The following excerpts from the interim report by the Winograd Committee describe the events of July 12, 2006, the first day of what would become a 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They were translated by McClatchy Newspapers special correspondent Cliff Churgin. Words in parentheses were added for clarity.

There was no specific formal warning before the kidnapping. There had been a warning earlier in the month, but the preparedness level had dropped. At 8:45 AM, a patrol went out without a proper briefing and exercises. At 9:00 the patrol was attacked. At 9:27 the alert went out that soldiers had been captured. At 9:33 Israeli soldiers began firing, according to (standing) orders, at Hezbollah positions. At 9:45 helicopters reported two burning vehicles and at 10:03 it was reported that two soldiers were missing.

(Israeli Prime Minister Ehud) Olmert was informed of the attack while meeting the parents of Gilad Shalit (the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Palestinian militants in Gaza on June 25, 2006). At 10:20 he consulted with the chief of staff.

(Israeli Defense Minister Amir) Peretz was meeting with army commanders at the time. The army staff went down (to the command room) to deal with the situation and Peretz went to his office. Later, the army asked for and received permission from the defense minister to attack targets (in Lebanon) to prevent the soldiers' captors from leaving the area.

Peretz later spoke to the chief of staff and said: "(I asked him for his opinion of the situation and he spoke) also about his feeling that this was part of a series of incidents, it was not an isolated incident, but this was an incident added to what had happened in Gaza. Also the kidnapping that had taken place in Judea and Samaria (sic)... and certainly this incident felt like it was more severe... We're not speaking only of a kidnapping. We're talking about during the kidnapping there was also firing on sovereign Israeli territory. In other words, there was a serious escalation that could in no way be ignored."

In the first army evaluation, the northern commander said that Lebanon was responsible and proposed using this opportunity to change the situation. Several other officers felt action should be taken against Lebanon: "Lebanon attacked us and we have demands against Lebanon." The chief operations officer proposed waiting and thinking before acting.

The head of Military Intelligence said: "Don't be surprised that, if we are able to extract a price, the response will be deeper into Israel than we are used to." The chief of staff ordered the Air Force commander to draw up plans to attack Hezbollah's ground-to-ground rockets.

Between 11 and 12, the prime minister and defense minister spoke on the phone twice. The second call was about a press release. At 12:50, after a meeting with the Japanese prime minister, Olmert held a press conference where he said, in part: "The events this morning are not a terror attack, but the act of a sovereign nation that attacked Israel..."

The prime minister went to his office in Tel Aviv where, according to his chief of staff, Olmert had decided Israel must "respond with force. It was clear that if we respond with force the danger from rockets would grow, but the danger of not responding was much greater."

At 12:45, Peretz met with (then-Chief of Staff Dan) Halutz. Peretz was worried about rocket fire, but Halutz was concerned with teaching the Lebanese and Hezbollah a lesson: "We must bang on the table with all our might and most painfully. The response will be Katyushas, the response will be Fajrs... The main thing is not to bring the Syrians in." Halutz also wanted to take action to "change the rules of the game."

The defense minister hesitated, afraid that this would bring about rocket fire on Haifa and Hadera. The chief of staff doubted this. The defense minister asked if it wasn't more logical to take out the rockets rather than attacking Lebanese infrastructure. At the end of the meeting, Peretz and Halutz had agreed that "this incident could not be treated as an ordinary incident, the policy of restraint had to be changed."

At a meeting with senior officers, some officers expressed reservations about bombing Lebanese infrastructure, but Halutz accepted these targets. He did, however, forbid any ground troops from entering Lebanon.

At a meeting with the defense minister, the chief operations officer told Peretz that Lebanese infrastructure should be attacked "...Israel needs a Lebanese address. The understanding is that if we attack Hezbollah then Hezbollah will respond. If we attack Lebanese infrastructure, that will create a dilemma." Halutz, however, added that Hezbollah targets would also be attacked. The head of the Mossad deferred, saying that "we need to do something other than our regular responses... It seems to me that what has been suggested has been done before in Lebanon more than once. We know where it will lead to.... With these steps we are headed for a long distance battle with a high potential to hit the Israeli home front."

General (ret.) Amos Gilad opposed attacking Lebanese infrastructure. The defense minister again proposed attacking Hezbollah's rockets while Halutz and the Air Force commander opposed this. Amos Gilad again opposed attacking Lebanese infrastructure, noting that Hezbollah had a massive amount of rockets with a range of 20 kilometers that could reach deep into the Galilee.

Later that evening, at 18:00, there was a meeting between the prime minister and defense minister to talk about whether or not to bomb Lebanese infrastructure. The chief of staff, and chief operations officer were in favor of hitting the infrastructure, while the prime minister, defense minister, head of the political-policy branch of the Defense Ministry were opposed and wanted an attack on Hezbollah's rockets. Those present felt there was urgency to take action that night. The chief of staff also brought up the issue of preparing to draft reservists, but that was put aside.

The head of Military Intelligence discussed the events of the morning and discussed further scenarios - from both sides reaching a point where they've had enough, where one side gives in and continuing escalation. The head of operations briefed them on actions taken by the Air Force since the kidnapping and defined future goals as "strengthening deterrence" and redefining the relationship between Israel and Lebanon where Lebanon takes responsibility for the northern border.

The head of the Mossad again differed saying: "I still don't understand the goal of the operation. If we want to extract a price, fine, but if we what to attain different goals... that will demand a very long period of action in Lebanon..."

During this meeting, Halutz gave his assessment of the probability of a ground attack, "I also think there is a chance we will need to launch a ground operation but I believe it is improbable."

In his summary, the prime minister wrote that if Israel responded, it would be faced with a situation it had never faced before of rocket attacks possibly deep within Israel. And that any action Israel would take would be accompanied by a heavy price. The question is where would the price be heavier. He also noted: "I don't see how Hezbollah would be severely hurt and how we would change the balance of power if we attack Lebanese power stations." Which might "even draw the (Lebanese) population closer to Hezbollah."

Cabinet Meeting

The cabinet met at 20:00 that evening and was first briefed by the head of Military Intelligence, the Head of the Mossad, and the chief of staff. Halutz said: "A process has started that must be stopped at some point. If we allow this to continue that we are deterred by Katyshas aimed at the home front, we are likely to have more kidnappings and more kidnappings..." The Head of the Mossad said that Hezbollah's response (to Israel) would depend on how deeply it was hurt. "If they feel Lebanese or Hezbollah interests have been badly hurt...Hezbollah will respond to the Israeli home front."

The foreign minister asked Halutz: "What is victory?" And he answered: "There is no victory here, there is no 'knock-out,' what we need to do is respond so forcefully that the international community will have to get involved... to pressure those who need to be pressured... I don't know of a military action that will bring home the kidnapped soldiers."

The defense minister said: "It is clear that international pressure will start sooner than we think. Therefore we must see these next two days as the two days when we will act most dramatically and forcefully... I think Hezbollah must pay a heavy price, it must be such that Hezbollah understands that this kind of event cannot be repeated...but Lebanon cannot be freed of responsibility."

Minster Yitzhak Herzog warned of actions that would "unite the Lebanese people against us and strengthen Hezbollah." He also asked that the home front be prepared. At his testimony, Herzog said that he felt the decisions had already been made before the cabinet meeting: "The decisive process occurred, without a doubt, before the cabinet meeting."

Minister Shimon Peres said: "Military pressure on Lebanon will not achieve results, because of the weakness of the Lebanese government." Peres also expressed doubts as to the effect of strikes against Hezbollah as they were already prepared for that. He also said that the proposed actions were shortsighted, routine and expected. He agreed that Israel must react but should do so in an unexpected manner. "You must think two steps ahead, let's say we do this, they'll respond then what will we do?" Peres later testified, "There were always consultation beforehand between the prime minister, the defense minister and army personnel, and what was brought before the cabinet was 'pre-cooked.' "

Minster Ofir Pines-Paz agreed that there must be a response, but warned of escalation. Afterwards he testified to the committee: "I thought there would be an air campaign, apparently a very impressive and significant one." It was clear to everyone that there was no clear exit point... the cabinet decided to accept the operation "as is." Pines-Paz's main concern was that it remain an air campaign and not become a ground campaign.

(Foreign) Minster Tzipi Livni later testified: "It was clear that there was no clear point of military victory." "The goal was to call on the international community to enforce the decision it had already made - Resolution 1559."

That evening Israel attacked Fajr rocket sites in Lebanon, Hezbollah rocket warehouses and the Beirut International Airport.

Israel also declared an air and sea closure of Lebanon. Moderate Hezbollah fire continued on Israel's northern border area mostly on border bunkers and a military base."