North Korea "presents a long and bleak record of duplicity and bad-faith negotiations" the document said, warning: "We will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct."

The document made clear that Washington does not view the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the core of the public case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a blow against its strategy of preventive war.

"The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same," it said. "We do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."

US President George W. Bush had made former Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein's alleged possession of chemical and biological weapons and pursuit of nuclear arms the centerpiece of his case for war, but no such weapons have been found.

"There will always be some uncertainty" about banned weapons programs, the White House said. "We have no doubt that the world is better of if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril."

Three years after the Bush administration pressed the Security Council to act on Iraq's weapons programs or face independent US action against the Baghdad regime, the UN is witnessing a strikingly similar conversation. Moreover, some experts warn that dallying by the council could prompt the US to eventually act outside the UN.

"Déjà vu," said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of the current standoff. He was Russia's UN ambassador during the Iraq debate.

"If that is déjà vu, so be it," responded US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, who says the Iran case is about getting a country to comply with its international obligations.

While some key actors in the current saga have changed - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has replaced Saddam Hussein as international rogue; China and Russia, not France, are now the burr under America's saddle - much of the plot remains the same. The US complains about some council members backing down from commitments to concerted international action and warns of the council's irrelevance if it can't force Tehran to back down. Others, like China, vaunt council unity but say action at this stage should be elsewhere - in this case, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In another parallel with Iraq, the US accuses Iran of using the delays in international action to make crucial progress towards weapons development.

"This is a test for the Security Council: Can it take up an issue like [Iran] and try to be tough?" says one US official with close knowledge of the deliberations. "It's really the same message point of Iraq - whether the UN is able to enforce its own rules and regulations."

As of Wednesday morning, the Security Council appeared to be making progress on a draft statement that would outline Iran's violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - the next step in what has proved to be a long and still unfolding diplomatic journey. In the draft, proposed by France and Britain, the council would not lay down sanctions and instead inform Iran how it can return to compliance with international law. The draft would direct the IAEA to report back to the council on Iran's compliance. When the IAEA should report back remains one of the contentious points. Further meetings were scheduled for Thursday and Friday.

Yet even as debate continues, some experts said the apparent difficulties in lining up behind even this rather mild rebuke suggests the council is still laboring with issues reminiscent of the Iraq debate.

"The negotiations over Iran are causing a distinct sense of déjà vu, not least among those who said at the time of the Iraq debate that it was the final chance for the Security Council to prove its worth," says Nile Gardiner, a specialist in the UN's role in international affairs at the Heritage Foundation in Washington.

"Frustration, particularly in Washington, over the UN system has only built up," he adds, "so the Iran debate is going to be hugely important for how the US deals with the Security Council - or whether it prefers to bypass it altogether in the future."

So far, the US is officially expressing confidence in the council's ability to unite behind an action plan on Iran. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, traveling in Indonesia, said Tuesday she remains confident the council will "find an appropriate vehicle for expressing the international community's solidarity."

But Mr. Bolton was scheduled to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Thursday, a venue where US frustrations were likely to surface, some observers say. That is especially true in the wake of a 170-4 vote Wednesday to create a new Human Rights Council to replace the discredited UN Human Rights Commission. The US opposed the body, arguing that the criteria for council membership won't be tough enough.

For some experts, US rejection of the new Human Rights Council only adds to the sense among some countries that America is still acting as it did on Iraq.

"On the human rights [council] and increasingly on Iran the US is coming across as 'It's our way or the highway,' " says Lawrence Korb, a foreign policy analyst at the Center for American Progress in Washington.

"There's a sense the administration would love to do something more muscular on Iran, like they did in Iraq, but that what's stopping them is a lack of any good options," he adds. "That doesn't raise a lot of confidence that the US has really changed and is now set on working with the international community."

The draft statement, now being debated among the 15 members of the Security Council, calls on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and to maintain a "full and sustained suspension", giving IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei two weeks to report on Iran's response.

It also calls on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve "outstanding issues" and to take the steps needed to "begin building confidence".

The last statement is rather strange, since the IAEA has always insisted that "verification is confidence-building". And in light of three years of robust inspection it is rather disingenuous of the sponsors of this text to imply that there has been no confidence-building on Iran's part. These involved about 1,700 inspection-hours and 20 other visits to military and civilian facilities at short notice beyond the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Equally questionable is the selectiveness with which the draft statement refers to IAEA resolutions and reports without once mentioning their acknowledgements of Iran's "steady progress", "access" and greater and greater transparency.

This was reflected in ElBaradei's candid statement in December at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies that "over the past three years we have compiled a detailed picture of most aspects of Iran's past and current nuclear program ... we have asked that Iran provide additional transparency measures".

Hence, given that the IAEA has given a clean bill of health to very few countries and that requesting greater transparency is not exactly calling a member state in "breach of its obligations", one wonders how far the US and its European allies can run with this ball. Can the Security Council operate in a legal vacuum indefinitely?

To elaborate, the February 4 decision by the IAEA to complain about Iran to the UN did not cite two important articles, XII.C and III.B.4, in the IAEA statute that would trigger a "report [on] the non-compliance to all [IAEA] members, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations".

Instead, in a compromise reached in London to get Russia and China on board, it was decided that the IAEA director general should "report to the Security Council" only on the need for Iran to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its program by (i) re-establishing "full and sustained suspension" of all its enrichment and reprocessing activities; (ii) reconsidering the construction of the Arak heavy-water research reactor; (iii) ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol, and pending ratification to act in accordance with its provisions; and (iv) implementing transparency measures "requested by the director general which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol".

As Jean Dupreez at Monterey, California's Center on Non-Proliferation Studies has aptly noted, in the absence of any smoking-gun confirming an Iranian weapons program, the legal foundation for any punitive measures against Iran are lacking.

Mindful of these delicacies, the Non-Aligned Movement requested, at the conclusion of the most recent IAEA meeting this month, that Iran's case remain within the IAEA, a sentiment shared by both Russia and China.

To return to the legal nihilism of the Security Council, the draft statement cleverly seeks to sidestep the legal framework by pushing for a measure - full suspension of the fuel cycle - which the IAEA itself has demanded not as a right but as a "legally non-binding confidence-building measure". In other words, Iran has been asked to either "volunteer" to suspend its enrichment activities or be found in violation of the will of the Security Council.
Also, the draft text expresses the "conviction that continued Iranian enrichment-related activity would intensify international concern". There is, first of all, international concern about not just Iranian but any nuclear fuel cycle, which is why the IAEA has called for a universal moratorium on new enrichment facilities and the establishment of an international fuel bank.

But until that idea pans out, countries such as Iran, which has a track record with the IAEA since 1973, can meet this "expressed concern" only within the legal framework of the IAEA, that is, by implementing the terms of its bilateral safeguard agreements with the agency to put those concerns and anxieties to rest.

Yet, echoing the IAEA's latest resolution on Iran, the draft text currently circulating within the Security Council asks Iran to "implement transparency measures ... which would extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol".

At the same time, the drafters of this "presidential statement" have called on Iran to "promptly ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol". Yet, as per the above, the drafters are seeking measures beyond the Additional Protocol, thereby undermining its value.

This attitude, if it persists, given that the majority of IAEA member states have not adopted the Additional Protocol, will only undermine the IAEA's singular emphasis on the Additional Protocol and its hoped-for universal adoption.

All this belies the rosy prediction of former IAEA deputy chief Pierre Goldschmidt that "the Iran case provides an opportunity to improve the overall non-proliferation regime".

Goldschmidt overlooks the nightmarish scenario that the non-proliferation regime could suffer a lethal blow as a result of the Iran crisis, given UN head Kofi Annan's admission at the 2005 NPT review conference that the NPT regime faced a double crisis of "verification and confidence".

Clearly, the US double standard of differentiating "good proliferators", such as Israel and India, from "bad proliferators", such as Iran, must count as serious causes of this crisis.

Indeed, the entire non-proliferation regime may suffer as a result of this rule-avoiding approach crystallized in the draft text on Iran. If it is adopted and eventually proven as the first link in a chain of a "graduated response" by the Security Council, culminating in sanctions which prompt Iran to exit the NPT and the IAEA framework, it may have a domino effect. That is, it could lead other states, including several in the Middle East, to follow suit or, at a minimum, question the wisdom of their transparency with the IAEA.

Ironically, the so-called "outstanding questions" mentioned in the draft text have, in fact, been deemed as not outstanding and "normalized" by the admissions of ElBaradei. These include the foreign source of equipment contamination (via Pakistan) and the results of environmental samplings at some military sites.

Anomalies in the case against Iran
The US and Europe would be well advised to consider the anomalies in their article of faith, their self-constructed paradigm sheepishly followed by their "free and pluralistic press" regarding Iran's purported march toward nuclear weapons. Briefly:
# In 1995, Iran voted in favor of the indefinite extension of the NPT.
# Iran has been an enthusiastic supporter of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and, in light of the required nuclear testing for any would-be proliferators, this raises the question of why would Iran take such steps if it is not in its nuclear interests.
# Iran just reversed a two-year "voluntary and legally non-binding" suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities.
# In Brussels in January, Iran put forward a six-point proposal that includes another two-year moratorium on uranium enrichment - a novel proposal dismissed out of hand as old news by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. The other points included Iran re-embracing the Additional Protocol by formally legislating for its adoption, and pursuit of an international fuel bank.
# Another proposal, still on the table and submitted last March to the IAEA and the EU-3 - Germany, France and Britain - was for a contained, monitored enrichment.
# Iran's leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has issued a religious decree, fatwa , against the acquisition, development and use of nuclear weapons, a position he and other leaders of the Islamic Republic have regularly reiterated.

These points count as "anomalies" in the sense that they do not support the behavior of a would-be proliferator. Indeed, if that were the case, why would the Iranian leaders insist so much, and so frequently, on the un-Islamic and amoral nature of nuclear weapons?

On the other hand, it is impossible to isolate the Iranian nuclear issue from other developments, above all the United States' desire to defang the Islamic Republic via the nuclear standoff by isolating it and, at a minimum, weakening it considerably. This would remove a major barrier to its planned visions for the "greater Middle East". These extra-nuclear considerations are often neglected in the West.

Good news on the horizon?
What is remarkable about the Iranian nuclear crisis is how close it could be to being resolved. Iran is willing to forgo large-scale enrichment and limit itself to a small cascade of centrifuges for research and development, in conjunction with assurances of a fuel supply, mainly from the Russians.

The Russians dropped the ball on the way to Washington, yet there are strong indications that this proposal could resurface soon - if only the US would stop ignoring this option, which is viable for two main reasons.

First, the military risk posed by such a small cascade is minimal as the fissile-uranium output of 168 centrifuges would be nowhere near enough to facilitate a weapons program.

Second, the reason the IAEA favors this option is that agency safeguards would be in place and it would notice any change in Iran's agreed program.

With the potential risks of militarization thus minimized, this option is distinctly preferable to others, including the military one, which without doubt would spur a clandestine weapons program on Iran's part. And this is not to mention the collateral damage on the world economy and other grim consequences.

The cause of regional and world peace, therefore, dictates urgent attention to this viable option benefiting the cause of the overall non-proliferation regime.

You see, Americans have grown weary of "preemptive doctrine" [.pdf] after the Iraq fiasco, no matter what the officially adopted "National Security Strategy" proclaims. We will not support a U.S. attack on Iran based on a nuclear threat that is at best several years into the future. The Israeli argument that Iran should be attacked before some ill-defined "point of no return" has no traction. No matter how "grave" the nuclear threat is, no matter how "unacceptable" a nuclear Iran is, we need a trigger. And unfortunately, Israel has bailed out on us. It wisely does not want to be accused of "dragging the nations into a war" with an Osirak-type bombing that would "force us" to step in, so it has said that it will not "act alone against Iran." No, the ball is in our court, it is up to us to get it rolling. And we will.

Why Haven't We Attacked Iran Yet?

The "reasons" to attack Iran are infinitely better than they were for Iraq. Iran is processing yellowcake uranium, which is a precondition for nuclear bombs. Iran is determined without a doubt to build such weapons, as stated repeatedly and categorically by administration officials. Iran is believed by all of Congress and most Americans to be the prime sponsor of terrorism. Iran has missiles that can reach Israel, and its statements against Israel have been prominently amplified in the news. Iran can kill a lot of Americans in Iraq if it so chooses. Iran is "threatening" the U.S. with "harm and pain" (never mind that the statement Iran made was completely distorted in the press). Iran has weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological) and their means of delivery (missiles with suitable warheads), according to administration officials. Iran is stirring up trouble in Iraq. Iran oppresses its people. Iran harbors al-Qaeda. What on earth are we waiting for?

All this is good but not good enough, because the bar has been raised much higher by the Iraq fiasco, and because the upcoming confrontation has much higher stakes: it will result in many more casualties and will involve the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. for the first time in 60 years. We need a mighty good reason, one that will allow the president to stand up and say "we cannot wait any longer" and Americans to stand behind him and cheer. Because the stakes are so high, we need a Pearl Harbor; a Gulf of Tonkin won't do, a "defiant Saddam" much less. Or we need an imminent threat, one so huge that it can be argued to be equivalent to an actual attack, and that has a crucial time element. The Bird Flu Threat

Iran's Shahab missiles can reach Israel but not Western Europe or the U.S. But Iran's birds can. They can carry a weapon that will potentially cause 150 million deaths, as the media have been pointing out so conveniently [1], [2], [3].

Iran's wetlands in Gilan and Khuzestan and several other locations are reservoirs for thousands of migratory birds. Ducks, geese, and swans from Iranian wetlands will start migrating to cooler northern countries in early April. Some will head northwest through Eastern Europe to Germany and Scandinavia, others will head northeast through East Asia toward Alaska. The deadly strain of H5N1 bird flu virus will travel with them, and their feces will infect chickens and other domestic fowl in their path. And from there, on to kill tens of millions of Americans and Europeans. Or so the story goes.

It has been pointed out by Michel Choussudovsky and others that there is something very strange about the sudden fearmongering by government officials and the Western press on the dangers of bird flu. Avian flu has been around for centuries, and even the particularly virulent form H5N1 has been known since 1959, and human infection has been recorded since 1997. Why the recent emphasis? Why are the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense so deeply involved in preparations for an impending bird-flu pandemic?

The H5N1 virus is not transmissible from human to human, so a pandemic is impossible unless the virus undergoes a random mutation. However, any random mutation of any virus could potentially be very dangerous to humans. What if the HIV virus suddenly mutated into a form where it was transmitted by casual contact or even worse, through the air? What if the ebola virus suddenly mutated into a form that remains dormant for six months before killing the victim? Why aren't we panicking about those possibilities, which are as likely (or rather, as unlikely) as H5N1 mutating into a human transmissible virus? Simply because the H5N1 disaster scenario lends itself to a casus belli against Iran. Iran has the "weapons" and the "means of delivery." Time is of the essence. All that is missing is the bioterrorism connection, which the Bush administration is about to kindly provide.

Iran and Bioterrorism

Iran is accused by the U.S. State Department, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and John Bolton of "operating a clandestine biological weapons program." Judith Miller was warning as far back as 1998 that Iran was working on germ warfare, at the same time Rumsfeld was warning about Iran's "means of delivery." There is not a shred of real evidence for this claim, which does not prevent the administration from continuously repeating it.

In May 2003, the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq claimed that "Iran has begun production of weaponized anthrax and is actively working with at least five other pathogens, including smallpox, in a drive to build an arsenal of biological weapons," and that "the anthrax weapons are the first fruits of a program begun secretly in 2001 to triple the size of Iran's biowarfare program." This was duly reported in the press, despite the fact that no evidence in support of these claims was presented. "Experts" said the description "seemed plausible" since the group had "provided solid leads in the past." Indeed, this is the same group that exposed the existence of the Natanz nuclear enrichment complex, claiming that it was part of a " very sophisticated, advanced, serious, and expensive nuclear weapons program," which, coincidentally, has also been the U.S. position, again without a shred of real evidence. Iran has an advanced biotechnology research and development effort and certainly knows how to genetically modify organisms. What prevents the U.S. from arguing that because biotechnology could potentially lead to bioweapons, Iran should not be allowed to pursue biotechnology for non-weapons purposes? It would be no different from the U.S. stance toward Iran's nuclear aspirations.

Watch for more explicit language on Iran's "biological weapons" programs to be added to the H.R. 282 bill in the next few days. It will be the equivalent of the congressional authorization for the Iraq war. Bolton has accused Cuba of pursuing biotechnology for the sake of biological weapons, but not Iran. Experts and a Canadian military agency have warned about the possibility of using bird flu as a bioterrorist weapon. The U.S., however, has been silent on this, and there is a good reason why: the surprise factor.

Classified Information

The U.S. has gathered intelligence revealing that Iranian scientists have been working intensely in hidden underground facilities to develop a strain of the H5N1 virus that is transmissible from human to human. The information is being kept classified, following Executive Order 13292 of 2003, which made all information on "weapons of mass destruction" and "defense against transnational terrorism" classifiable. The real reason to keep such information classified is, of course, to avoid public scrutiny. I should clarify that I am not privy to classified information. However, there is no doubt that at the very least administration officials believe that what I just described is possible, and a single individual such as "Curveball" making such a "plausible" claim could lead the administration to act, if it fits their aims. So let's continue with the scenario:

Dual-use facilities disguised as Iranian chicken farms are being used to test how fast the virus can be transmitted from a wild duck to a chicken and on to the humans handling the chicken, and from them to their family and friends. In the last few weeks, a breakthrough was achieved, and the perfect strain was finally found. Iranian ecologists are currently at work in the Iranian wetlands to deploy the mutated virus among wild ducks, swans, and geese, in preparation for the launching of the birds along their migratory paths toward the Western world in early April. Does that sound like a good enough casus belli to you? It does to me.

If true, this could potentially lead to tens of millions of deaths in the Western world over the next six months. Can you prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that it is not true? Time is of the essence. The birds start migrating in early April. There is no time to "trust but verify." A B61-11 nuclear earth-penetrator aimed at Iran's underground facility where the mutated virus is being manufactured would destroy the facility and prevent a bioholocaust, at the inevitable cost of a few lives. "The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."

"Geographic combatant commanders may request presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for a variety of conditions. Examples include… Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy." Plus: "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. Bush's April 2006 Speech

I am not a speechwriter. Still, I feel compelled to help the president out, to make my small contribution to the New World Order. Here is what President Bush will announce to the nation and the world in early April 2006:

• Iran has flouted the international community and continues in its determined path to manufacture nucular weapons.
• Iran has announced that it will destroy Israel, and once it has a nucular weapon it will do so.
• Iran is the prime sponsor of terrorism, and once it has nucular weapons it will give them to terrorists to detonate in New York, London, and Tel Aviv. It will also put nucular weapons on missiles aimed at Europe and the U.S.
• I have said that I will not remain idle while dangers gather. Nevertheless, I am mindful of those that say that there is still time to pursue diplomatic action, however unlikely it is to succeed. But I am here to announce that we no longer have that luxury.
• Thousands of Iranian birds will begin their journey along their migratory pathways in the next few days. Their routes will bring them to Europe and the United States. This is a fact, and nobody can accuse the United States of making it up. [smirk]
• Intelligence gathered by the U.S. and British governments shows that Iranian scientists have developed a mutated strain of the H5N1 virus that can be transmitted from human to human. World health agencies and experts have warned that such a virus will lead to a bird-flu pandemic that can potentially kill 150 million human beings. Iranian birds have already infected and killed innocent birds of our allies in Europe.
• Even a single bird carrying the mutated strain can transmit it to countless other birds and humans, causing a nightmare of unimaginable proportions.
• I demand that the Iranian government immediately destroy all strains of the mutated virus and provide to the international community incontrovertible proof that it has done so.
• While we are at it, I demand that the Iranian government immediately destroy all its dual-use nuclear facilities, as well as all the knowledge it has about nucular weapons, including all physics books written after September 27, 1905.
• I demand that the Iranian government immediately open up all its military, industrial, scientific, health care, and agricultural facilities for full and unconstrained international inspections.
• I demand that the Iranian government immediately and verifiably destroy the wetlands at Gilan, Khuzestan, and Hamoon that breed the deadly birds that will attack us.
• The Iranian government has 24 hours to comply with these just demands. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.
  
  

The rest, such as "[we] did nothing to deserve or invite this threat," "before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed," and other appropriate statements you can cut and paste from the March 17, 2003 speech. Bombing will start right after the 24-hour deadline expires. You are welcome, William McGurn. Why It May Not Work

There is of course the small point that there will be no proof Iran is making the deadly virus. But that doesn't matter: Iran will have 24 hours to prove that it is not making the virus. The proof that Bush's claim was false will be buried in radioactive fallout, impossible to retrieve. In the administration's logic, because it will not be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that their claim was untrue, it must have been true. They trust, based on earlier experience, that the American people will treat them as criminal justice demands: innocent, even if suspect, until proven guilty. And that is good enough for them, given the important goal that will be achieved.

But it may not work, because it is being exposed in this article and elsewhere. The fact that I and others can predict these events proves that they will not be based on real facts gathered from intelligence, since I am not privy to classified information on any Iranian bioweapons work. These future events can be predicted today based on publicly available information only because they are not based on facts but rather on a sinister plan: to manufacture conditions that will make the U.S. nuclear attack on Iranian underground facilities palatable to the American public. It may not work because those who are privy to this plan or parts of it still have time to make choices that may prevent it from happening: to blow the whistle, disobey orders, or resign from their posts. To talk to their colleagues and persuade them not to carry it through.

Or perhaps the American people will come out en masse, when the ultimatum to Iran is given, and demand that the administration back down. Others have done this and succeeded [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. Perhaps the military, seeing the overwhelming public opposition, will collectively refuse to go along with the plan.

If the Bush administration carries through with the attack, at least we will know that it is heinously criminal. The terrorists who retaliate against America will know it, and Americans will know why they are being attacked. At the very least, we will be able to put a new administration in place that will bring the perpetrators to justice, swiftly, and with penalties that match the crime.

The discussions, which were describes as intelligence-oriented and not policy-oriented, examined the likelihood of an Israeli pre-emptive attack against Iran and the method in which such an attack could be carried out. One of the main questions presented in these discussions was whether Israel would inform the US in advance in case such an attack is to take place and when would such an advance notice be given.

The sources pointed out that it is clear that Israel would have to coordinate with the US forces air control any attempt to fly over Iraq on the way to Iran, if Israel chooses to attack using the shortest route.

Last week, former Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon said in Washington that the West does have a military option against Iran and that a joint US-NATO-Israeli air strike against dozens of nuclear facilities in Iran could set back Teheran's nuclear programs for several years.

The sources stresses that Ya'alon's remarks were not the trigger for the Pentagon consultations about a possible Israeli attack but added that there is a sense in the administration that the Iranian issue is gaining urgency.

The Washington Post reported Monday that the Bush administration has made Iran a top priority issue and that the president and his team had several meetings on the issue to discuss Iran's nuclear plans.

The Pentagon discussions, according to the sources, did not lead to any conclusion regarding the plausibility of an Israeli attack against Iran, nor did it recommend any action by the US.

Israeli and US sources have said in the past weeks that the US did not convey any message to Israel in which it asked to refrain from an attack and has not raised the issue in bilateral discussions with the Israelis. Both countries share intelligence on the situation in Iran and the advance of the nuclear program, but do not discuss - according to sources who took part in bilateral talks - the possibility of using military force to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The American assumption, according to the administration sources, is that an Israeli decision on attacking Iran is not imminent and that in any case it would not be taken before the Israeli elections, scheduled for March 28.

One of the questions Pentagon analysts are grappling with is how an Israeli attack - if launched - would affect the US and its forces in the region and whether it would force the US to follow with further strikes in order to complete the mission. The US is also discussing what could be the possible avenues of retaliation Iran would take against US's forces and interests in the region.

US Vice President Dick Cheney said last week that all options are "on the table" regarding Iran and on Sunday leading senators pointed out in TV interviews that the US can stop Iran's nuclear program. Senator George Allen (R-VA) said, relating to the question of using military force against Iran, that it is not the preferable route, but "if necessary, it is an option", and Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) stressed that he believed that Iran's nuclear program can be stopped "short of war".

The UN Security Council is expected to take on the Iranian issue this week. During the weekend consultations continued between the US and European representatives and those from Russia and China in attempt to reach an agreement on the language of a Security Council presidential declaration regarding Iran.

The Americans would like to include a clause that would give Iran a 14 day ultimatum to accept the international community's conditions, before moving ahead with sanctions. Western diplomats said Monday that it is not clear if Russia and China would agree to such an ultimatum and speculated that they might insist on a month's period instead of the proposed 14 days.