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When the first World War came to its end, intimations of an end to the European Era were already evident in symptoms: aching diplomatic joints, straitened perceptual political vision and the general financial health of the patient about to turn acute, as the constipated monetary policies of the Central Banks ushered in the Great Depression. But 'life' went on: European men and women wildly danced the Cancan throughout the 1920s; It was Cabaret, party time.
No one wanted to acknowledge the omens of what lay afore them.
Last month, an Israeli academic opined that
the future shape of the Middle East lies in the hands of three 'insider' states: Iran, Turkey and Israel. It was an interesting observation. None are Arab; and it implied an incremental US disengagement, and a modest 'king-maker' role for Russia.
What makes this statement intriguing is
the focus on just three states and the downplay of external intervention as the key 'shaper' of the future strategic 'map'. Implicit here is that all three are flexing their military muscles. But diplomats and political analysts usually prefer to stay at the plane of politics and national interests. They dislike the fact that the outcome of military contestation, per se, can determine political outcomes,
and thus validate or negate national interests. It is offensive to diplomacy. But often, it is just so.
The region at this time is not really susceptible to a direct conceptual approach: So, the focus on the outcome of military contestation, trials of strength, and then on the other - quite different dynamic - of Covid-19 and its economic effects, makes more sense than traditional purely political calculus of interests.
Comment: See also: