani to reassure and seek his support for a new nonsectarian political movement.

Source of memo text: The New York Times, which senior Bush administration officials commented on in detail today while refraining from confirming the accuracy of a classified document which was leaked.

"We discussed security, economy, oil and industry and reached general agreement," he said.

For his part, Ahmadinejad voiced his support for the Iraqi people and reiterated his call for the United States to withdraw forces from Iraq.

"I advise you to leave Iraq ...(and) transfer the responsibilities to the Iraqi government according to a timetable as it wants," he said.

He said that enemies of Iraq were determined to prevent the formation of a powerful Iraq and seek to sow seeds of discord and enmity in the war-torn country.

"We all should strive to forge unity among the Iraqi nation,"he said.

In a joint statement on Wednesday, the two countries called for upgrading current level of relations and cooperation in political,security, oil, industry, economic and cultural affairs, according to Iran's official IRNA news agency.

The Islamic Republic of Iran underlined the need to maintain Iraq's national unity, territorial integrity and independence, the statement said.

The two sides also strongly condemned continued atrocities and sabotage activities of terrorist groups in Iraq and emphasized the necessity of serious confrontation with such criminal and terror activities.

Talabani arrived in Tehran on Monday for his second trip to Iran as the Iraqi president. In November 2005, Talabani held a historic meeting with Ahmadinejad as the first Iraqi president to visit Iran in 40 years.

Upon his arrival in Tehran on Monday evening, Talabani called for Iran's "comprehensive" help to stem escalating violence in war-torn Iraq.

"We need Iran's comprehensive help to fight terrorism, restore security and stabilize Iraq," Talabani told reporters at Iran's Presidential Office.

In response, Ahmadinejad pledged to support Talabani's request,saying "we will help our Iraqi brothers with all we can to implement and reinforce security in Iraq."

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in his meeting with Talabani on Tuesday, also pledged that Iran would do its best to help Iraq establish stability and security.
    "Iran will spare no efforts to promote stability and security in Iraq, if Iraqi officials call for such help," Khamenei was quoted by the state television as saying.

Talabani's visit came as Iraq was increasingly plagued by killings and kidnappings on a scale that some feared would slip into a civil war.

Iran had reportedly invited Talabani and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to attend a three-way meeting last weekend, but Tehran denied later that such a meeting was on agenda.
    The Iraqi president had planed to visit Iran on Saturday, but his trip was delayed due to a huge attack on Shiites in Baghdad's suburban Sadr City, which killed over 200 people and caused a three-day curfew to stave off further violence.
    Observers say that as Iran has great influence on Iraqi Shiites,Talabani's Iran tour was to seek help to stem bloodshed that has been wracking the war-torn country.

The United States has said that it welcomed any talks that could help stabilize Iraq's situation, but doubted effect of a meeting between Iran, Iraq and Syria.

U.S. President George W. Bush has been under mounting domestic pressure for him to contact Iran and Syria in an effort to calm down the situation in Iraq.

Ahmadinejad said on Sunday that he would assist the United States to stabilize the situation in Iraq if Washington changes its "bullying" policy toward Iran.

But, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Julie Reside replied, "The Iranians have made comments similar to this in the past. There's nothing new there."

Approximately 8,000 Americans have refused to report for duty or deserted in order to avoid taking part in this war, or to avoid taking further part in it. Many have objected to the stop loss program that requires them to serve longer than they had agreed to. Others have objected to the rationale behind the war and the horrors that are part of it. Many are best able to support their families by avoiding military service that is poorly compensated. In the cases we know the most about, one motivation for desertion that is clearly absent is cowardice. While quiet desertion tends not to result in any penalty, public opposition and resistance often means prison.

Lt. Ehren Watada, the first U.S. military commissioned officer to publicly refuse to fight in Iraq, has said that he will not obey an illegal order. He faces court martial on February 4, 2007, for obeying the law. Sgt. Camilo Mejia was one of the first Iraq War vets to publicly refuse to return to Iraq -- for which he served 9 months in prison. Mejia objected to the war as based on lies and to the murdering and torturing of civilians that he witnessed. Sgt. Kevin Benderman is serving a 15-month sentence for the crime of applying for conscientious objector status and refusing to serve any longer in Iraq. Marine Corps reservist Stephen Funk was the first enlisted man to publicly refuse deployment to Iraq, and he spent 6 months in prison as a result. He said: "I will not obey an unjust war based on deception by our leaders." Dan Felushko enlisted as a Marine after September 11, 2001. When ordered to Iraq he deserted, commenting: "I didn't want 'Died Deluded in Iraq' over my gravestone. I didn't see a connection between the attack on America and Saddam Hussein."

Some who have deserted and been AWOL for months or years have decided that it is their proper duty to turn themselves in and face court martial. Ricky Clousing has done this. (Watch his explanation on video.).

Agustin Aguayo has done the same and faces charges with a maximum penalty of 7 years.

In many cases, turning yourself in is not easy. Pvt. Kyle Snyder, who spent Thanksgiving helping restore houses in New Orleans with Iraq Veterans Against the War, is currently AWOL and says that his lawyer has tried to contact the military 75 times.

The Army used to pay bounties for turning in deserters. Now the U.S. military leaves deserters alone but requires the troops who don't desert to serve longer than they agreed to. (These days we even elect deserters president. Bush was AWOL during the Vietnam War, and Clinton too avoided serving.) This is a break with the past, but much about resistance to the military has changed little since 1776.

Robert Fantina has just published a careful survey of past wars titled "Desertion and the American Soldier, 1776-2006." During the Revolutionary War, he tells us, one reason for desertion was the corporal punishment endured in the military. Men were often given 100 lashes. When George Washington was unable to convince Congress to raise the legal limit to 500 lashes, he considered using hard labor as a punishment instead, but dropped that idea because the hard labor was indistinguishable from regular service in the Continental Army. Soldiers also left because they needed food, clothing, shelter, medicine, and money. They signed up for pay, were not paid, and endangered their families' well being by remaining in the Army unpaid.

During the Mexican-American War, in a tribute to a future president, soldiers were branded on the face with a "W" if for some reason they were deemed worthless. This sort of treatment, as in the Revolutionary War, was one reason for desertions, but another reason played a large role and would play an increasingly prominent role in desertions through the course of later wars: lack of belief in the cause.

Through the course of recounting the types of desertions prevalent during the various U.S. wars and peace time, Fantina slowly begins to make a case for reforms in the military that he believes would reduce desertions. By the time he's discussing World War I he's arguing as follows: "Without fundamental change that allows a man or woman to be, first and foremost a human being, and a soldier only by chosen occupation, the military will continue to struggle with desertion."

But if, as Fantina proposes, soldiers are permitted to resign at any time, will we not see mass resignations? If troops now serving in Iraq could legally choose to quit, wouldn't many of them do so?

Fantina lists the various rights that soldiers die fighting to supposedly protect but which, as soldiers, they are denied. He views this as hypocrisy and injustice. But is it not necessary in order to get people to kill each other? Fantina describes cases in which deserters have been executed, deserters whose desertion put no one at risk, whose desertion was arguably justified, whose current lives were a threat to no one. "One can only wonder what good such [executions] accomplish," writes Fantina. But those who make war don't wonder much, I think. Does Fantina not see that he is calling into question the entire logic of war?

In the book's final pages, Fantina writes: "The following list of military reforms was suggested in 1903: Over 100 years later, most of them are yet to be implemented, yet they would certainly contribute to a more stable military force:

* 1. Private soldiers to receive a substantial increase in pay.

* 2. The employment of trained cooks.

* 3. Recognition of the right of all soldiers of whatever position to engage in criticism and in free speech at all times and under all circumstances.

* 4. All the food a soldier wishes to eat, instead of being limited as at present, to an inadequate 'ration.'

* 5. Absolute amnesty to all deserters from the army and navy.

* 6. The erection of modern sanitary buildings at all places where troops are quartered.

* 7. Service in the army to be limited to two years.

* 8. Abolition of military salutes and all other imbecile and servile practices.

* 9. Thorough practice in mobility, rapid field movements, quick concentration, with special attention to supplying the troops promptly and regularly with abundant, wholesome nourishing food.

* 10. All soldiers and officers, whatsoever, to eat exactly the same food, and to be housed or quartered alike at all times and in all places.

* 11. Prohibition of all forms of torture and violence." Of course, Fantina is right. It is a disgrace the way we mistreat those who risk their lives for us. But would rectifying this produce a more stable force or a force likely to collapse when ordered to kill innocent people for power-mad cowboys and their oil profits?

Then again, would that be such a bad thing? Does anyone doubt for a minute that if the United States were actually threatened soldiers would sign up to fight proudly in its defense? Many did so following September 11, 2001. Many of them have since deserted. And rightly so. They, the deserters and resisters, are the ones to whom we owe the most gratitude.

After months of requests for more troops from NATO commanders on the ground, a summit of alliance leaders this week agreed to a small increase in troop numbers and to ease some restrictions on how and where their forces can be deployed.

Obaidullah repeated Taliban threats to step up the suicide attacks which killed several foreign soldiers before and during the NATO summit in the Latvian capital, Riga.

Fighting in Afghanistan this year has been the worst since a U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taliban government in 2001.

NATO and U.S. officials say the rebels have been bolstered by the country's blossoming illegal opium trade -- hitting record levels this year -- and sanctuary in Pakistan.

NATO leaders pledged at the summit on Wednesday to stay the course to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan.

"It is winnable, it is being won, but not yet won," said NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the most dangerous ground combat in the alliance's 57-year history.

In October, NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took over command of the country from U.S. forces.