"The interior minister has formed an investigation committee to learn more about the Sunni person and those 22 men, particularly whether they work for the interior ministry or claim to belong to the ministry," he told the Associated Press news agency.

Hundreds of Sunni Arab Iraqis have been found dead since the 2003 war in what appear to have been extra-judicial killings.

On Wednesday, the bodies of four unidentified men were found in Baghdad's Shia district of Shula. They had been handcuffed, blindfolded and shot in the head.

Iraqi insurgents have also often used a similar tactic against Iraqis working with international forces or the Iraqi government.

Detained

Gen Peterson, who is in charge of training the Iraqi police, told the Chicago Tribune on Wednesday that US forces had stumbled across the first evidence of death squads within the interior ministry.

The 22 interior ministry traffic policemen, dressed in police commando uniforms, were arrested in late January at an Iraqi army checkpoint in northern Baghdad and asked what they were doing.

They told soldiers they were taking a Sunni man away to be shot dead.

"The amazing thing is... they tell you exactly what they're going to do," Gen Peterson said.

Militias

Gen Peterson said US forces were holding four of the men at the Abu Ghraib prison and that the 18 other men were being detained at an Iraqi jail.

The Sunni man, who was accused of murder, is also being detained.

Subsequent investigations found the four men in US custody are linked to the Badr Organisation, the armed militia of one of Iraq's main Shia parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

But Gen Peterson said he was convinced Iraqi Interior Minster Bayan Jabr, a member of Sciri, had no knowledge of or involvement in the death squads.

"Who are these guys? That's what the minister is trying to find out," he said.

"They are discrediting him and his organisation. He wants to find these guys. He does not support them."

But Gen Peterson said he believed other death squads were operating within the Iraqi security forces.

"It's an issue of loyalties, of allegiance," he said. "If you're still wearing your Badr T-shirt under your uniform, that's a problem."

'Official help'

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Narmin Uthman said she believed lower-level officials were helping the death squads.

"These officials are helping the criminals by informing them on where targeted people are going or where people are living," she told AP.

A spokesman for the country's main Sunni Arab party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, backed the launch of the investigation.

"For a very long time we have been talking about such violations and we have been telling the interior ministry officials that there are squads that raid houses and arrest people who are found later executed in different parts of the capital," Nasser al-Ani said.

Since April 2003, the people of Basra have consistently been bemused by reports that they and their city enjoy a state of calm and stability under the command of the British forces, in contrast to the north of Iraq and the so-called Sunni triangle. As someone born and bred in Basra, I hope that the recent images of British troops beating young Basra boys to within an inch of their lives will allow such claims to be laid to rest and show a fraction of the reality that has made life throughout Iraq a living hell.

When the Abu Ghraib scandal broke a couple of years ago, I recall a commentator on the BBC World Service smugly saying that the Americans were heavy-handed and undisciplined when it came to dealing with civilians, while the British were far more restrained, touring Basra in their berets as peacekeepers rather than occupiers. My estimation of the BBC World Service dipped when the other side of the picture was not presented.

The truth is that ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime, abuses and atrocities committed against Iraqi civilians have been a regular, at times daily, occurrence throughout the country, including in Basra. These have been committed by American, British and Iraqi official forces. Hearing the British prime minister describe this latest incident as an isolated case fills me and fellow Iraqis with anger.

It adds insult to very serious injury when we are told that this humiliation, torture and violence is the work of a few "bad apples". From previous experience, the most we can look forward to is a whitewash inquiry and possibly a young, low-ranking soldier being made a scapegoat.

As a strong believer in the need for Iraqis to use the political process to bring about change, it is not difficult to see how innocent youngsters are radicalised and why they turn to widely available arms. Those who were beaten mercilessly while being mocked by the film-maker for their pain and humiliation will never listen to me or my colleagues when we try to win them over to peaceful ways of venting their anger and frustration. Their families, loved ones, friends and even those who see the horrific images on TV will be ever more convinced that such degradation can only be met with fire and force.

The allegation that insurgents have flooded into Iraq from neighbouring Syria and Iran may hold some truth, but the flooding I fear is the daily recruitment of insurgents by the brutal, inhumane and tyrannical treatment that young Iraqis experience every day at the hands of occupation forces, as well as the Iraqi government forces they support.

Although I and numerous members of my family suffered personally, physically and otherwise at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime, and dreamed for many years of the day he would be gone, I always opposed the invasion and occupation of our country. Subsequent events have made me even more convinced of the fallacy and immorality of the military campaign that Britain and the US have pursued in Iraq. The biggest indictment of the war and occupation is surely that more and more Iraqis are speaking publicly of how life was far better when Saddam was in power - an achievement most Iraqis never imagined possible.

Tony Blair's suggestion that British forces are in Iraq to educate Iraqis in democracy has only added salt to our bleeding wounds. This rhetoric harks back to imperial times when Britain was a colonial power and treated my forefathers, as well as many other peoples in the world, as backward savages. It hurts me that despite Mr Blair's first-class education, he seems to have learned so little. Until recently, Britain was admired and respected by Iraqis. The few who had the chance to visit or study in the UK were looked upon with envy. The past three years have seen to it that that respect has been obliterated.

Iraqis have suffered immensely over recent years, first from the west's support for a despotic dictatorship, then from 13 years of sanctions that ravaged the country, and finally from a war and occupation that reduced a once-affluent country and its highly-educated people to rubble and dust.

It saddens me that Britain has had a significant hand in every episode that has heaped misery on Iraqis. At a time when a brief apology and admission of fault by the prime minister would have gone a long way towards reconciliation between our peoples, he has chosen to widen the gap still further. I suggest that next time Britain hears of a fallen British soldier in Iraq, Mr Blair should be asked about his role in that tragedy.

I share with the majority of Iraqis the belief that the only way forward is the immediate departure of American and British troops from our country. The suggestion that this would make matters worse is at best laughable and at worst a scurrilous lie. Matters cannot get any worse, and they only became this bad because of the decision by American and British leaders to wage war against a people who were already suffering.

I have no doubt that I will see my country truly free and liberated from tyranny and occupation. I pray that this happens without the further spilling of blood - Iraqi, American or British.

· Dr Jasem al-Aqrab is head of organisation for the Iraqi Islamic party in Basra - jasemaqrab@imapmail.org

On the morning of February 14, 1991, when I turned the TV on to see the latest lies being told to the public about the U.S. bombing of Iraq, I saw a chaotic situation in Baghdad. The Amiryah bomb shelter had just been struck by two 2,000-pound superbombs. Information was sketchy, but it was evident that many people lost their lives.

The first statement from the U.S. administration was that the U.S. hit an Iraqi command and control post and the dead were military. Then, the cameras showed charred bodies of women and children, to the U.S. story had to be revised. The administration then said that the building was a military target in which Saddam Hussein placed civilians to protect the military personnel.

Remember that the current vice-president of the U.S., Dick Cheney, was the U.S. Secretary of War in 1991. He said, "We blame the Iraqi leadership for putting civilians in harm’s way." That statement was not only a lie, but one of the most absurd allegations one could make because it denigrated the hundreds of humans who lost their lives. Current occurrences show that Cheney can’t tell the difference between a small bird and a person, so nothing is new about his lack of brainpower or eyesight.

For a couple of hours, the world was told that the Iraqis led civilians to their deaths by putting them into a military target. Then, the truth began to emerge.

The Amiryah bomb shelter was built as a civilian bomb shelter during the Iran-Iraq War. Even the engineer who designed it came on television and told the world that there was no way it could be a military asset.

After the lies were put to rest, it became evident that the U.S. had mistaken the target as a military venue, or it had deliberately bombed it knowing it was a bomb shelter. To this day, not one U.S. government spokesperson has ever mentioned the truth. In fact, after February 14, 1991, the subject has been left unspoken: even the lies.

Those inside the bomb shelter died horrific deaths. First, a 2,000-pound bomb crashed through the shelter creating a massive tunnel in which the second 2,000-pound bomb then came. Both blew up leaving a huge hole and killing more than 400 people. Only seven humans survived the attack. Those who died actually saw the first bomb and had a few seconds of life left before the second burrowed its way into the shelter. Such an attack transcends the barbarity of a bombing in which the people die immediately.

The lines of burnt dead bodies lining the street presented a horrific scene reminiscent of Hiroshima after it was nuked by the U.S.

This is the 15th anniversary of the bombing of the shelter, yet few words have been written as a reminder of the horrific act. Before March 2003, at least Iraq commemorated the event and remembered the dead. The stooges in power today don’t want to remind the world of the lack of caring for human life the U.S. displayed in 1991 in the bombing of Iraq. Most weren’t even in the country then. No matter how much they stick their heads in the sand, nothing will never ease the pain of one of the most barbaric terrorist attacks in history. The silence from the U.S. and the Iraqi quislings is deafening.

Copyright Malcom Lagauche - Visit his website http://www.malcomlagauche.com/

WASHINGTON, Feb 15 (IPS) - Despite reports of growing tensions and even occasional clashes between Islamists and nationalists, the predominantly Sunni insurgency in Iraq appears increasingly united and confident of victory, according to a new report released here Wednesday by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG).

The 30-page report, based primarily on an analysis of the public communications of insurgent groups, as well as interviews and past studies about the insurgency, also concludes that rebel groups have adapted quickly and effectively to changing U.S. tactics -- in both the military and political spheres.

"Over time, the insurgency appears to have become more coordinated, confident, sensitive to its constituents' demands and adept at learning from the enemy's successes and its own failures," according to the report, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency".

"The U.S. must take these factors into account if it is to understand the insurgency's resilience and learn how to counter it," it added, stressing that the most effective responses include reining in and disbanding sectarian militias responsible for human rights abuses and repeatedly making clear that Washington has no designs on Iraq's oil resources or on its territory for military bases.

The report, which comes amid intense -- but so far unavailing -- efforts by the U.S. Embassy to negotiate the creation of a new government in Baghdad that will place prominent Sunnis in key cabinet posts, is based mainly on what insurgents have themselves said on their Internet websites and chat rooms, videos, tapes and leaflets since the invasion and how those messages have evolved.

While much of the rhetoric is propagandistic, according to the ICG, it also provides a "window into the insurgency" capable of informing the analyst about its internal debates, levels of coordination, its perceptions of both the enemy and its constituency, and changes in tactics and strategy.

Such a textual analysis, according to the ICG, yields conclusions that are substantially at odds with many of Washington's current, as well as past, assumptions about the insurgency. Indeed, "(I)n Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows," the report asserts.

The notion, for example, that the insurgency is divided between Iraqi nationalists and foreign jihadis, most prominently al Qaeda's Organisation in Mesopotamia (QOM) allegedly led by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, appears increasingly questionable, according to the report, which notes that there has been a "gradual convergence" in the groups' tactics and rhetoric.

"A year ago, groups appeared divided over practices and ideology, but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances," according to the report.

"Practically speaking, it has become virtually impossible to categorise a particular group's discourse as jihadi as opposed to nationalist or patriotic, with the exception of the Baath party, whose presence on the ground has been singularly ineffective."

During the first half of 2005, when reports of armed clashes between the two kinds of groups first surfaced, that was less true, but, since then and despite intense U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between them, the groups have largely harmonised their rhetoric.

In that connection, "recent reports of negotiations between 'nationalist' groups and the U.S. over forming an alliance against foreign jihadis appear at the very least exaggeratedà", according to the report. It noted that any such "duplicity" would almost certainly have been exposed and denounced by others.

Moreover, "no armed group so far has even hinted" that it may be willing to negotiate with the U.S. and Iraqi authorities. "While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its 'collaborators'."

That does not mean that differences between the two kinds of groups do not exist and that there could be a day of reckoning -- but only after Washington's withdrawal. "To this day, the armed opposition's avowed objectives have ...been reduced to a primary goal: ridding Iraq of the foreign occupier. Beyond that, all is vague."

Meanwhile, the groups have become increasingly mindful of their image and the necessity of cultivating public opinion among Sunnis, other Iraqis, and the West, according to the report.

Thus, they promptly and systematically respond to charges that they are corrupt or target innocent civilians and even reject accusations, despite the evidence from suicide attacks, against Shiite mosques, that they are waging a sectarian campaign.

Similarly, they have abandoned some tactics that proved especially revolting to their various audiences, such as the beheading of hostages and attacking voters going to the polls. And "(w)hile (they) deny any intent of depriving the population of water and electricity, restraint does not apply to oil installations, which are seen as part and parcel of American designs to exploit Iraq."

According to the report, four main groups now dominate the communications channels of the insurgency and publish regularly through a variety of media: QOM; Partisans of the Sunna Army (Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna); the Islamic Army in Iraq (Al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-'Iraq); and the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance (al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-'Iraqiya, or Jami).

QOM, whose operational importance has, according to the ICG, been exaggerated by U.S. officials, sought during the past year to "Iraqify" its image, in part by reportedly replacing Zarqawi, a Jordanian, with an Iraqi leader. Jami, according to some ICG sources, may be a "public relations organ" shared by different armed groups and tends to be somewhat more sophisticated and nationalistic in its rhetoric and communications strategy than the others.

Another five groups that take credit for military actions generally use far less elaborate and stable channels of communication, while four more groups appear to lack regular means of communication to produce occasional claims of responsibility for armed actions through statements or videos.

All groups appear to have become more confident over the past year, according to the report, which noted that their optimism is not only noticeable in their official communiqués but in more spontaneous expressions by militants and sympathisers on internet chat sites and elsewhere.

Initially, according to the report, they perceived the U.S. presence as extremely difficult to remove, "(b)ut that no longer is the case".

"Today, the prospect of an outright victory and a swift withdrawal of foreign forces has crystallised, bolstered by the U.S.' perceived loss of legitimacy and apparent vacillation, its periodic announcement of troops redeployments, the precipitous decline in domestic support for the war and heightened calls by prominent politicians for a rapid withdrawal," the report states.

Moreover, "(w)hen the U.S. leaves, the insurgents do not doubt that Iraq's security forces and institutions would quickly collapse".

Copyright © 2006 IPS-Inter Press Service. All rights reserved.

The government figures, compiled between January 2003 and September 2005, emerged in an answer by Don Touhig, minister for veterans' affairs, in response to a question by Mark Harper MP.

Out of the 1,333 diagnosed as suffering from mental health problems, 182 have been found to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder while 601 are judged to have adjustment disorder or, in laymen's terms, " combat stress".

A further 237 are classified as suffering from depression and 167 suffer other forms of mental illness or substance misuse.

The Independent has found many soldiers suffering from mental disorders after returning from Iraq are not being given the care they feel they need.

Anthony Bradshaw is one of those who came home still haunted by his experience of Iraq. The 22-year-old former private in the Pioneer Regiment, Royal Logistics Corps, suffers from recurrent panic attacks and nightmares.

But despite his records containing a note stating he may be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, he was seen only once by a psychiatrist before being discharged. He said: "We have been abandoned by the powers that be."

Charles Plumridge of the Gulf War Veterans and Families' Association said: " This situation is appalling. The MoD should not be allowed to get away with it. I would not be at all surprised if the figures increase greatly."

After leaving the Army, Mr Bradshaw enrolled at an agriculture college in his home city, Hull. But yesterday, he had to leave his class and go home after suffering another panic attack. "I had never, ever had any such problems in the past, I had a healthy and stable life," he said.

"But I have forgotten what it is like to have a normal life now. There are physical symptoms, but what has happened to me mentally is much worse. I feel frightened if I go out on my own, I wake up in the night feeling frightened. I would not wish this experience on anyone."

As a member of the Royal Army Medical Corps, L/Cpl David McGough treated civilians, women and children, as well as the British and US military at the height of the conflict.

He is now on medication prescribed by his GP for anxiety and stress. But the Army has refused to accept that he suffers from mental problems.

"I was a serviceman for four-and-a-half years and intended to be in for the full 20," said L/Cpl McGough, 24, who lives in Preston. "I am originally from Northern Ireland and I have dealt with serious medical cases both in the Army and helping civilian powers in emergencies. But there is no acknowledgement from the MoD that Iraq was the place where a lot of people had very serious and awful experiences.

"My problems started two weeks after I returned to the UK and I am not seen to be suffering officially from mental problems."

Stress caused by the Iraq conflict has also been used in legal defence. The former SAS trooper Andrew Wragg, who killed his 10-year-old terminally ill son, was cleared of murder last month and convicted instead of manslaughter.

One of the military's most senior psychiatrists, Group Captain Frank McManus, has acknowledged reservists in particular are suffering from lack of psychiatric care from the MoD.

He said: "They have a particularly rough deal. Once they are demobilised and return to civilian life they are not entitled to health care. They are more vulnerable because in their normal working day and life they have no contact with the military, they are surrounded by people who cannot begin to understand what they went through in Iraq."

He added: "The MoD at the highest level is aware of the problem with reservists and solutions are being sought."

The MoD said last night that the problems faced by reservists were not being neglected but no solution had been found. However, it said that the National Health Service was being made aware of the possible problems those returning to civilian life may face.

The ministry also insisted that those who had been diagnosed with mental health problems on duty were receiving the best possible attention.

Mr Harper said: "It is crucial that servicemen and women receive all necessary support. Our troops are performing a vital role in helping to rebuild the country. But this does place them in danger - and the Ministry of Defence is failing in its duty of care if it does not make the necessary arrangements."

Private Anthony Bradshaw: 'I think a lot more could have been done for us'

Anthony Bradshaw saw combat in the Iraq conflict. He now has difficulties at times even leaving the house by himself.

"It is difficult to describe how bad panic attacks can be unless one experiences them himself. I was a soldier, but now I sometimes feel frightened just going shopping," he said.

Mr Bradshaw, 22, who was a private in the Pioneer Regiment, was stationed in a town south of Basra where he and his comrades were tasked to build camps.

"But the camps had already been built and instead we came under pretty regular attacks," he said. "As a soldier this is something you learn to expect and I did not know at the time what effect this was having on me."

Mr Bradshaw, from Hull, was medically evacuated after being bitten by a poisonous insect which led to his arm swelling. "I was taken first to a field hospital and then to Cyprus. When I returned to England I began to have psychological problems.

"An army doctor who saw me wrote on my records that I may be suffering from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) but the only time I ever saw a psychiatrist he seemed to be just concerned with whether I wanted to leave the Army. I did not receive any counselling then and I have not received any since.

"After leaving the Army I joined a college to do a fishery management course. But frankly it is very hard. I get panic attacks, feelings of wanting to vomit, and have to leave to come home.

"I have got mates who have not suffered any mental problems. But there are others who have and I think a lot more could have been done for them."

Kim Sengupta

Private Peter Mahoney: 'I have plans for the future'

Pte Peter Mahoney served in Iraq from March to July 2003. From the Gulf he wrote to his wife, Donna: "We have plans when we get old and dotty together, so put out of your mind any thoughts of me dying."

In August 2004, he dressed in his uniform, got in his car in the garage, attached a hosepipe to the exhaust and started the engine. Beside him were pictures of his family and a MoD leaflet on psychological trauma, ripped to pieces.

Pte Mahoney's death at the age of 45 will never be recorded on army mental health figures as post-traumatic stress disorder due to service in Iraq. He refused his wife's pleas to seek help.

But she is adamant there is no other way to explain his death, and says other reservists and TA members need recognition.

"When they fight alongside regular soldiers they are treated like regular soldiers but when they are back at home in civvy street, they are less of a priority".

"I know of 15 or 16 other suicides. It is not highlighted."

Terri Judd

L/Cpl David McGough: 'The children haunt me'

It was seeing the terrible injuries suffered by children which was the most shattering experience for David McGough in Iraq. Their pain and tears, the distress of the families, are memories which still haunt him after returning home. L/Cpl McGough, 24, of the Royal Army Medical Corps, served in Iraq for three months after the invasion during some of the fiercest fighting. He treated Iraqi civilians as well as US and British military.

"Some of the children suffered from burns, others had shrapnel and bullet wounds. It was very distressing," he said. "When I was there I just carried on with what I was doing. We were working 14, 16 hours a day. It was two weeks after we got back that I began to feel really bad. I started having blackouts and vomiting. The RSM (Regimental Sergeant Major) was actually quite sympathetic, and tried to help me the best he could. But the Army does not accept that I am suffering from mental problems. I am on Prozac, but that is from my GP."

According to Pentagon figures through January 21, IEDs have accounted for at least 894 of the 1,735 US military deaths (51%) by hostile fire and over 9,200 of the more than 16,500 wounded (56%).

It is being described as the defining weapon of the war in Iraq, lethal though low in technological sophistication. The IED is a simple weapon, easy and cheap to build, and easier to hide. This makes it an attractive weapon for insurgents.

An IED is often just some old artillery shells detonated by remote control or by an electric charge through an attached wire. In Iraq, IEDs have been remotely detonated using readily available doorbells, cellular phones, pagers, car alarms, garage-door openers, toy-car remotes and so on. They are hidden alongside roads in potholes, rubbish heaps, discarded cartons, drink cans and animal carcasses.

As with other aspects of the war in Iraq, it is the Iraqis who are bearing the brunt. Iraqi soldiers are far more vulnerable to IEDs than the Americans as the vehicles they drive are not armored.

While suicide bombings grab media attention for their spectacular impact, it is roadside bombings that are far more numerous in Iraq, and their frequency has grown dramatically over the past two years. There were about 10,600 roadside bombings in 2005, nearly twice the number that occurred in 2004. This means that on an average, 30 roadside bombings are carried out per day across Iraq.

Not surprisingly, deterring IED attacks is an important component of the US military effort in Iraq. The Joint IED Defeat Task Force that was set up in October 2003 was recently expanded and put under the charge of a four-star general, signaling the priority that the Pentagon is according the fight against the roadside bombs. The task force's budget has grown from US$600 million in 2004 to $1.2 billion in 2005 and is expected to triple this year to about $3.5 billion.

Media reports citing US government sources say that while the number of IED attacks has grown over the past two years, US countermeasures seem to be working in reducing the number of fatalities.

Statistics give a different story, however. The number of fatalities from IEDs rose steadily all of last year, according to the Iraq index compiled by the Washington-based Brookings Institution. While the number of IED fatalities per month was in single digits in 2003, it surged in 2004 and grew significantly throughout 2005, averaging more than 30 deaths a month last year.

US government efforts to detect and neutralize IEDs have no doubt increased, but so has the ingenuity of the insurgents. Insurgents have refined their techniques with regard to construction, concealment and detonation of devices. The lethality and sophistication of IEDs have also improved.

In 2003, IEDs were little more than artillery shells that, when exploded, caused an extensive blast and scattered shrapnel indiscriminately. But these were less effective in piercing armored targets. Then the insurgents started packing the IEDs with more explosives, even nails, ball bearings, glass and gravel - eventually using anti-tank missiles instead of artillery shells.

Since early 2005, insurgents have been using a "shaped charge", an IED adapted to concentrate the force of the blast, giving it a better chance of piercing armored vehicles. Describing the capacity of the shaped-charge IED, John Pike, director of US defense policy group GlobalSecurity.org, told the BBC News website that it could "go through the heaviest armor like a hot knife through butter". Insurgents have also advanced with regard to the detonators they use. With the US forces using electronic jammers to block radio-wave detonators, they have moved on to using infra-red lasers.

For US troops in Iraq, the most unsafe place seems to be inside their vehicles. Instead of using vehicles that could set off a pressure-detonated IED, the US forces are opting for foot patrols. The insurgents have responded to that by laying IEDs near likely foot paths.

The battle of the roadside bombs in Iraq is not just about detonating or defusing IEDs. It is about innovation and counter-innovation, ingenuity and guile. And the insurgents seem always a step ahead.

Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.

Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pull out of the alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if they did not get what they wanted. The tactic worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would be chaos.

Sadr had decided to back Jaafari after his followers met with the prime minister and presented him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for Sadr's movement. "We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this program," Aaraji said, than Mahdi was.

The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a postponement of any decision about creating autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons; and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in the north.

Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political showdown.

Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish pressure, Jaafari could face a Kurdish rebellion.

There have already been signs of tension with the Kurds and with Allawi's secular coalition. On Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats, would not bow to demands that Allawi's group be barred from the new government. Talabani did not say it, but he was referring to demands made by Sadr, who has never forgotten Allawi's role in putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.

"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and Allawi," Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr followers and has a personal position against Moktada. We cannot sit with him."

By far the most troubling aspect of Sadr's political power is the persistence of his militia. It is difficult to know how much control Sadr has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and informal, and there appear to be rogue elements working outside of anyone's control; street criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army disguise.

But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries out widespread abuses, including killings. They rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control, including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the Western official said. "It's almost a state within a state, and it's a serious problem."

The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry, supplying them with names of people they want arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concern for his safety.

The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with the British Army over arrests of their members and even merging with the official police.

"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi, a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything, and no one asks why."

Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power. At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University, groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see identification when they spot behavior they deem improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters beat up a professor of the media department for his ties to the Baath Party, students said.

"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel something inside of themselves," Khalaf said last month, after guards warned him against speaking with a foreign reporter. "The university is unbearable because of them."


BAGHDAD Late Saturday night, on the eve of a crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was on the line with a threat.

"He said that there's going to be a civil war among the Shia" if Sadr's preferred candidate was not confirmed, the politician said.

Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar calls to top Shiite leaders, Sadr got his wish. The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was anointed as Iraq's next leader. "Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance.

It was a crowning moment for Sadr, whose sudden rise to political power poses a stark new set of challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly uprisings against American troops in 2004 now controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis closest to the United States — the mostly secular Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.

Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of continuing assassinations and other abuses that American officials have pledged to stop. Sadr himself was accused by the American of arranging a killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was quietly dropped.

"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did not want to be seen as interfering in Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected without Sadr's support."

In one sense, his participation represents the realization of a central American goal: to bring populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite — off the battlefield and into democratic politics.

Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based government that includes all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.

American officials have worked especially hard to include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are much closer to Sadr on some key matters of policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.

Like the Sunnis, Sadr has said he opposes the creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to the American presence, and even sent some of his followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents in Falluja in 2004.

"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki, a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to him on some points."

That sense of shared purpose may be more important than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of running death squads in Sunni areas.

It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But others said Jaafari was no worse than Mahdi, whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.

Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Sadr's position is no worse from an American point of view — and may even be better — than that of his Shiite rivals who have been running the government for the last year. Although Sadr recently traveled to Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a homegrown nationalist.

"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the main reason why people like them."

Sadr's new political power burst into view last weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition, which won the largest share of votes in the December election, was trying to decide whom it would name as the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this time most party leaders agreed that Mahdi, who was not tarnished by the mistakes of Jaafari's government, would be the winner.

But Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in Parliament that he favored Jaafari. He told them to put out the word that they would pul