The most frequently stated response was, in various iterations, "to serve my country." Many spoke of a desire to serve where they are most needed. Some respondents mentioned an additional hope that Iraq service would be career-enhancing, while others pointed to the financial incentives.

How does the way you work in Iraq differ from the way you worked at other posts?

The three top ways working in Iraq differs from other places, according to the respondents, are: the level of danger, the extreme work hours and the non-integrated command structure between the embassy, the military and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office.

Another factor raised by many survey respondents was the impact of having so many appointees and contractors at the mission, many of whom have never served in an embassy or overseas before.

One officer notes the difference by describing a trip to the Red Zone he had just taken the day before to meet with an Iraqi contact. (The Red Zone is all of Iraq outside the protected central-Baghdad area known unofficially as the Green Zone and officially as the International Zone.)

"I traveled to the meeting with three armored vehicles and 14 fully-armed contractors in assault gear as my personal security escort. I was met by six more of the same at the site who had secured the building before my arrival. As we entered Check Point One on our return to the International Zone, a car bomb detonated at Check Point Two, killing two and injuring many more. Timing is everything."

Many respondents commented on the "extreme" work hours. It is clear that the pace in Baghdad is frenetic and the flow of incoming taskings is relentless.

"The day begins at 8 a.m. or before, with meetings scheduled as late as 8 p.m.," explains an FSO serving in Baghdad. "People routinely work until 11 p.m., and there never seems to be a break. It creates a kind of Vegas casino atmosphere where you don't know if it's night or day outside because the activity level is constant. We have Friday 'off' but since Washington works on Friday, we need to be here then as well."

Are you able to do your job effectively, as one might expect at another post if you had the same portfolio? Can you see or talk to the people you need to? Can you communicate effectively with them (i.e., in Arabic, English)?

The most common response to the question about effectiveness was a conditional yes. The security situation is by far the most limiting factor. This includes both the difficulty of arranging meetings outside the Green Zone and the restrictions resulting from traveling to those meetings with armed guards.

"Extreme perseverance, determination and stubbornness are required to overcome the myriad of difficulties of performing diplomatic duties," writes an FSO serving in Baghdad. "However, often security restrictions keep us overly locked down and in a bubble, where we cannot accurately track or influence events."

Do security precautions limit your ability to do your job, and if so, how?

"It is not possible to leave the Green Zone without bodyguards," says an FSO serving in Baghdad, "and it is necessary to request them at least two days prior to any trip out. Many times security conditions will make it necessary to cancel or postpone a planned trip. The heavy security presence that accompanies us into the Red Zone also puts a damper on meetings. These security precautions are, however, absolutely necessary. This is a war zone and there are people out there who are actively trying to kill us. Anyone who doubts the need for the security precautions in place should be immediately removed from the mission."

"Security limits my ability to work," writes one officer serving in Baghdad. "Iraqis don't want me to visit their ministry with my personal security detail in town because that makes them a target. At the same time it is such a hassle to put in for and be approved for a Personal Security Detail and to coordinate the movement. There is very little flexibility, so no spontaneous action is ever possible."

Is housing adequate and sufficiently secure?

Housing security is described by respondents as a significant problem for Foreign Service personnel serving in Baghdad who are not with USAID. Without being specific (though respondents were very specific) about the security problems, suffice it to say that most respondents feel that the trailers -- informally referred to as "hooches" -- are unsafe.

"Not only is housing inadequate," writes an FSO serving in Baghdad, "[but] basic privacy is not respected. The housing contractor, KBR, regularly goes into private housing for inspections without notice. Three such recent 'inspections' to my hooch did not result in needed repairs. When there is indirect mortar or rocket fire (a fairly common occurrence), the announcement tells us to seek cover under our beds (eight-inch clearance) or under our flimsy desks. I certainly do not feel safe when the entire hooch shakes violently from a nearby hit (five occurrences during four months so far)."

Many positions in Iraq have been and continue to be filled by non-career appointees, contractors and detailees from outside the Foreign Service. What has been the impact of this?

Out of some 2,000-plus people working on the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad, fewer than 200 are career Foreign Service. Of course, at many embassies, State and the other foreign affairs agencies are a minority compared to the other federal agencies represented, but there is no other embassy in the world that is host to so many non-Foreign Service employees, political appointees and contractors.

"Frankly, I think a lot of the political appointees were disasters," writes an officer who served in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. "They seemed to be ideologues rather than diplomats. A lot of the contractors and other detailees I met seemed quite capable."

Do you believe that Iraq service has helped or not helped your career? How?

Service in Iraq may give a boost for employees when they come up for review for promotion, but no conclusion could be drawn from the input we received on this question. For many people it is too early to tell what Iraq service will do for their career.

' That there should be a political controversy over whether there is a civil war in Iraq is a tribute to the Bush administration's Orwellian attention to political rhetoric. By the most widely accepted social science measure, Iraq is incontestably in a civil war.

J. David Singer and his collaborators at the University of Michigan (where I also teach) have studied dozens of such conflicts and have offered a thorough and widely adopted definition of civil war. It is:

"Sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter's ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5 percent of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain." (Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, May 2000.) '