"Governance? What kind of governance problem? There is one-person rule in Israel. The prime minister decides everything. He is a lot stronger than the president of the United States."

The senior minister spoke from experience: He has served in several governments and has taken part in the most secret forums, but always with the knowledge that the real decisions are made at the echelon above. As for the routine contentions of politicians and political science experts that it is difficult to rule in Israel because of the frequent crises and changes of government, he finds them ridiculous. On the contrary, he says, if anything, the government here is too strong.

This week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrated this. He canceled the drought tax, rejected a plan to split the attorney general's job and froze the biometric-database bill. In all three cases, Netanyahu decided alone, and with one fell swoop did away with the efforts of other ministers and lawmakers.

The power of the Israeli prime minister does not stem from his formal authority. The law grants him few special privileges, one of which is the ability to fire ministers. Under the law, the executive branch is the cabinet, and it makes its decisions by voting. Netanyahu's vote is equal to that of each of the other 29 ministers. That's the law.

In real life, however, it is the prime minister who decides whether to go to war; authorizes cross-border raids, sorties and secret-service activity; oversees the country's nuclear affairs; sets the budget; and manages Israel's foreign relations, above all the ties with the White House. There is no decision involving budget modifications, or mediating between opposing ministers and ministries, on which the prime minister does not have the final word.

Formally, the prime minister derives his power from two documents: the government regulations and the security "constitution." Article 1 in the government regulations stipulates that the prime minister "shall decide the agenda of the government's meetings." Accordingly, Netanyahu can decide the size of the budget to be brought for government approval. By the same token, he has veto power over ministers' initiatives, such as the one to split the attorney general post.

The second document, which has never been officially published, divides the power and responsibility over security affairs between the prime minister and the defense minister. This document, which was drawn up after prime minister Levi Eshkol transferred the security portfolio to Moshe Dayan in 1967, stipulates that cross-border operations require the prime minister's authorization. Thus the premier controls military activity, even though the law does not grant him any standing in the civilian supervision of the Israel Defense Forces.

In the United States, the president is the executive branch, with a large number of powers. But presidents have little experience. Barack Obama has been in politics for 12 years, only one of them in an executive post, president. George W. Bush's political career spanned 14 years, and Bill Clinton's lasted 24 years. But in Israel? Here the politicians are eternal, even when they move between parties and camps, coalitions and oppositions and national unity governments.

Netanyahu has been in politics for 21 years, and before that he was ambassador to the United Nations. Ehud Barak joined the government 14 years ago, but before that he held senior operative positions in the IDF and took part in numerous meetings with the political echelon. Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert spent decades in the political system before rising to the top. Politicians like Silvan Shalom, Eli Yishai and Benjamin Ben-Eliezer have gone through so many governments and positions that they have become entrenched in the public consciousness as lifetime ministers. And let us not forget the eternal Shimon Peres.

It follows that when leaders are weak and inexperienced, they need the support of a strong system. That is how America is structured: a constitution, a large administration, separation of powers. Instead of the ramshackle system and organization of Israel, where there is no constitution and no rules, and where the government is dependent on a crisis-prone coalition, the leaders in the United States need experience to survive and succeed. That is why we like them in their second term, when they have matured, and not when they are young, tempestuous and promising but lacking in political experience. The Israeli system, if one can call it that, suits the culture of winging it, and the public likes it. That is why voters are not enthused by reforms that seek to make Israel "more like America." Give us Peres and Bibi, Barak and Fuad, and don't bother us with talk about constitutions.

But even in the Israeli system, the prime minister is not omnipotent. His power is limited by affairs of state and religion, and by peace processes. He cannot decide to change the religious status quo and begin to promote civil marriage or public transportation on Shabbat. (Toward the end of his term, Barak declared a "secular revolution." Big deal.) Nor can the prime minister decide "Who is a Jew," not even in the rare periods when the religious parties are not part of the coalition.

The peace process poses a greater challenge to governance. The prime minister decides by himself and in secret whether to opt for an agreement or for a unilateral move, such as the evacuation of territories, and then has to forge a majority in the Knesset, which is almost always farther to the right than the government. Even Sharon, with all his popularity, needed almost a year to get the Gaza disengagement plan approved.

That's the way it is in Israel. The government has no problem mustering a huge majority in the Knesset (and in the polls) for going to war, at least until the war bogs down, but finds it difficult to obtain support for a peace treaty. The right toppled Yitzhak Shamir and Netanyahu (in his first term) as punishment for embarking on the peace process. That's why it's easy for Netanyahu to deal with the drought tax, but far more difficult for him to get a peace process off the ground.