Initially Merkel, being a novice and highly critical of her predecessor's policy of distancing German foreign policy from the US, rattled a few cages with her post-election leaps in bandaging German-US relations, citing Iran as an "example" of how things work between the two countries.

Then came Merkel's blistering criticisms of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad for his remarks on Israel, which she compared in no unmistakable language to fascism. In her trips to both Israel and the United States, Merkel consistently criticized Iran's nuclear and foreign policies, which, in turn, fueled Germany's current role in the Security Council debates on Iran, referred to as "Permanent Five plus one".

While still short of the formal veto power, the historical precedence set by Germany's critical role in the Iran crisis will undoubtedly be an important catalyst in paving the road for Germany's eventual inclusion in the Security Council's exclusive club, which is now limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia.

This depends to some extent on the global perception of how Germany plays its diplomatic card with regard to Iran. A compliant Germany, subservient to the policy dictates of Washington, is unlikely to receive much backing from the other powers in its current bid to gain a permanent seat at the Security Council. On the other hand, an independent, self-generating diplomacy, based on Germany's, and the European Union's, calculations of risks and benefits, will have the opposite effect. So far, Germany is evincing a middle position, where signs of autonomous diplomacy and old US dependency converge.

On the positive side, Germany's adamant objection to the military option against Iran, which Merkel communicated to President George W Bush in her recent White House visit, is a welcome development that in a certain sense brings Germany closer to Russia and China, both of whom oppose any reference to UN's Article 42, which would set the stage for a future US military action against Iran.

Among the EU-3, Germany is, in fact, the most enthusiastic proponent of the so-called "carrot" approach, including the security approach, favoring direct Iran-US talks.

Yet, contrary to Berlin's wishes, the US has turned down both the Iranian offer of direct talks as well as any "security guarantee" for Iran, the justification being that Iran is a "troublemaker in the world", to paraphrase Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

But don't expect the fissures between Berlin and Washington to spill into the open any time soon. Merkel and her ardent pro-American coalition are committed to avoiding any "crisis of confidence" with Washington, which she has blamed on Gerhard Schroeder and his former Green Party foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, who was intensely disliked by the White House.

Fischer's replacement, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a member of the leftist Social Democrats, has so far proved an invaluable "balancer", bringing a measure of equilibrium to the unbounded tendency of Merkel's Christian Democratic Party to appease the Americans.

Germany's stakes in the Iran crisis

Germany is Iran's No 1 European trade partner and its booming import-export with Iran will be a net casualty of any UN (or other) sanctions on Iran, compared with the United States, which has practically no economic interests at stake in Iran as a result of 27 years of US sanctions.

Iran is a major market for Germany's industrial and technological products, just as Germany is an importer of Iranian oil and such goods as rugs; some 35% of Iranian rugs are exported to Germany. According to a recent article in Der Spiegel, "Between 2000 and 2005, German exports to Iran more than doubled. Last year they reached a new record of 4.4 billion euros [US$5.6 billion], or 0.6% of Germany's total export volume. Manufacturers of machinery and equipment are the main beneficiaries because Iran is using German know-how to develop its economy."

Another report by the Iran-German Chamber of Commerce indicates that as much as 75% of Iran's small and medium industries rely on imported goods and technology from Germany. German companies and banks are also involved in projects in Iran's industrial free zones.

Indeed, in light of their physical proximity, a large Iranian community in Germany, and so on, there is every expectation of growing economic exchanges and interdependencies between Germany and Iran, absent the nuclear crisis. Because of the crisis, however, these relations have suffered, not the least because of growing US pressure, reflected in the recent news that the US is utilizing anti-terrorist laws to curb European banks' involvement with Iran - with a measure of success.

As a result, as the nuclear row has been upgraded to "pre-sanction sanctions", many German companies have stayed away from Iran and numerous deals in the pipeline, such as on airplanes and parts, power generators, machinery, have been put in limbo. Undoubtedly, such setbacks will be minuscule compared with a few months or a year or so from now when and if the UN or a "coalition of the willing" imposes sanctions on Iran, which will only benefit German black-marketeers.

Indeed, as Mohammed Nahavandian, an economist with Iran's Supreme National Security Council, recently stated, the implementation of sanctions on Iran would be "impractical" because of the size and nature of Iran's many frontiers, but Iran would "incur extra expenses".

Therefore, to safeguard its vested economic interests with Iran, the German government must show a greater independence from the hitherto coercive US approach, thinly disguised as "diplomacy". The US pseudo-diplomacy, if sheepishly followed by Germany and other European countries, will harm their economic interests, this when, to quote former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, "Europe has to compete with the US in the area of economics and trade, rather than in politics."

What Berlusconi misses is that by following the US diplomatic prescriptions over Iran, Europe's economic and trade interests will suffer, whereas what is needed is an alternative European Iran policy that fully recognizes "Iran's legitimate rights to nuclear technology", to quote Javier Solana, the EU's foreign-policy chief.

However, the problem with the EU's present approach is that, first of all, Iran's right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to nuclear technology does not really require any "recognition" by the EU and others, and to the extent that under the present circumstances such a statement is laden with special meanings, then it must be taken to its logical conclusion and extend to recognizing Iran's right to produce nuclear fuel, per Article IV of the NPT, under the necessary safeguards and surveillance measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Otherwise, the statement by Solana and other European officials remains vague and indeterminate, denuded of substantive legal connotations.

The question of security guarantee

Security is a two-way process, and if Germany and other Western powers seek Iran's cooperation against global terrorism and the threats of nuclear terrorism, then they must show a better understanding and appreciation of Iran's post-September 11, 2001, security anxieties. The unprecedented influx of US military might in Iran's vicinity has "securitized" Iran's foreign-policy debates for the foreseeable future. Yet the nub of dilemma on the question of security has largely bypassed policy-makers throughout Europe.

That dilemma is as follows: the European suggestion of Iran's inclusion in any regional security infrastructure is naive and simplistic, given the structural conflict between the US and Iran and their ongoing games of strategy. The main reason the US is incapable of formulating an Iran-inclusive security framework in the Persian Gulf is precisely because the operation of Iranian power in the oil region works against the United States' interventionist policies aimed at controlling the access and flow of the strategic commodity relied on by the industrial world, that is, oil and gas.

That is precisely why the US quest for regime change in Iran will never completely disappear, no matter what deals are brokered on the nuclear front. A more prudent political realism on Germany's, and Europe's, part would step down from the wishful hope of full normalization of relations between Iran and the US. Instead, it would work toward bringing a semblance of order and predictability to the antagonistic relations between Tehran and Washington.

Thus calls for more European pressure on the US to make explicit pledges not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs and to put the regime change recipe (for disaster) on the back burner are insufficiently mustered at the present moment. After all, Europe is much more cognizant of the perils of Iran's potential "breakup", and the threats of irredentism with regard to its own security, should the US make good on its own policy of fomenting ethnic divisions inside Iran.

That would mean escalating the Middle East boiling pot to new heights of insecurity, in light of Iran's present importance as a strong centralized government contributing to regional integration and cooperation, something the EU countries can ill-afford.

Unfortunately, neither Germany alone nor the EU as a whole can provide any security guarantee to Iran without US backing, but that does not mean that the EU cannot take proactive steps, such as with respect to influencing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against taking stern anti-Iran steps or promoting Iran-OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) cooperation, both in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. The OSCE advances the objective of a UN-like cooperative security framework potentially favored by Iran. Already, Iran has participated in a number of OSCE-sponsored events, for example, on environmental security.

Building on the past, but which past?

In crafting its Iran policy, Merkel's government must deepen "constructive engagement" with Iran and disregard any suggestion that the EU's Iran diplomacy has been a failure. Rather, the result so far has been mixed, in light of Iran's marathon negotiations, its willingness to implement the Additional Protocol of the NPT, allowing intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities, as requested by the EU-3 in 2003, until January 2006, when Tehran dropped it in reaction to the EU's backtracking on its promises in the Paris Agreement.

This included, above all, a pledge to respect Iran's "exercise" of its nuclear rights "without discrimination". But, as stated by Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, Iran is willing to re-adopt the Additional Protocol and to pass it through the parliament (majlis).

Also, learning from past errors of "nuclear reductionism", that is, reducing the sum of Iran-German relations to the nuclear issue, as warned by some top German experts on Iran, such as Johannes Reissner of the Berlin think-tank Stiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik, is mandatory if Merkel wishes to make a tangible difference in the present crisis.

As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently stated, "isolating Iran" will have the adverse effect of augmenting Iran's non-cooperative behavior. The obverse strategy of integrating Iran, reflected in the new European package approach, should not be tactical, however, but only if it is buffeted with the firm guarantees of faithful implementation, will it have a decent chance of success.
From Iran's vantage point, Germany's role in Iran's nuclear program leaves a lot to be desired. The German government failed to take any action when Siemens reneged on its lucrative contract to build the Bushehr power plant, forcing Iran to turn to Russia in the mid-1990s for a project half-finished. Consequently, the present European offer of light water reactors to Iran cannot possibly be taken seriously, short of serious stipulations by the EU that would preclude the recycling of such bitter experiences in the past.

Fortunately, Germany resisted some calls, by Israel and its Washington lobbyists, for excluding Iran from the upcoming soccer World Cup, and there is a possibility of Ahmadinejad's presence at the games, preemptively denounced by the hawkish editorials of the Washington Times, among others.

Merkel would be wise to send Steinmeier to Iran ahead of those games and or to invite Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki to Berlin, and to decouple to some extent Iran-German trade and economic cooperation from the nuclear row, as an intermediary measure that could well have salutary effects on the nuclear crisis.

The more Germany shows its ability to engage in creative diplomacy toward Iran, the better the chances of a mutually-satisfactory resolution of this crisis, following the assumption that Iran greatly values its continuous interaction with Germany and other EU countries.

The crucial question at this critical juncture is whether or not trans-Atlantic considerations and US pressure will impede or neutralize the present drift of Germany toward finding its own voice on Iran.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's Nuclear Potential Latent", Harvard International Review. He is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction .

It was initially intended that only five specialized examining magistrates would be appointed, but due to a growing backlog and the sheer volume of cases requiring attention, the number of posts was expanded to 13.

Federal terrorism magistrate Johan Delmulle said police and public prosecution offices already had employed terrorism specialists, and it was only logical their investigations should be led by an investigative judge with the same expertise.

Of the judges, four will be working in the capital of Brussels,and two in each of the three major cities -- Antwerp, Gent and Mons. Liege is to get three, one of whom will be responsible for the German speaking community.

The number of posts was based on an analysis of the terrorism threat and the number of cases that are already being investigatedin certain regions.

The 13 will be directly responsible for their posted region although they will also be empowered to operate on a national level.

The federal public prosecution office started 223 investigations into alleged terrorist crimes in the past four years. Some 40 percent of them, or 89 investigations, were opened in 2005.

Belgium's Federal Public Prosecutor's Office said that the appointment of the specialist examining magistrates was vital to terrorism prevention efforts. Recent high profile terrorist trialshave highlighted the need for specialists in the field.

The violence broke out in the town of Montfermeil just 15 kilometers east of Paris, with trouble also erupting in nearby Clichy-sous-Bois -- the flash point of last year's riots.

Dozens of vans carrying riot police officers were stationed around Montfermeil Tuesday night. A helicopter was used to keep the area under surveillance.

Clashes erupted on Monday night when a gang attacked the mayor's home in Montfermeil, shaking its gates and hurling stones at the windows.

They also targeted the town hall, shattering its glass facade with stones, throwing Molotov cocktails and setting fire to cars and a large number of garbage bins.

The violence was a stark reminder of the anger of residents in the suburbs, despite new government efforts to tackle high youth unemployment and racial inequalities following the three weeks of rioting last fall which shook the country.

National police said nine officers suffered light injuries, mostly from projectiles, during the three hours of unrest in Montfermeil on Monday.

Voulgarakis, who held the portfolio of Public Order Minister before the cabinet reshuffle in early February, admitted that he has received a barrage of threats, adding "I have been targeted".

"Every bomb, in a period of democracy, is targeted against democracy itself, and not against specific individuals," he said.

The explosion, just 200 meters from Voulgarakis' apartment at 7:42 a.m. (local time), was due to a home-made bomb placed in a travel bag that the perpetrators had hung on a bicycle they placed between two parked cars, police said.

Police were in the area with a bomb sniffing dog as part of normal precautions, and the explosive device went off three minutes before the minister was due to pass the area.

Police disclosed that a car was approaching the spot when the bomb went off, and police believe this could have misled the perpetrators who possibly thought that the approaching car was an escort for the minister's car, thus causing them to detonate the explosive device earlier.

It was as yet unknown how the bomb was detonated, since the explosion destroyed the entire mechanism and remnants have not been found, but bomb-disposal experts said that, given the strength of the explosive material, which was equal to about 2 kilograms of ammonia dynamite, it was very likely that the device was detonated by remote control.

The strong explosion causes extensive damage to the two cars between which the bicycle had been placed, the police car and to other cars parked along the curb, while debris from the cars was hurled at least 10 meters away, breaking the windows of a nearby school, which was empty at the time.

Government spokesman Theodoros Roussopoulos condemned the attack and expressed the government' s support for Voulgarakis' family, which he said, had become the target of such an attack forthe second time in three years.

Such attacks actually targeted democracy itself, the spokesman added, while noting that Greek democracy was strong and not threatened by such incidents.

"We are protesting on behalf of our school. The bathrooms are disgusting, you can't even take a shower in the locker room, and they don't do anything about it," said Bernardo Ferrada, 15, his nose and eyes burning from tear gas.

Ferrada said he and 25 other students from the Arturo Prats high school in the middle class neighborhood of Puente Alto joined a march headed to the national palace before police sprayed them with tear gas from armored vehicles.

Protests began two weeks ago when students took over a few schools in the capital -- sleeping overnight in classrooms and eating food brought in by sympathetic parents.

The movement spread all over the country and has turned into the biggest street protest faced by new President Michelle Bachelet. Local media said Chile hasn't seen student protests on this scale since the early 1970s when Socialist President Salvador Allende was in office.

Bachelet is highly popular and her center-left coalition has been in power for 16 years in Chile, one of Latin America's wealthiest countries. But students say schools should be seeing more government funding at a time when profit from high-priced copper, Chile's main product, has handed the government billions of dollars of budget surpluses.

"Copper sky high and education in the gutter," read a banner at one school.

MINISTER TO MEET STUDENTS

Bachelet initially said her government would not negotiate with students who had occupied schools but on Tuesday Education Minister Martin Zilic said he would meet with student leaders to hear their demands.

Students and parents have criticized what they have said was heavy-handed police reaction to peaceful marches.

"The police did what they had to do to dissuade the students from marching, so that they don't interrupt traffic and disturb the peace," Santiago city administrator Victor Barrueto told TVN television.

Santiago's main avenue was closed all afternoon and into the evening as protesters regrouped after repeated bouts of tear gas and water cannons. Bus service was interrupted in some areas and some subway stations were closed.

Protesters said they want the $40 college entrance exam fee and 20 cent student bus fair both to be eliminated.

While protesters marched in the capital, students in Valparaiso, Concepcion and other cities held demonstrations and college students stayed away from classes in sympathy.

Students at elite private schools -- including the school Bachelet's youngest daughter attends -- went to school but held solidarity events on Tuesday instead of classes.

The well-organized student leaders in their grey-and-blue school uniforms have taken over the nightly news and the public agenda in the last two weeks.

In recent decades, Chile has expanded school coverage to most of the population, but students say quality has lagged.

"We have not improved the quality of education as we wanted. The big new challenge for us is closing the quality gap," Deputy Education Minister Pilar Romanguera acknowledged in a recent radio interview.

The assembly passed the nonbinding motion Tuesday, after debating Monday's crash in which a U.S. truck plowed into a line of cars, killing up to five Afghans and sparking citywide, anti-foreigner riots, said Saleh Mohammed Saljuqi, an assistant to the parliamentary speaker.

Elsewhere, suspected Taliban fighters fired a grenade at a police vehicle in southwestern Afghanistan, killing the Zabul Province deputy police chief, Ghulam Rasool, and wounding three policemen, officials said.

Rasool was driving through the province to warn security forces of an impending militant attack on police posts when his vehicle was hit, said a spokesman for the region, Ali Khail.

The militants took control of the police compound in the Uruzgan province town of Chora around dawn Wednesday after hours of fighting, said a senior regional official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to media.

He said no police were wounded in the battle.

In recent weeks, Afghanistan has seen some of the deadliest fighting since the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001. Militants have stepped up attacks, particularly in the south, drawing a fierce response from coalition and Afghan forces.

As many as 376 people, mostly militants, have been reported killed in attacks or fighting since May 17, according to coalition and Afghan statistics.

Islamist militiamen attacked early in the morning in northeastern Mogadishu, and seized several positions previously held by fighters loyal to an alliance of warlords who say they have banded together to fight terrorism, residents said.

The fighting broke three days of relative peace in the city, as the militias re-armed and gird for new turf wars.

The two sides have been battling for control of Mogadishu in fighting that has killed at least 326 people since February, among the worst ever seen in Somalia.