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First, here's what the origin of jihadism isn't: It's not the «Arab-Israeli conflict», nor is jihadism a response to the West's support of the barbarous way that Israel's apartheid government (and the vast majority of Israel's Jews) treat, and historically have treated, Palestinians. Even without that Israeli-Jewish barbarism and its support by Western countries, jihadism would exist, not much different than it today is.
In order to understand where jihadism really comes from, what's necessary first is to understand the relationship that the Sauds, who are the royal family of Saudi Arabia, have with their clergy, who are the Wahhabist Islamic preachers, a relationship between the aristocracy and clergy in that area, which began in 1744, and which was subsequently combined with the oil-for-weapons trade and an alliance with the United States, that began in 1945, and that then was ignited by the petrodollar after Richard Nixon's de-dollarization of gold in 1973. That's what laid the ground for it.
And then, US President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a born Polish nobleman whose family hailed from the most anti-Russian part of Poland, and who was also a protégée of the oil-and-banking baron David Rockefeller, advised Carter in 1978 to import pro-Saudi fighters or «mujahedeen» (later called «Taliban») into the then-Soviet-allied Afghanistan, in order to create there a wave of terrorism that would drain Soviet resources necessary to preserve the Soviets' Afghan ally, and thus help to bring down the Soviet Union.
It is, in short, an anti-Soviet operation that the West subsequently continued as an anti-Russian operation (especially in Chechnya but also in other predominantly Muslim parts of Russia), but that got out of control, and now bites the hands that fed and that continue to feed it.
- 4-2 giving the Kurds equal use of their language alongside Arabic within their "cultural autonomy";
- 4-3 suggesting that it can be used in schools, though not stipulating whether or not this is limited to the "cultural autonomy" zone or nationwide;
- 4-4 creating the pretext for "locally held referendum" to be conducted in potentially expanding this zone and allowing other copy-cat formats;
- 10-5 says that "performing military or militarized activity outside the domain of state power is prohibited", but the conditional clause is "outside the domain of state power", so if the PYD reaches an agreement with Damascus, then it could potentially be allowed to "police" the "Kurdish cultural autonomy" as "self-defense forces";
- 15-3 forcing Syrians to accept "decentralization";
- 15-4 mandating the establishment of the "Kurdish Cultural Autonomy";
- 24-3 curiously speaking about "federal law";
- 45-2 allowing undefined "territorial units" to propose legislation, thus hinting that the "Kuridsh Cultural Autonomy" would have this right;
- 46-2 speaking for the first and only time about a mysterious "Territories Assembly" which appears nowhere else in the text and might be a shell body for facilitating de-facto "federalization" after the Russian-written "draft constitution" is promulgated.
Confirmation that this is indeed the purpose of the 'draft constitution' and that it has no other purpose has been provided by the most authoritative source possible, which is Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov himself. Here is how TASS describes him explaining the purpose of the 'draft constitution' in a telephone conversation Friday 3rd February 2017 with the French Foreign MinisterThe Russian top diplomat provided comments on the Russia-proposed Syrian draft constitution, saying "it is an invitation for a conversation," an attempt to find common ground in approaches of the Syrian government and the opposition with an aim of creating conditions for the Syrians to decide about the future of their country in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (bold italics added)In other words the 'draft constitution' is not a blueprint for Syria's future, or a discussion document, or even a position paper. It is - just as I said - a standard mediator's ploy to get all the Syrian parties "talking about something other than the future of President Assad, whilst highlighting areas for future discussion".
My clear impression is that the Russians are baffled and somewhat embarrassed by the attention the 'draft constitution' has attracted. Now that it has served its purpose of breaking the deadlock I doubt we will hear much more of it when the Astana talks resume, which they are due to do on Monday.
Comment: See also: