U.S. strategic planning for the Middle East comes out of the White House, which considers Iran to be America's biggest Middle East challenge.

Why Iran? Because there are two issues that worry America most: the Iranian nuclear program and Iran's influence in the region.

The Iranian nuclear program worries Washington because of Israeli fears. Israel is alarmed that Iran is nearing the bomb-making stage, an eventuality that would constitute a new balance of power in the region. It would also constitute a new deterrent against the Israeli bomb.

Iran's influence is a concern because of America's entanglement in Iraq. At one point, Iran and America had a common enemy called Saddam Hussein. But after getting rid of him, their opposing interests materialized in Iraq. The U.S. is unable to bring stability and launch the political process without the help of neighboring countries (it first tried a strategy of frightening neighboring countries, to prevent them from meddling in Iraqi affairs). But facts on the ground have been pointing to a major conflict between the U.S. and surrounding countries, each of which looks at what America is trying to establish in Iraq as harmful to its interests. This applies to all of Iraq's neighbors: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey and Jordan.

Every one of these countries has their eyes set on Iraq. Some of them fear the "Democratic Prototype" that America is trying to erect, and others fear being hit by the chaos and sectarian violence that the Americans insist has not yet reached the level of a civil war.

What's more, the popularity of this war is at its lowest level since the invasion, due to its high cost in both lives and soldiers. Moreover, the reasons for which the Americans went to war turned out to be merely "inventions," used by the administration to justify and "market" the war to Congress and the public. Perhaps if Americans had known that there were no WMDs, the American public and Congress wouldn't have supported Bush or allowed him to use force. Bush has at great length tried to explain to U.S. citizens that bringing democracy in the Middle East is linked to homeland security. But Americans haven't been convinced, and the proof is the plummeting support for the president and the war.

Facing deadlock in Iraq, Bush is again seeking the help of regional powers, which could help him stabilize and prevent Iraq from slipping into a civil war that would have devastating effects on neighboring countries. This explains Washington's reaching out to Iran for talks concerning Iraq. No matter what justifications Washington has given for contacting Iran, such contacts could have a positive impact on other issues, such as the nuclear file; because Iran is not going to give anything away in Iraq. Iran will compromise with the U.S. if, and only if, it is beneficial to Iran.

But Iraq is just one of the thorny issues between Iran and the United States. In addition to the issue of her nuclear file, Iran is a regional power with a sphere of influence that covers Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.

Is the United States aware that there will be more challenges in the region because it is "falling down" in Iraq?

There are doubtless many pressures descending on Bush to create some measure of Iraqi stability before the midterm elections in November. If the situation in Iraq remains the same or deteriorates deeper into violence and chaos, it could end the Republican majority.

Therefore a truce with Iran seems more urgent than ever.

would be counterproductive, but US support for an Iranian civilian nuclear capability could produce positive results for both the United States and Iran.

Sanctions have proved ineffective time and again and are not likely to obtain a different outcome in the case of Iran. Faced with shortages and economic privations, the Iranian populace will blame the West and cluster more closely around the current regime.

Sanctions are also unlikely because they would cut off Iranian oil. China would never tolerate this because of its dependency on Iranian oil, and the US economy could not bear the increase in the cost of oil. Iraq also taught us that sanctions could also serve as a fertile breeding ground for corruption and allow the government further leverage in exercising its power. Also, the US cannot leverage Iranian access to America's vast economy because it has already been closed to Iran for 27 years.

Military strikes would be a godsend for the regime in Iran, especially the hardliners that the United States most fears. Targeted strikes on several key installations might indeed disrupt the nuclear program, but again these would generate immense consequences for the US and its allies. Military strikes would create ill-will from ordinary Iranians and extend indefinitely the lifetime of the regime. Such strikes also would not be enough to topple the regime and no government now has the manpower or will for such an occupation.

To the degree that military strikes would be successful and would manage to destabilize the regime, US foreign policy would be faced with a vortex of anarchy stretching from Islamabad to Damascus. The internal chaos in Iran in the early 1980s showed how deep and virulent Iran's ideological divisions can be. All of these divisions could be strengthened or influenced by elements outside of Iran were the regime to collapse. This, coupled with the potential for ethnic unrest from the almost 50% of Iran that is not Persian, could lead the country into a long civil war. Furthermore, even if a stable regime were to emerge, there is no guarantee that it would be a more responsible international citizen.

Iran has far more power to cause harm and pain to the US and its allies than they can inflict on it. Iran has the ability to destabilize Afghanistan and Iraq decisively before it even nudges the valve on its huge energy supplies. US officials have acknowledged a heavy degree of Iranian infiltration in Iraq and independent analysts tend to think it is even greater than that. The Iranian presence in Iraq is not nefarious, but it is a major fact on the ground that the US and its allies cannot ignore.

The United States does not want a nuclear Iran, but it cannot bear failed states in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, further destabilization would be a far more dangerous outcome. A nuclear weapon in Iran would be in the hands of a regime that is not losing its grip. Unlike the case of Pakistan, where the highest officials used proliferation to line their pockets, Iran has every interest in and ability to keep its technology under wraps and not let it slip into the hands of non-state actors.

Iran's underlying issues and need for unlimited access to its own fuel cycle are less psychological than the outcome of a rational cost-benefit analysis. It would be easy to ridicule Iran's vast reserve of conspiracy theories, if so many hadn't come true. Thanks to a combination of natural wealth and strategic location, Iran has been riven by international intrigue in a way that few other places have been.

The worst episode concerned the British- and US-backed toppling of the democratically elected nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953. After the shah's reinstatement, capitulations were granted to foreign personnel - a practice long abolished with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. Taken together, such policies have done wonders to promote a deep-seated and well-founded suspicion of policies that seek to limit Iran's strategic range. On the day the US Embassy was overrun in 1979, its ambassador was to be found in the office of the foreign minister of the provisional government; the purpose of that visit was to discuss a reinstatement of capitulations and special privileges for US personnel.

Despite the state of relations, the US generously allows Iranian diplomatic personnel in its country. Simultaneously, however, Iran understandably cannot risk having American diplomats on its soil. Added to this is the traumatic legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, with its hundreds of thousands dead and sense of victimization and isolation at the hands of the international community.

Iran's bottom line is complete control over the fuel-production cycle. The hope of much of the international community that Iran halt all nuclear activity is not producing any movement toward that outcome, nor is the Russian proposal to enrich uranium on its soil. The option is for the US to remain quiet and take as little action as possible.

Yet if US policymakers feel compelled to speak out, there is one counter-intuitive approach that could prove effective. This approach would involve far more than saying, "We understand your security concerns," it would entail actually understanding them and then taking measures in that direction, unilaterally, and without regard for Iran's reactions or the possibility of rapprochement with its government.

There are few ways for the US to get ahead without an outcome that mutually benefits Iran. A win-win strategy would be to be wholeheartedly to support Iran's access to the fuel cycle and the development its own civilian nuclear program under the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection regime. From a cynical point of view, this would call Iran's supposed bluff - that it only wants nuclear fuel for civilian purposes. After being given the same level of trust and responsibilities as any other state, denying access to the inspectors or playing games would ring hollow.

Such a move would show Iranians that the US is not their enemy. This idea is not without illusions. With a civilian nuclear program, Iran would be in a position to drop out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and weaponize in very short order. The US, however, has a unique ability to stop the process from ever reaching weaponization by taking away many of the concerns that drive that desire. Without the US threatening violence and regime change, Iran will lose the major threat to its existence.

For weaponization finally to occur, there are some hurdles that Iran must overcome. These two hurdles are the nature of support for the nuclear program and the religious establishment's views on the legality of such a program.

It is well known that the vast majority of Iranians favor their country having a domestic nuclear capability. What is far less certain is how many people really support nuclear weaponization. In all likelihood, the number is a small minority (though it could easily gain popular support if the US threatens military action, engages in covert activities, or plays ball with terrorist organizations such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq). The Iranian public is relatively intelligent, well informed, and very cognizant of the dangers of proliferation. The US could do a lot to support this attitude by openly encouraging Iran along the peaceful path and in doing so tacitly acknowledging that a world that is safe for Iran is also safe for the United States.

Policymakers and analysts frequently underestimate the degree of debate within Iran's conservative circles. Even if this debate is not proceeding under optimal conditions of transparency, accountability, and rule of law, it is still far-ranging. One factor in this debate is clerical rulings against nuclear weapons. One such ruling comes from none other than Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself. The strongest proponents of nuclear weaponization in Iran are not the highest-ranking members of the Shi'ite clergy. There is no reason to believe that the religious establishment would roll over and change tact just because its nominal allies say so.

The party line of Iran's regime is that it is only seeking energy for civilian nuclear purposes. Yet behind the scenes there is a detente that is delaying a potential political confrontation until a later date. Supporting a civilian nuclear program would highlight differences within segments of the ruling elite, some of whom would have to find new and clever ways to admit that Iran wants more than just nuclear energy. More open differences would then proffer more opportunities for political change within Iran.

By supporting Iran's domestic nuclear capability, the US could overcome fears held by even the most pro-Western Iranians that the United States is against their power and prestige. Such a change in policy would also separate the majority of the population, who still see the US as a land of good governance and opportunities, from the minority who view the US as an aggressor. Doing so would call the bluff of this minority who want nuclear weapons, by forcing them to adhere to their stated purpose of civilian capabilities.

This would be a radical shift in foreign policy, but it is the only available strategy that could prevail for the US. The other option is for US officials to sit back, take a deep breath, relax, and then do nothing. Either way, a beneficial outcome for US and Iranian interests is possible. The alternatives - belligerent statements, sanctions, and military strikes - all range their outcomes from unproductive to unthinkable.

Scott Bohlinger is a Washington, DC-based analyst specializing in the Middle East, most specifically Iran. He also currently works at Jane's Intelligence Group.

(Copyright 2006 Scott Bohlinger.)

Khamenei said that "if the Iranian officials can make the U.S. understand some issues about Iraq, there is no problem with the negotiations."

"But if the talks mean opening a venue for bullying and imposition by the deceitful party (the Americans), then it will be forbidden," he said in a speech in the northeastern city of Mashhad, aired on state television.

Both the United States and Iran have said the talks will focus solely on stabilizing Iraq and not deal with the heated issue of Iran's nuclear program. No time or place has yet been set for talks, though the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, who is to head the U.S. side, has proposed holding them in Baghdad.

Last week, a top Iranian official - Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council - announced that Tehran was willing to enter talks with the United States. Khamenei voiced his approval Tuesday after some hard-liners in Iran's clerical government came out against any contacts with the United States.

Iran has considerable influence with Shiite political parties who dominate Iraq's parliament, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq could be "useful."

Bush on Tuesday told reporters that he had instructed Khalilzad to make Iran understand that "attempts to spread sectarian violence or to maybe move parts that could be used for (improvised explosive devices) is unacceptable to the United States."

The Bush administration has accused Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard of smuggling bomb-making parts across the border into Iraq, though Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged last week he has no evidence Iran's government is sponsoring such activity. Bomb attacks have mainly been carried out by Sunni insurgents attacking the Shiite-led Iraqi government.

Also in Tuesday's speech, Khamenei dismissed the threat of U.N. Security Council action over Iran's nuclear program, saying Tehran would reject any measures it considers against its interests.

It certainly isn't blameless. First, its nuclear arming would deal a major blow to an already fraying international non-proliferation regime. Second, it would involve a huge deceit. Third, the United States broadly divides actual or potential nuclear powers into responsible and irresponsible ones. Iran would be irresponsible par excellence, being already the worst of "rogue states." Typically, a rogue state, as well as being domestically oppressive, ideologically repugnant and anti-American, unites an aggressive nature with disproportionate military strength, thereby posing a constant, exceptional threat to an established regional order. What could now more emphatically consign Iran to such company than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with his calls to "wipe Israel off the map?"

Yet, in nuclear terms, Israel is the original sinner in the Middle East. Non-proliferation must be universal; if, in a zone of potential conflict, one party goes nuclear, its adversaries can't be expected not to either. No matter how long ago it was, by violating that principle, Israel must bear a heavy responsibility for what has since happened. Second, its deceit was no less than Iran's, though, there being no nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the time, it was only America it deceived. Mindful of what Israel's mendacity portended, the Central Intelligence Agency warned in 1963 that, by greatly enhancing its sense of security, nuclear capacity would make Israel less, not more, conciliatory toward the Arabs; it would exploit its new "psychological advantages" to "intimidate" them.

Which - thirdly - points to the irresponsible use Israel has indeed made of its nuclear capability. Sure, it always justified it as its "Samson option," its last recourse against neighbors bent on destroying it. There is no such threat now; but if there was once, or will be again, the question is why.

A major part of the answer is that on most counts, except hostility to the U.S., Israel has always behaved like a rogue state. It came into being as a massive disrupter of the established Middle East order, through violence and ethnic cleansing. Such a settler-state could only achieve true legitimacy, true integration into a still-to-be-completed new order, by restoring the Palestinian rights it violated in its creation and growth.

That, at bottom, is what the everlasting "peace process" is about. The world has a broad definition of the settlement lying at the end of it. It doesn't involve that full emancipation of an indigenous people that had been the norm in European decolonization; only a compromise vastly more onerous for the defeated Palestinians than the victorious Israelis.

But the settlement never comes, because Israel resists even that degree of compromise. For it runs no ultimate risk in doing so. Its nuclear power, on top of its already overwhelming conventional superiority, ensures that. Such irresponsible use of it is what Shimon Peres, the father of Israel's nuclearization, was alluding to when he said that "acquiring a superior weapons system would mean the possibility of using it for compellent purposes - that is forcing the other side to accept Israeli political demands." Or what Moshe Sneh, a leading Israeli strategist, meant when he said: "I don't want the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to be held under the shadow of an Iranian nuclear bomb." As if the Arabs haven't had to negotiate under the shadow of an Israeli bomb these past four decades There are three ways the crisis can go. The first is that Israel insists on, and achieves, the unchallenged perpetuation of its "original sin." For it isn't so much "the world," as President George W. Bush keeps saying, that finds a nuclear Iran so intolerable, but the world on Israel's behalf; not the risk that Iran will attack Israel that makes the crisis so dangerous, but that Israel will attack Iran - or that the U.S. will take on the job itself. In effect, Israel's nukes, or the protection of them, have become a diplomatic instrument against its benefactor. It is legacy of America's own reluctant acquiescence in a nuclear Israel, which subsequently turned into uninhibited endorsement by ever more pro-Israeli administrations.

So here is a superpower, wrote American strategic analyst Mark Gaffney, so "blind and stupid" as to let "another state, Israel, control its foreign policy." And, in a brilliant study, he warned that a U.S. assault on Iran could end in a catastrophe comparable to the massacre of Roman legions at Cannae in 216 BC, by Hannibal's much inferior army. For in one field of military technology, anti-ship missiles, Russia is streets ahead of the U.S. And Iran's possession of the fearsome 3M-82 Moskit could turn the Persian Gulf into a death trap for the American fleet. And sure enough, from the Bush administration itself have been coming the first hints that, given the regional havoc Iran could indeed wreak, there may be nothing the U.S. can realistically do to stop it from going nuclear.

This points to a second way the crisis then could go, where Israel would be obliged to renounce its nuclear monopoly and the Middle East would enter into a Cold War-style balance of terror. It could be a stable one. Clearly, like Israel, Iran would make irresponsible, political use of its nukes. But, like Israel's too, Iran's nuclear quest is essentially defensive, even if not in quite the same "existential" sense. Nothing could have more convinced it of the need for an unconventional deterrent than the fate of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which the U.S. had no qualms about attacking because it didn't have one. But surely even the mullahs wouldn't be mad enough to make first-strike use of their deterrent against an Israel that could unleash such overwhelming second-strike capability against them The third way - Iran's abandonment of its nuclear ambitions - would stand its best chance of being accomplished if Israel were induced to do likewise; not just because reciprocity is the essence of disarmament, but because it would signify a fundamental change in the U.S. approach to the region.

And that might have beneficent effects way beyond the merely nuclear. Wrote veteran Israeli military analyst Zeev Schiff, "There is only one way to avoid a nuclear balance of terror: to use the time left, while we still have a monopoly in this field, to make peace. In the framework of peace, a nuclear-free zone can be established."

But that is the wrong way round. For making peace, as the CIA memo foresaw, Israel doesn't need the intransigence that absolute security brings, but the spirit of compromise a judicious dose of insecurity might bring. A utopian notion perhaps, with the world now so focused on the villainy of Iran - yet better than a U.S. onslaught which would add so thick a layer to an already mountainous deposit of anti-Western feeling, that Israel could barely even hope ever to win acceptance in the region.