What went wrong? This is the simple question that guided the great authority among Anglo-American experts on the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, in his book on Islamic and Arab history after Sept. 11, 2001. The question turned out not only to be good -- it was also necessary. Today, three years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, that question needs to be directed not just at the Arab world, but also at Western policy, and above all at United States policy. After all, since the administration of George W. Bush decided to remove Saddam Hussein from power by war, just about everything went wrong that possibly could have. What is more, the reality in Iraq and the surrounding region far surpassed all negative expectations and fears, and it continues to do so today.
The war in Iraq was supposed to create the conditions for a regional realignment. It was supposed to create a new, an American Middle East, proving America's power and global leadership and thereby guaranteeing America and the West lasting security in the face of the new terrorist threat. Today, we're farther removed from that than ever. If things continue to develop in the way they have since the US entered Baghdad, then there is reason to fear that there will indeed be a realignment of this dangerous region, but one entirely different and even diametrically opposed to the one intended by Washington and the neo-conservative strategists. At the core of the Middle Eastern crisis is the stalled modernization of this region. Given the pressures of globalization, and hence the accentuation of economic, social and cultural contradictions, such modernization will have to take place if the most basic needs of a very young and rapidly growing population are to be met even approximately. The decisive question will be how peacefully or violently this modernization process in the Middle East will take place. The Bush administration's disastrous miscalculation in Iraq seems to have created all the conditions for the latter.
It was perfectly clear from the very beginning that by invading Iraq, bringing about "regime change" and becoming an occupation power, the US would assume responsibility for the reshaping not just of Iraq, but of the entire Middle East. That was the very premise of the neoconservative approach of going to war for purposes of regional realignment. Along with Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, Iraq formed the center of the Near East that replaced the fallen order of the Ottoman Empire -- a Near East created after 1918 by France and, especially, by Britain.
After 1918, the British combined the three Turkish provinces Baghdad, Basra and Mosul to form the new state of Iraq. This, however, meant creating a state that bore within itself, from the very beginning, the most important religious, ethnic and power political contradictions of the Anglo-French Middle East - Sunnis, Shiites and oil. Yet all these contradictions in Iraq were never resolved and thereby overcome; rather, the state was held together by brutal violence from the Sunni- and Arab-dominated government in Baghdad, or by occupation powers.
Given their overwhelming military superiority, it was easy for the US to remove Saddam Hussein from power. If, however, it was not just a matter of toppling Saddam and installing a pro-Western dictator, but rather of setting in motion a process of regional realignment by means of the democratization of Iraq, then the decisive question was and continues to be a different one than that of military superiority. The question is whether the majority of US citizens were ever really prepared to pay the very high military, political, economic, and moral cost for such an imperial enterprise, and to pay for it over a long period of time. We know today that the answer is "No." But such a negative answer was already to be expected in 2002 and 2003, and would have been the starting point if the actual reason for the war had been placed at the center of the domestic debate in the US. That's why other reasons for going to war were invoked - weapons of mass destruction and international terror - reasons that have quite obviously not held up to reality.
From this there resulted a second question: If the US entered Iraq with superior military might but with a lack of political support, then how were they going to leave again within a manageable timeframe without leaving behind a highly explosive vacuum? This question is still unanswered today. Because these questions were foreseeable, warnings against going to war were issued from various sides. The occupation of Iraq and the toppling of the dictator Saddam Hussein had to lead either to a great realignment of the entire Middle East or create a vacuum that would threaten to endanger the cohesion of Iraq, trigger a civil war and draw the most important regional powers into this war.
There is a third question that should not be forgotten. The toppling of Saddam Hussein by the US would shift the power balance among the regional powers in a decisive way, unless that power balance was adjusted and hence neutralized by the lasting presence of the US as the new Middle Eastern hegemonic power. The US approach of attempting to make the war in Iraq the trigger for regional realignment on the basis of democratization and free elections could not but turn the old power relations between Arabs and Kurds, between the Sunni minority -- which is also the traditional power elite -- and the Shiite majority on their heads. For democracy means the rule of the majority determined by free elections, and the Shiites make up the majority in Iraq.
That also made it clear from the start that Tehran's influence on the fate of Iraq would rise disproportionately, and that Iran threatened to become the genuine regional winner of the war in Iraq if the US lost control over events on the ground or if the feared power vacuum were to be created by a US retreat. The current development in Iraq is leading very quickly into this disastrous direction. The urgent question of how to prevent a situation in which the US, with its policy in Iraq, unintentionally makes itself an agent of the implementation of Iranian interests, thereby decisively strengthening Iran, was in fact never answered by Washington.
The power vacuum the US threatens to leave behind in the region in the case of a withdrawal from Iraq will draw all regional powers involved into a struggle over hegemony in Iraq and in the region. The first regional power that needs to be mentioned in this regard is Iran; the second is Israel, and the third Turkey. Without a doubt Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Gulf states will not sit idly by. They currently find themselves in a weak position, both structurally and in terms of their specific current situations. Moreover, they are threatening to become the next hot spots of the conflict over hegemony in the Near East triggered by the war in Iraq. In order to understand the tremendous strategic danger of the Iranian nuclear program, which is doubtless aimed at making Iran a nuclear power in the military sense, one has to consider this possible hegemonic confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Israel will interpret the Iranian bomb both as a threat to its existence and as a hegemonic challenge, and this constellation contains within it the danger of a highly explosive crisis. But Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and all the other states in the region will not sit idly by either as Iran pursues Near Eastern hegemony by means of its nuclear program, so that there is the risk that there will at least be a nuclear arms race in the Near East. This alone would be nightmare enough.
Nonetheless, realism requires one to assume that this risk of a struggle over regional hegemony, a risk that assumes a nuclear dimension with Iran, will bring about a situation that triggers a military confrontation that none of the powers involved wants, but into which they will nonetheless find themselves sliding - by virtue of the chaotic automatism of the power relations and the high power political stakes. What is more, there is already a danger today that Tehran will overestimate its own strength and underestimates American power, thereby reaching the wrong conclusions -- conclusions with a dangerously escalating effect.
And it is here that we encounter a fourth question, that concerning the role of terrorism in Iraq and in the region. The battle against terrorism was one of the main arguments for the war in Iraq, but this argument has transformed into its opposite. If the al-Qaida terror network was on the defensive after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and the war in Afghanistan, this situation has been reversed since the war in Iraq. For international jihad terrorism, Iraq has historically taken on the same mobilizing function that the Islamic and national resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had in the 1980s. Then, it was Pakistan that became the main beneficiary of the Afghan power vacuum; in today's Iraq, that role falls to Iran.
Sunni jihad terrorism objectively contributes to Tehran's interests, not just because it is making the situation of US troops in Iraq increasingly hopeless, but also because it is highly likely to pursue the destabilization of the Arab peninsula and Jordan by terrorist means following a US retreat from Iraq. A Middle East that falls into chaos would almost certainly bring about Iranian hegemony, especially if Tehran were to succeed in becoming a nuclear power. Of course, all these calculations could turn out to be very short-sighted, since they underestimate both the Israel factor and the possibility of an anti-hegemonic Middle Eastern coalition against Iran, a coalition which could transform a possible Iraqi civil war into a second Arab-Iranian land war in Iraq - hardly an encouraging prospect, to be sure.
Another dangerous result of the American intervention in Iraq can already be discerned on the political horizon. Oil and nuclear weapons are being made the decisive power currency in this hegemonic confrontation in the Middle East. Iran already disposes of oil today and is striving for nuclear weapons. But Sunni jihad terrorism should not be underestimated either. Its true targets are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two countries whose stability is questionable. Taken together, they also dispose of the two decisive components of the new power currency in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, US policy in Iraq today has stalled entirely. Instead of bringing about regional realignment, the US is using its strength to create a power vacuum, and thus prevent a civil war. Such a civil war is, however, becoming more likely every day. If, in 2003, everything suggested that this US war was a mistake, then today, the arguments against a US retreat in Iraq are at least as strong. But the situation is even worse, since every day that US troops remain in Iraq will only aggravate rather than solve this crisis -- a crisis that is headed for civil war. It's depressing to see that nothing is left of the US strategy of regional realignment. Instead, an unnecessary defeat -- and one with far-reaching consequences -- will have to be responded to by a strategy of containment, deterrence and long-term transformation from within the societies concerned.
These prospects are anything but encouraging, but when one looks back on the years since the US invaded Baghdad, one finds that all gloomy predictions have been surpassed by reality. Foreign policy pessimists usually turn out to be bad-tempered realists. But when pessimists are overtaken by reality itself, as has happened in Iraq, that would seem to be cause for true concern. The only stage of pessimism left would then seem to be the escape into optimism, an escape that would entail the surrender of every form of realism. Recent official statements by the US administration suggest that this next stage has already been reached.